
The Druze-Maronite sectarian clash in the War of the Mountain (1983-1984): The resilience of mid-nineteenth century Maronite-Druze enmities in the Druze collective memory and its impact on the dynamics and consequences of Harb Al Jabal

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The Druze-Maronite sectarian clash in the War of the Mountain (1983-1984):

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Contents

Glossary:

Mount Lebanon[1]: a rural area in the center of Lebanon and the cradle of the modern Lebanese state.

Al Chouf[2]: The southern area of Mount Lebanon. Historically, this area was known as: *Jabal Al Duruz*. The Druzes were the first to settle in this area in the eleventh century. Starting from the twelfth century, the Maronites started to settle in Al Chouf and work as peasants in the lands of the Druze landlords. By the seventeenth century, the Chouf turned into a mixed region.

***Bilad al Sham*[3]**: The area that is currently known as: The Levant, which includes the territories of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordon.

Kisrawan[4]: An area in the northern part of Mount Lebanon, where the Maronites first settled in the tenth century.

The Druzes[5]: A community whose faith is an off shoot of Ismaili Shi'ism. They settled in Mount Lebanon in the Chouf in the eleventh century where they sought refuge. The Druze faith first appeared in Egypt under the Shi'ite Fatimid rule in the eleventh century. With the advent of the Sunni Abbasids to power, the Druze faith or *Din al Tawhid* was perceived by the Abbasids as a sort of heresy. Thus, the followers of this faith left Egypt and settled in mountainous areas, one of which was Mount Lebanon.

***Uqqal*[6]:** The religious figures in the Druze community.

Sheikh Al Aql[7]: The highest religious rank in the Druze community.

The Maronites[8]: Those are Christians who follow the Maronite church, which is the only church in the East that is in union with the Roman Catholic Church in the Vatican. They sought refuge in Mount Lebanon in the tenth century as they were persecuted by the Byzantines.

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[1] See Kanafani-Zahar (2012: 46).
[2] SeeHamze (1984:7).
[3] See Philipp (2004: 401-418).
[4] See Salibi (1957: 292).
[5] See Druze: Religious Sect (2018).
[6] See ʿuqqāl (1998).
[7] See Swayd (2009:19).
[8] See Maronite (n.d.).

Jizya*[9]*: A tax that the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire had to pay for their protection since they were not allowed to join the military. Non-Muslims also paid this tax in return for practicing their religious rights freely.

Iqta'/Itizam*[10]*: Under this system, the landlords had tax-farming rights and in some cases, they had control over their *Iqta'*/ land. In return, they had to pay a certain amount of money to the Wali or Sultan, maintain stability and order in the province they were living in and provide armed men to the higher authorities (Wali or Sultan) whenever needed. Mount Lebanon was subject to the system of *Iqtaa'* up until 1861.

Muqati'ji*[11]*: Landlord

Emir Bachir Shihab II[12]: A Maronite Emir who ruled Mount Lebanon from 1789 till 1840. He is one of the members of the Sunni Shihab dynasty. In the eighteenth century, he converted to Christianity. It is debatable whether his conversion was before or after he became the ruler of the Mountain. The majority of the Druzes, till now, believe that the Emir's sectarian policies ended the Druze-Maronite peaceful co-existence in the Mountain. Additionally, his policies were responsible for ending the autonomy of the Emirate of Mount Lebanon; replacing it by the Ottoman system of double Qaimmaqamiyya.

Sheikh Bachir Joumblat[13]: One of the influential Druze leaders in the nineteenth century. Following the 1838 Druzes' revolt against Emir Bachir and Ibrahim Pasha (Mohamed Ali's son), he was exiled to Hawran and executed there.

Qaysite-Yemenite division[14]: This was a division between the north and south Arab tribes in Syria that existed since its conquest by the Arabs in 634. This division manifested itself in Mount Lebanon in the Druze community up until the nineteenth century. In the battle of Ayn Darah, in 1711, the Qaysites defeated the Yemenites who had to leave the Chouf and settle in Hawran Mountain. The Qaysites were then divided between two Druze sub-factions: The Joumblats and Yazbaks (represented by Arslan family); a division which continues to exist till today.

Qaimmaqamiyya (district governorship)[15]: Following the 1840 sectarian clashes between the Druzes and the Maronites in Mount Lebanon, the Ottomans introduced the

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[9] See Jizyah (2018).
[10] See Salibi (1988: 120).
[11] See Shanahan (2005:18).
[12] See Bashīr Shihāb II (2019).
[13] See Traboulsi (2007: 5-6).
[14] See Salibi (1988: 6-9).
[15] See Traboulsi (2007:24-26).

system of Qaimmaqamiyya in 1842. This system divided Mount Lebanon into a northern region controlled by the Maronites and a southern area controlled by the Druzes.

The Tanzimat reforms[16]: The Tanzimat is the name that was given to the set of reforms that were carried out by the Ottoman sultan Abdulmecid (1839-1861) and Sultan Abdelaziz (1861-1876). Such reforms were implemented between 1839 and 1876. They were partially introduced in the Empire in an attempt to win the European support at a time when the Empire was declining. The Tanzimat suggested a number of reforms that included the equality between Muslims and non-Muslims before the law, reform of education, administration and army. The Empire was concerned with increasing its centralized authority and bringing the different provinces under the control of the central administration in Istanbul.

Mutasarrifiyya of Mount Lebanon[17]: It is also known as **Règlement Organique.** This system was introduced in Mount Lebanon in the aftermath of the 1860 Druze-Maronite sectarian rivalries in Mount Lebanon. Under the Mutasarrifiyya, or the autonomous government, Mount Lebanon was ruled by a Christian figure from outside Mount Lebanon (appointed by the Ottoman Empire) and a council of 12 men who represented the confessional groups in the Mountain (Maronites, Druzes, Shi'ites, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics).

Greater Lebanon[18]: This state was created in 1920 as a result of the Franco-British partition of the Middle East, following the Sykes-Picot agreement. It was later declared as the Lebanese Republic. In 1920. The French annexed the former Ottoman provinces of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon to the Mutasarrifiyya of Mount Lebanon and the Bekaa valley.

The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)[19]: A political party that was established by the Druze leader Kamal Joumblat in 1949. Its membership was open for both Druzes and non-Druzes alike. It was an opposition party to the Lebanese political system, which was dominated by the Maronites.

The Phalangists/Kataeb[20]: A right wing Maronite political party that was established by Pierre Gemmayel in 1936 as a para-military group. During the Lebanese civil war, this party turned into a militia that fought against the Lebanese left, which was led by Kamal Joumblat.

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[16] See Tanzimat (2016).
[17] See Traboulsi (2007: 42).
[18] See Lebanon (n.d.).
[19] See Progressive Socialist Party. (n.d.).
[20] See Kataeb Party. (n.d.).

The Lebanese Forces (LF)[21]: A Maronite political party that was established during the Lebanese civil war in 1976 by Pierre Gemmayel (and his sons: Amin and Bachir), Camille Chamoun and Suleiman Franjieh. It acted as an umbrella organization, which coordinated between the Christian right wing militias during the civil war. In the Mountain War (1983-1984), the Lebanese Forces was the Christian armed group that fought against the PSP in Al Chouf.

Samir Geagea[22]: The leader of the Lebanese Forces party. During the civil war, he was the commander-in-chief of the Lebanese Forces. In 1983, Geagea led the LF during the Mountain War.

Bachir Gemmayel[23]: A senior member of the Phalangists. He was also elected as Lebanon's president on the 23rd of August 1982. On the 14th of September 1982, he was assassinated.

Amin Gemmayel[24]: Lebanon's president from 1982 to 1988. He came to power following his brother's (Bachir's) assassination.

Walid Joumblat[25]: The son of the Druze leader Kamal Joumblat. Following his father's assassination in 1977, he led both the Druze community and the PSP. He managed to achieve a massive political and military victory in the Mountain War, driving the Phalangists and the majority of the Christian population out of the Chouf in 1983 and 1984.

Suleiman Franjieh[26]: Lebanon's president from 1970 to 1976. Following the Ehden massacre that was carried out by the Phalangists in 1978, and which culminated in the death of his son, wife and their daughter, Franjieh turned against the Phalangists; and started to co-operate with the Lebanese Left. He was one of the Lebanese public figures who expressed their rejection of the May 17 accord.

Nabih Berri[27]: The speaker of the Lebanese parliament since 1992 and the leader of the Shi'te party, Amal. During the Lebanese civil war, he was also the leader of Amal militia. He was one of the Lebanese figures that rejected the May 17 accord.

PLO[28]: The Palestinian Liberation Organization was created in 1967 to represent the Palestinian cause and fight the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Following its expulsion

[21] See Lebanese Forces (n.d.).
[22] See Abdel Nour (2004).
[23] See Gemayel Family (1998).
[24] Ibid.
[25] See Walid Junblatt (n.d.).
[26] See Suleiman Franjieh (2018).
[27] See Nabih Berri (n.d.).
[28] See Palestinian Liberation Organization (2013).

from Jordan in 1971 after its violent confrontation with the Jordanian army, it relocated to Lebanon. It continued to conduct its attacks on Israel from the South of Lebanon. During the Lebanese civil war, the PLO fought with the Lebanese left against the Phalangists. In 1982, following the Sabra and Shatila massacre against the Palestinians, Israel and the Phalangists forced the PLO to leave Beirut.

Lebanese National Movement (LNM)[29]: A conglomeration of the Lebanese leftist parties that was formed in 1969 under the leadership of Kamal Joumblat. This coalition defined itself as being secular, socialist and pro-the Arab world in its foreign policy orientation. During the civil war, the LNM fought against the Lebanese front, which encompassed the Christian militias.

Re-incarnation[30]: It is the belief that a dead person's spirit returns to life in another person's body. Re-incarnation is one of the main tenets of the Druze faith.

[29] See Lebanese National Movement (n.d.).

[30] See re-incarnation (n.d.).

Chronology:

1516: The Ottoman conquest of Syria.

1523-1842: The Ottoman Empire declared Mount Lebanon as an Emirate.

1616: The Druze Emir Fakhr al Din Ma'n, who used to rule over the Chouf, extended his control over the northern area of Mount Lebanon; bringing it under his authority.

1711: The Battle of Ayn Darah that ended with the triumph of the Qaysites over the Yemenites.

1789: Emir Bachir Shihab II became the ruler of Mount Lebanon.

1820: First (Maronite) peasants' revolts in the northern region in Mount Lebanon.

1838: The revolt of the Druzes of Mount Lebanon against the conscription policy that was imposed by Ibrahim Pasha. Many of them, including one of their leaders Bachir Joumblat, were exiled to Hawran mountain and executed.

1840: Second (Maronite) peasants' revolts in the northern region of Mount Lebanon. In the very beginning, it was led by both Maronite and Druze peasants against the policies of conscription and the foreign troops of Ibrahim Pasha. However, it was quickly hijacked by the Maronite church; ending the Druze peasants' participation.

1841: The first civil war between the Druzes and the Maronites in Mount Lebanon.

1842: The Ottomans introduced the system of Qaimmaqamiyya to Mount Lebanon in the aftermath of the Druze-Maronite inter-sectarian clashes in 1841.

1858: The outbreak of the (Maronite) peasants' revolt in Kisrawan in the northern area of Mount Lebanon under the leadership of the Maronite cleric Tanious Shahin. They were able to confiscate some of the lands and properties of the Maronite Khazin feudal family. The revolts endeavored to extend its influence to the Druze-controlled southern area of Mount Lebanon. However, this attempt failed.

1860: The outbreak of the second civil war in Mount Lebanon between the Druzes and the Maronites.

1861: The system of Mutasarrifiyya replaced the Qaimmaqamiyya in Mount Lebanon.

1920: The creation of Greater Lebanon, following the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement (a Franco-British agreement) that divided the Middle East into a number of colonies and mandates. Greater Lebanon came under the French mandate.

1943: France granted Lebanon its independence. Additionally, the Maronites and the Sunnis agreed on the creation of a confessional political system in Lebanon that allocated political and administrative posts on the basis of the confessional weight of each sect in Lebanon. This agreement was written in the form of a document, known as: The National Pact or *al mithaq al watani*.

1958: The outbreak of a mini-civil war in Lebanon, which was mainly led by the Lebanese left under the leadership of Kamal Joumblat against the Maronite-dominated political system. This civil war was also an expression of the socio-economic and political frustration of many disenfranchised Lebanese citizens. It ended with intervention of the American naval forces to support the regime of the Lebanese president Camille Chamoun against the Lebanese left, which was supported by the Soviet Union.

1975: The outbreak of Lebanon's most prolonged civil war, which lasted for fifteen years.

1975: The months following the outbreak of the civil war witnessed the division of Beirut via the Green line. The latter divided the capital into: East and West sides. The East side of Beirut was majorly inhabited by Christians and the West side was mainly inhabited by Muslims.

1976: The Syrian army invaded Lebanon. Syria justified this move by claiming that it aimed at settling the Lebanese conflict without siding with one Lebanese faction against another. The Syrian occupation of Lebanon ended in 2005.

1977: Assassination of Kamal Joumblat.

1982: Israel invaded the south of Lebanon, and its forces were able to enter Beirut.

May 17, 1983: The US tried to broker an agreement between the Phalangists in Lebanon (represented by Amin Gemmayel/ Lebanon's president at that time) and Israel. This agreement was known as: The May 17 Accord.

September 3rd, 1983: The beginning of the Mountain War, following the withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from the Chouf; and the decision of the Lebanese Forces (LF) to fill the vacuum that the IDF left in Al Chouf.

1984: The Mountain War ended with massive military and political defeat of the Lebanese Forces at the hands of the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP).

The Shuf

At one point in space,

Like two clasped hands,

Man and form discover one another,

Man and stone resemble one another.

Eagles rest their splendor

In the high mountains.

Here on these mountains, sun and wind commingle.

Everything becomes silence and color.

The Shuf is a notable solitary bird

With white veils and the gestures of death.

(Tuéni, 2006: 27)

Introductory Chapter

The War of the Mountain /*Harb Al Jabal* (1983-1984): How can the specific history of the inter-sectarian rivalries between the Maronites and the Druzes in Al Chouf region in Mount Lebanon in mid-nineteenth century provide an explanation for their sectarian clash at the end of the twentieth century?

A. Introduction

"Every day that passed, every new controversy that arose, every fresh hatred that erupted brought undeniable proof of an eternal rift having deep roots in scores from the past, some of them more than a century old, none of them were really settled"

(Kassir, 2010:17).

Lebanon, a country that was created in 1920 as a result of the Franco-British partition of the Middle East, witnessed a number of sectarian rivalries between its diverse confessional groups[31] throughout its history (1841, 1860, 1958 and 1975). While the reasons for each of those wars were different, all of them were expressions of colliding interests; in which aspirations of socio-economic and political dominance prevailed over power-sharing[32]. This does not necessarily mean that such aspirations of dominance were the reason behind such conflicts. However, it could be argued that the different confessional groups in Mount Lebanon (in 1841 and 1860) and Greater Lebanon (in 1958 and 1975) manipulated those conflicts to impose their dominance; which some groups (such as the Maronites and the Druzes) backed with arguments as "the historical right to rule" over Mount Lebanon and then, Lebanon. Questions on the identity of the land, as expressed by the Lebanese historian Fawwaz Traboulsi, were invoked by the different communities in Lebanon during its sectarian conflicts. This is especially the case with the Maronites and the Druzes in Mount Lebanon during the 1841, 1860 and 1983 clashes (Traboulsi, 2007: 24-26).

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[31] Lebanon has 18 religious sects. There are four Muslim sects: Sunnis, Shi'ites, Ismailis and Alawites. Christians constitute twelve sects: Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholics, Chaldeans, Jacobites, Nestorians, Protestants, Latins, Roman Catholics, and Syriac Catholics. Other sects include: The Druzes and very few number of Jews (Lebanon: Religious Sects, n.d.).

[32] Such an observation is not meant to generalize or oversimplify the reasons behind those sectarian clashes; which involved a diverse number of internal and external actors that will be unpacked and addressed throughout this thesis. Moreover, while the terminology of power-sharing (*Al Aysh Al* Mushtarak) was a product of the institutionalization of sectarianism in Lebanon in 1920, it was implicitly practiced in Mount Lebanon by the landlords (both Druze and Maronite landlords) (as it will be examined in chapter one). See El-Khazen (1991).

By examining the politics of Mount Lebanon in the nineteenth century, where land was the main source of socio-economic and political power in Mount Lebanon, one could understand why land had been the main source of political contention between the Druzes and the Maronites in the Mountain (starting from the mid-nineteenth century till the occurrence of the Mountain War). Up until the nineteenth century, Mount Lebanon was premised on the system of *Iqtaa'*, where the Druze landlords were the initial ruling class of the Mountain. Despite the fact that there were Maronite landlords, the majority and the most powerful *muqata'jis* were from the Druze community. According to Zahar (2005: 221), "the Imarah of Mount Lebanon rested on a feudal society that linked the primarily-Druze feudal landlord class (although there were also Druze peasants) to the primarily-Maronite peasantry (even though a few Maronite families had become members of the elite class)". Given that, this thesis will argue that the 1841 and 1860 sectarian clashes were expressions of the Druze landlords' rejection of the mid-nineteenth century changes that altered the socio-economic and political situation, to be in favor of the Maronites. As a result, the Druze landlords, with the help of the Druze religious leaders, managed to mobilize the Druze masses against their Maronite counterparts to re-confiscate territories, which they used to control (before they lost such territories to the Maronites as a result of the socio-economic and political changes that were introduced in the nineteenth century in Mount Lebanon). Massacres of the Christians and their displacement were expressions of the Druze landlords' attempt to alter the demographic composition of the Mountain in their favor; and thus, restore their socio-economic and political dominance over Mount Lebanon. Moving to the end of the twentieth century, the Druze political leadership, led by Walid Joumblat, capitalized on the Mountain War to re-assert its political control over the Mountain; this involved bringing the memory of the 1860 events into the context of *Harb Al Jabal* to mobilize the Druzes against their Maronite counterparts. While the Maronite political leadership endeavored to do the same, they failed to mobilize their community by using the same discourse (as it will be, thoroughly, examined in chapter three).

A plethora of academic studies endeavored to understand why a number of civil wars happened in Mount Lebanon and Lebanon; and more importantly, why the vicious cycle of sectarian violence keeps on repeating itself. Some of the literature written on Lebanon's modern history focuses on what Fawwaz Traboulsi called "religious and identity-based" discourses, which solely explain Lebanon's civil conflicts in the light of sectarianism (Traboulsi, 2007: viii). This approach explains sectarian clashes in the light of the prevalence of primordialism and tribalism over modernity in the Middle East; using the nineteenth century sectarian rivalries in Mount Lebanon as an evidence. For instance, Karl Marx described the 1860 sectarian rivalries in Mount Lebanon as nothing but "atrocious outrages of wild tribes" (Marx, 1860). Kamal Salibi, a Maronite Lebanese historian, referred to Mount Lebanon's mid-nineteenth century politics as "tribal"; and used this as an explanation for the outburst of communal rivalries in the mid-nineteenth

century in Mount Lebanon (Salibi,1988: 165). Although Kamal Salibi revised his ideas in his book *A House of Many Mansions* (1988), he expressed very similar ideas on the tribal nature of Lebanon's communities in his book *The Modern History of Lebanon* (1976). In the latter book, Salibi explained the outburst of Lebanon's civil war in 1975 in the light of the primordial nature of its communities. This approach is very problematic since it depicts sectarian violence, identities and politics as being ahistorical, and more primordial than political; overlooking the surrounding context that could have produced such sectarian violence (Makdisi, 2000: 5).

The second approach describes Lebanon's sectarian conflicts as having their roots in the sectarian policies of Emir Bachir II who ruled Mount Lebanon from 1789 to 1840. Such policies altered the sectarian balance of the Mountain, in a way that affected the distribution of power among Lebanon's different confessional groups; some of which were not satisfied with such allocation of power. This continued to create instability in Lebanon in the twentieth century. While Lebanon's confessional system could not be the sole reason behind its sectarian conflicts, it was one of the principal reasons behind the outbreak of sectarian violence in the twentieth century. This approach is mostly shared by the majority of the Druze scholars, many of whom come from aristocratic families that had been negatively influenced by the nineteenth century socio-economic and political changes in Mount Lebanon, such as Sami Makarem, Najib Alamuddin and Neila Abu Izzeddin. This explains why they focus on how Emir Bachir's sectarian politics altered the balance of power between the confessional communities in the Mountain to be in favor of the Maronites; the majority of whom were peasants in the lands of the Druze landlords. By time, this culminated in the emergence of identity politics and communal identities started to replace class-based stratifications. Although this explanation is relatively valid, it could not solely explain why sectarian rivalries occurred in Mount Lebanon, and later, in Greater Lebanon. This approach depicts the changes in Mount Lebanon as imposed from above, overlooking the internal transformations of the Maronite community that started from the mid-eighteenth century, and which resulted in the emergence of new actors that challenged the *Iqtaa'* system in Mount Lebanon (as it will be examined in chapter one) (Hazran, 2009: 461-462).

The third approach to sectarian rivalries in Lebanon, and which is adopted by scholars as: Samir Khalaf, Michael Hudson, Joel Beinin, Ussama Makdisi and Ilya Harik, endeavors to adopt a more holistic understanding of sectarianism in Lebanon. This involves an understanding of the interplay of the local, regional and international factors that created the ripe conditions for sectarian rivalries to occur in Mount Lebanon; and later, in Lebanon. For instance, such approach explains the mid-nineteenth century sectarian rivalries in the light of the local, regional and international factors that surrounded Mount Lebanon in the nineteenth century. In regards to the internal reasons, internal transformations inside the Maronite community are considered among the main reasons

behind the sectarian turbulences in the Mountain. These include the change in the relationship between the Maronite church and the Maronite landlords, as a result of the emergence of a number of reform-minded clergy, who resisted the church's subordination to the landlords. This important transformation, along with the increased peasants' grievances against the high taxes, corvée labor and other personal obligations for their landlords, made the reform-minded clergy develop strong links with the peasants; and lead them in uprisings against the *Iqtaa'* system in the Mountain. In regards to the regional factors, Mohamed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha's occupation of Mount Lebanon in 1831, during the reign of Emir Bachir II, added other layers of complexities to the situation. Ibrahim Pasha and Emir Bachir II's armament of the Maronite peasants to end the Druzes' rebellion in 1838 against the forced conscription signified the beginning of sectarian violence between both communities. As for the international factors, the increased European demand on the silk of Mount Lebanon as a cash crop turned some Maronite villages and towns in the Mountain into a market for this crop. Some Maronite peasants, accordingly, became very rich and some of them started to be money lenders to their landlords; the majority of whom were Druzes. This is besides the increased European presence in the Empire and the introduction of the system of capitulations, which signified an increased protection of the Maronites (Khalaf, 1987 & 2002; Hudson, 2001; Beinin, 2001; Makdisi, 2000; Harik, 1965). Unpacking sectarianism, and understanding the socio-economic and political factors that created and institutionalized sectarian identities in Lebanon since the mid-nineteenth century is important in the understanding of the persistence of sectarianism in the Lebanese society; and the repetition of sectarian violence in its modern history, and especially, in the twentieth century.

Although the third approach largely succeeded to present a holistic and overarching explanation to the prevalence of sectarianism in Lebanon up until today, it fell short of examining more specific issues as why the Druze peasants did not participate with their Maronite counterparts in the various peasants' revolts in 1820, 1840 and 1858 in Mount Lebanon. On the other hand, they sided with their Druze landlords and fought against the Maronite peasants in 1840 and 1858. An understanding of this issue is critical to understand how this community reacted in times of crises (1841, 1860 and 1983), especially ones that pitted them vis-à-vis the Maronite community. Understanding this issue is not only pertinent to the examination of the Druze community's reaction to the Maronite peasants' revolts of 1840 and 1858 revolts, but it is also integral to the understanding of how the community manages to sideline its class-based and factional divisions in times of crises (i.e. *Harb Al Jabal*). This issue will be examined in chapter three through the interviews that were conducted with a number of Druze ex-fighters in the Mountain War. While they explained the community's cohesion in *Harb Al Jabal*, they referred to the community's solidarity in previous crises, such as the 1860 sectarian clashes with the Maronites in Mount Lebanon.

Moving to the twentieth century, and within the context of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1991), two of Lebanon's confessional groups, the Maronites and the Druzes, clashed in 1983 in the Mountain War; which is also known as *Harb Al Jabal*. When the Mountain War occurred, the political leaderships of both communities used the discourse of the 1860 sectarian clashes to fuel their communities to fight in 1983 (as it will be discussed further in the introductory chapter and chapter three). To understand why the rhetoric of the 1860 rivalries was used in *Harb Al Jabal*, there must be an understanding of not only the 1860 clashes; but also, the socio-economic and political contexts that underlie such a violent encounter. This thesis will, accordingly, examine how the specific history of the Druze-Maronite inter-sectarian rivalries in the mid-nineteenth century could help in the understanding of the dynamics and consequences of their sectarian clash in *Harb Al Jabal* in the twentieth century.

The next section will examine why and how land was the source of political power and prestige in Mountain Lebanon; and how it installed a social division of labor, which cut across sectarian affiliations, in a way that provided one community (the Druzes) with certain socio-economic and political rights, and denied other communities the same rights (the Maronites).

1. The Emirate of Mount Lebanon (1523-1842): An understanding of the socio-economic and political organization of the Mountain before the outbreak of sectarian violence in the mid-nineteenth century

Mount Lebanon, home to a religiously mixed population that co-existed for centuries, has been a "refuge" for many of its different sectarian groups throughout its history. Some of those groups escaped religious persecution, such as the Maronites and the Druzes. The former escaped persecution by the Byzantines. As for the Druzes, whose religion is an offshoot of Ismaili Shi'ism, they escaped persecution by the Sunni Abbasid rulers in Egypt, who considered their beliefs as a sort of heresy. In addition to those two religious groups, there were Shi'ites, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics who lived in Mount Lebanon, as well. Until the Ottoman conquest of Syria in 1516, Mount Lebanon did not constitute a political entity on its own. Nevertheless, the Mountain played an important role in the protection of Syria or *Bilad al Sham*[33] as the Mamluks used to call it; since it constituted the range of mountains on Syria's Western fringes (Makdisi, 2000: 29). This explains why the Mamluk rulers of Egypt and Syria (1250-1516) relied on the Druzes of Mount Lebanon in the protection of the Syrian coast against the Crusaders' attacks in the twelfth century. In return, the Mamluks provided some of the Druzes with hereditary privileges, which they continued to enjoy under the Ottoman Empire (Salibi, 1971: 76).

[33] For more information on the history of *Bilad al Sham* under both the Mamluks and the Ottomans, See Philipp (2004: 401-418).

Those privileges, which were associated with the system of *Iqtaa'* that prevailed in Mount Lebanon at that time, empowered the Druzes more than the other religious communities in Mount Lebanon; since the *Iqtaa'* denoted a socio-economic and political organization that subordinated the peasants to the authority of the landlords.

The Druze landlords were further privileged with the establishment of the Emirate of Mount Lebanon (1523-1842), following the Ottoman conquest of Syria. Under the Ottoman Empire, Mount Lebanon continued to enjoy relative autonomy as it was not under the Empire's direct control. The Empire used to run Mount Lebanon via the system of *Iqtaa'*. This system allowed the landlords/ *muqati'jis*, the majority of whom were Druzes, to have tax-farming rights. In return to this semi-autonomous status, the landlords had to pay taxes to the Ottoman sultan, maintain order and peace in the Mountain and avoid any rebellions against the Sublime Porte in Istanbul. This enabled the landlords to exercise a great deal of power and control over the peasants (Agoston and Masters, 2009:329-330; Khalaf, 2002: 64; Aulas, 1985: 3).

It was not only the system of *Iqta'* that empowered the Druze landlords vis-à-vis the other confessional communities in the Mountain, but also the *millet* system. The latter was applied all over the Ottoman Empire, creating a "two-tier" hierarchy between a higher community that consisted of the Muslim subjects and a lower "protected" community that encompassed the non-Muslims (Christians and Jews). The latter were known as: The "people of the Book" or *Dhimmis* who enjoyed the right to practice their religious rituals in return for paying a tax, known as: The *Jizya*. Non- Muslims did not only pay the *Jizya* for practicing their religious rituals, but for their protection as well. They were also prohibited from working in certain fields such as the military and administrative posts. Christians and Jews worked in the sectors of commerce, finance and agriculture. The *millet* system, accordingly, entailed a social division of labor, which cut across religious affiliations. In Mount Lebanon, this social division of labor expressed itself in limiting the military functions to the Druzes; while the Christians worked in the lands as peasants and constituted the majority of the commoners (Traboulsi, 2007: 3).

Although the majority of the *muqata'jis* in Mount Lebanon were Druzes, there were also Christian landlords; the majority of whom were Maronites. The Maronite *muqata'ji* families were able to own lands under the rule of the Druze Emir Fakhr al Din Ma'n II. In 1585, Emir Fakhr al Din expanded Mount Lebanon's degree of autonomy under the Ottoman Empire to the extent that it enjoyed a great degree of sovereignty. He also managed to declare the Mountain's independence from the Empire, and to lay the ground for the establishment of an administrative apparatus in the Mountain. In 1616, the Emir expanded his authority over the northern region of the Mountain, and placed Kisrawan (where the Maronites were largely concentrated) under his authority. As a result, the Emir charged the Maronite Khazin family with the duty of collecting taxes from the peasants; and thus, it became the first Maronite *muqata'ji* family. Additionally, the

Emir's religious tolerance encouraged many Maronites to emigrate to the Chouf and work as peasants in the lands of the Druze landlords (Aulas, 1985: 3).

Although there were times when there was contention between the Maronite and Druze *muqata'jis*, religious differences were not the source of such disputes up until the mid-nineteenth century. On the other hand, disputes over land ownership were usually the main impetus behind such contention, since land was the main source of political power and class stratification in Mount Lebanon. This means that sectarianism and religious animosities were not primordially engrained in the Mountain. In many cases, there were alliances between the Druze and Maronite landlords against peasants' uprisings, blocking any possibility for social change or any disturbance for the prevalent social hierarchies in Mount Lebanon (Agoston and Masters, 2009: 330).

The fact that the majority of the peasants were Maronites gave their 1820, 1840 and 1858 revolts a sectarian nature. Moreover, blocking their attempts to challenge the prevalent socio-economic and political status quo meant that a certain group (the Druze landlords) wanted to monopolize its superiority over other groups (the Christians in general and the Maronites in particular). Over time, the relation between the different groups in the Mountain became one of co-habitation rather than co-existence. Co-habitation did not necessarily denote that relations of trust or harmony existed between the Mountain's different groups. Although those communities used to exist side by side and share common territories, competition and tensions used to define their relations. This was due to the presence of competing agendas that tended to "assign one particular community superiority over another or even to deny another community the ability to claim any intrinsic right in the territory at all". This communal sense of possession generated perpetual feelings of tensions and stress, which sometimes culminated in the occurrence of violent and brutal sectarian clashes (Kanaan, 2005: 20).

2. Mount Lebanon in the nineteenth century: From the prevalence of the tradition of co-habitation among its confessional communities to sectarian rivalries

By the mid nineteenth century, alliances between the Druze and Maronite *muqata'jis* started to collapse, with the rise of Emir Bachir Shihab II to power as the ruler of Mount Lebanon from 1789 to 1840[34]. Although Emir Bachir rose to power with the support of the Druze landlord Sheikh Bachir Joumblat, the former worked on empowering the Maronites against the Druzes by giving them more prominent positions in the administration; this made the Maronites more politically assertive in Mount Lebanon.

[34] For more information on Emir Bachir Shihab II, see Shwayri (2015:13-14).

This was accompanied by the increase in the birthrate of the Maronites, outnumbering the Druzes, which had already started to alter the demographic balance in the Mountain for the Maronites' favor (Agoston and Masters, 2009: 330).

It was not only Emir Bachir II who favored the appointment of Christians in his administration, but also Ibrahim Pasha (Mohamed Ali's son) who occupied Mount Lebanon and Greater Syria from 1831 to 1840. This further enflamed the sectarian tensions between the Maronites and the Druzes, which were already developing over land and political power. Thus, in 1838, the Druzes rebelled against the policies of both Emir Bachir II and Ibrahim Pasha who responded to the rebellion by arming the Maronites to fight the Druzes. The defeat of the Druzes in 1838 resulted in the confiscation of their lands and their allocation to the Maronite peasants. Additionally, some of the Druzes who revolted, including their leader Bachir Joumblat, were exiled to Hawran mountain and executed. This marked the beginning of the political defeat and marginalization of the Druze landlords, paving the way for the 1841 civil war. This war ended with the installment of a new administrative system called Qaimmaqamiyya (district governorship) that divided Mount Lebanon into northern and southern areas (Al Chouf); the former was inhabited and ruled by the Maronites and the latter was ruled by the Druzes. The southern area of Mount Lebanon, Al Chouf, remained mixed. This new administrative system did not stop sectarian tensions between the Maronites and the Druzes, especially that the latter forced many Maronite settlers out of several territories in the southern area of the Mountain; as they considered such territories to be "rightfully" theirs (Agoston and Masters, 2009: 330).

The Qaimmaqamiyya system signified the beginning of the end of both the *Iqtaa'* system and the Druze landlords' predominance over Mount Lebanon. This is because Mountain was divided along sectarian identities that became the main determinant of land ownership and political representation. The Druze landlords continued to reject this system and asserted their traditional right to rule over the whole territory of Mount Lebanon. The fact that the Druze landlords lost control over the northern area of the Mountain, which became under the rule of a Maronite Qaimmaqam, made them perceive this system as an attempt to dispossess the community of its territory (Traboulsi, 2007:24-26).

Between 1840 and 1860, sectarian tensions were boiling from below the surface until they exploded in 1860. The 1860 events started with the rebellion of a number of Maronite Peasants in 1858 in Kisrawan against the Maronite Khazin family. They managed to confiscate many of their lands and properties. The success of that uprising made those peasants encourage their Maronite counterparts, who were living in the mixed area of Al Chouf, to revolt against their Druze landlords, promising to support them. The Druze landlords viewed the Maronite peasants' uprising as a continuation for their political marginalization that started in the nineteenth century. Fighting those peasants

and defeating them was depicted as a battle of survival and an attempt to restore the Druze political dominance over Mount Lebanon. As a result, the Druze landlords mobilized their Druze tenants against the Maronites, turning the revolt from a class based one to a battle of existence and survival in Mount Lebanon. This culminated in the massacre of thousands of Maronites, especially in Deir El Qamar (8,000 inhabitants), and Zahle (7,000-10,000 inhabitants) (Hakim, 2013: 67-68).

Although the Druzes came out of the 1860 events militarily triumphant, they were politically defeated after the French intervention in Mount Lebanon to stop the massacres of the Christians. As a result of the French intervention, the Druze landlords had more of their dwellings and lands confiscated and given to the Christians, as part of compensating them for their losses during the sectarian clashes of 1860 (Fawaz, 1994:169). The political defeat of the Druze community in Mount Lebanon in the aftermath of the 1860 events continued to influence and shape the political roles that each of the Druze and Maronite communities were to play in Greater Lebanon. Such defeat exacerbated the Druzes' marginalization in the Lebanese political establishment from 1920 till the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975. This explains why the Druze political leadership, led by Kamal Joumblat at that time, endeavored to alter the community's political situation via exploiting a number of political crises that occurred in Lebanon in the twentieth century. For instance, in 1943, Kamal Joumblat rejected the National Pact, which he believed to be excluding the Druzes from the confessional configuration of the Lebanese political establishment. This is besides the 1958 and 1975 civil wars, which Kamal Joumblat viewed as critical opportunities to overthrow Lebanon's confessional system and replace it with a secular one (Hazran, 2009; Harik, 1995). The fact that Lebanon's political system was based on confessionalism meant that all the political and administrative posts had to be allocated on the basis of the numerical size of each community. In other words, "it is a system of proportional representation by religious faith in all government functions" (Hess and Bodman, 1954:10).

This, accordingly, turned the Druzes into a minor player in the Lebanese political system since they constituted a very small minority. Kamal Joumblat's desire to replace Lebanon's confessional system with a secular one aimed at enabling the Druzes to play a bigger role in the Lebanese political system that was not reflective of their small numbers. This was justified by the community's historical role in ruling over Mountain Lebanon, which was the cradle of Greater Lebanon. Such ideas were embedded in the writings of Kamal Joumblat, which will be examined in chapter three. Nevertheless, in all those political crises, the Druze political leadership did not succeed to overthrow the Maronite-dominated political establishment. This, accordingly, made Walid Joumblat, Kamal Joumblat's son who led the Druze community after his father's assassination in 1977, envision *Harb Al Jabal* in 1983 as a golden opportunity that the Druzes had to get rid of the Maronite hegemony over Lebanon. Walid Joumblat believed that if the

Maronites were defeated in Mount Lebanon, this will vehemently influence their role in Lebanese politics on the wider scale (Hazran, 2009). The central role of Mount Lebanon in the Lebanese politics was not only expressed by Walid Joumblat, but also by Samir Geagea (a Maronite Lebanese politician, former commander during the Lebanese civil war and the current executive chairman of the Lebanese Forces party). The latter perceived the Christian, and especially the Maronite, presence in the Mountain as immensely critical, in regards to ensuring the security of the Christians in Lebanon. This was clear in his words during *Harb Al Jabal* when he said: "If we (the Christians) are not safe in the Mountain, we will not be safe anywhere else in Lebanon" (Geagea as cited in Andary, 2012:1).

The outbreak of the Mountain War in 1983 did not occur mainly as a result of the Maronite-Druze historical rivalries, which date back to the mid-nineteenth century. *Harb Al Jabal* had its local, regional and international contexts that paved the way for this bloody confrontation to occur. Nevertheless, the inter-sectarian rivalries between the Druzes and the Maronites played a central role in fueling the situation and in shaping the dynamics and consequences of the war (as it will be examined in the next section).

3. The Mountain War (1983-1984): The localization of a conflict that primarily involved international and regional actors

3.1. The May 17 Agreement: The spark that ignited the Mountain War

From the beginning of the Lebanese civil war, political divisions strongly existed between the different Lebanese political factions. In the early years of the war, the political scene was polarized between two major groups: The Lebanese Front (which encompassed the right wing Christian militias), and the Lebanese National Movement (which encompassed the leftist Lebanese militias, including the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), some Sunni and Shi'ite factions and some of the Palestinian groups). Both groups had contending political ideologies and visions for Lebanon's identity. Additionally, each of those two factions had its own regional and international alliances. The Lebanese Front allied with the American-Saudi axis, which it considered to be a guarantee for Lebanon's independence and sovereignty. This is because the Lebanese Front believed that the Saudis were the moderate Arabs who did not adopt the Arab nationalist discourse; additionally, the presence of the US in the equation was a guarantee for Lebanon's integrity. On the other hand, the Lebanese National Movement allied with Syria and the Soviet Union[35]. The cold war context further polarized the situation in Lebanon, inviting more regional and international actors into the Lebanese

[35]For more information on the regional and international contexts that surrounded the May 17 accord and paved the way for *Harb Al Jabal,* See Freedman (1988: 210-232).

conflict whose local actors had already developed strong alliances with regional and international players (Phares, 1995:145).

In June 1982, the Israeli army invaded the south of Lebanon to drive the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) out of Lebanese territory. The invasion was not limited to the south as the Israeli forces occupied the Chouf mountains and encircled West Beirut where the PLO was mainly stationed. The occupation of the Chouf facilitated Israel's access to Beirut due to its geographical proximity to the capital. By occupying the Chouf, Israel was able to control the route to Beirut. In the early stages of the invasion, Israel was optimistic about driving the PLO out of Lebanon and stationing its forces in the south. Although the Israelis and the Phalangists succeeded to drive the PLO out of Lebanon in 1982, they failed to sign the May 17 accord (1983), which was sponsored by the US (Bowder, 1983: 444).

The May 17 agreement was based on three aspects: first, the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanon, which was contingent upon Syria's withdrawal. Second, a number of security arrangements were to be agreed upon by Lebanon and Israel so as to ensure Israeli control of its borders with Lebanon. Third, the agreement referred to the incorporation of Saad Hadad's South Lebanese Army (SLA) in the Lebanese army instead of its collaboration with the Israeli military, which aimed at empowering the Lebanese army to enable it to control the political instability in Lebanon (Rolland, 2003:174-176). The US perceived the withdrawal of Syria as an important step to contain the Soviet influence in Lebanon. The Soviet Union provided military support and equipment to Syria and its allies in Lebanon (the Druze PSP, the Shi'ite Amal militia and the Palestinians). Thus, the Reagan administration believed that if Syria withdrew from Lebanon, its Lebanese allies would be weakened and the pro-US Gemmayel government would gain more power over the Lebanese political scene. This would, concomitantly, undermine the Soviet influence in Lebanon (Quandt, 1984: 237-239; Bowder, 1983: 447-448).

Syria vehemently opposed this agreement because of the strategy that the US pursued in letting the agreement be signed by one of the Lebanese sides; the Phalangists under the leadership of president Amin Gemmayel, and the Israeli side; and after that, the US thought that Syria would be obliged to sign when it had no other option. As a result, Syria founded the National Salvation Front (NSF) that consisted of one of the Druze factions that was led by Walid Joumblat, representatives from the Shi'ites; led by Nabih Berri and some Christian elements; led by Suleiman Franjieh (Rolland, 2003:174-176). The Druze leader Walid Joumblat was one of the staunchest opponents of not only the May 17 accord, but of the Amin Gemmayel government as well. It is debatable whether Amin Gemmayel was responsible for the stationing of some Phalangists' checkpoints in some of the Christian villages of the Chouf; or if this was an individual move by Phalangists whose family members were expelled from villages in the limited sectarian encounters

that happened in the Mountain in the early years of the Lebanese civil wars (Geagea as cited in Charbel, 2011: 161-163). This, accordingly, generated limited sectarian encounters between the Phalangists and elements of the Druze PSP militia before the official start of the Mountain War. Nevertheless, when the Israeli army withdrew from El Chouf region on the 3rd of September 1983, it left a power vacuum that was soon filled by the Lebanese Forces, who were afraid to lose Mount Lebanon to the Druzes. This decision signified the beginning of the Mountain War (Rolland, 2003:174-176).

From the above examination, it could be argued that the May 17 agreement did not directly lead to the Mountain War. Although it paved the way for *Harb Al Jabal* to occur, by bolstering already existing political divisions, it was the decision of the Phalangists to send their forces (LF) to Al Chouf that resulted in the occurrence of *Harb Al Jabal*. The Mountain War, in other words, was an expression of historical fears (from the Maronite side) and a strong desire to avenge for historical losses (from the side of the Druzes).

3.2.The role of the Druze-Maronite historical rivalries in fueling *Harb Al Jabal*

Although the conflict in the beginning involved a number of international, regional and local players, it ended with a bloody sectarian confrontation between the Maronites and the Druzes in Mount Lebanon; since both parties were fiercely fighting to maintain their political control and dominance over the Mountain; and especially the Chouf region. Although the Chouf was a mixed region, with Christian (the majority of whom were Maronites) and Druze inhabitants, the latter considered themselves as historically “the rightful inhabitants” of the Chouf. This explains why the decision of the Phalangists to send their militia, the Lebanese Forces, to Al Chouf was considered by the Druzes as “a defilement of the Druze homeland” (Johnson, 2001: 63).

Samir Geagea illustrated how the international, regional and local contexts paved the way for the War of the Mountain to occur in 1983 (as stated above); nonetheless, the desire of the Druze and the Maronite militias to impose their full control over the Mountain, a matter of great sensitivity for both communities, culminated into a bloody clash between them (Geagea as cited in Charbel, 2011:163-164).

By looking at the words of Samir Geagea, one can find that his use of the word “sensitivity” in the phrase “a matter of great sensitivity” (to describe the attempt of both the Druze and the Maronite militias to impose their control over Mount Lebanon in 1983) has deep historical connotations, which transcend the internal and external milieus that surrounded Lebanon (and Mount Lebanon) in 1983. Thus, the understanding of the specific history of the Druze-Maronite relations in Mount Lebanon in the nineteenth century is important to understand how a crisis that started between the US and Syria (over the May 17 accord) turned into a bloody sectarian clash between the Druzes and the

Maronites; in which references to historical statuses of humiliation and injustice that date back to the mid-nineteenth century were used to politically and militarily mobilize one community against the other. In this case, discourses of collective victimization, dating back to 1860 (and even before), were used to fuel the Druzes against their Maronite counterparts in the Chouf. During the Mountain War, the Druze political leadership managed to use the rhetoric of the Maronite plotting to send the Druzes to the 'Hawran mountain' to fuel the Druzes against their Maronite counterparts. This discourse has deep historical connotations since it is premised on a real experience of humiliation that the Druzes experienced in the 19th century; when many of them, along with their leaders (including Sheikh Bashir Joumblat), were expelled in 1838 to Hawran mountain, following their revolt against the conscription policy of Ibrahim Pasha (Zeineddine, 2010: 26-31). This thesis will use similar statements that were used by both Walid Joumblat and Samir Geagea, during the Mountain War, to mobilize their communities to fight in *Harb Al Jabal.* This puts emphasis on the importance of examining the specific history of Maronite-Druze inter-sectarian relations in Mount Lebanon in the mid-nineteenth century to understand why the political leaderships of both communities used such statements (with references to the 1860 sectarian rivalries); and the extent to which such statements succeeded to mobilize the Maronites and Druzes in *Harb Al Jabal.*

3.3. Consequences of the Mountain War (1983-1984)

Following the military victory of the Druzes in the Mountain War, the Druzes destroyed sixty Christian villages, killed thousands of civilians and displaced the majority of the Christian population. It is estimated that around 160,000 Christians fled the Chouf region, which is the biggest displacement in the history of the Lebanese civil war. The massacres and displacement of the Christians during the Mountain War were the same strategies that the Druzes had used in the 1860 sectarian clashes; with the rationale of "cleansing the Chouf" from its non-Druze elements in an attempt to restore their homeland (Johnson, 2001: 63). Following the massive victory of the Druzes in *Harb Al Jabal*, the spiritual leader of the Druze community, then Sheikh Al Aql Mohamed Abu Shakra, stated that the brutality that the Druzes inflicted upon the Christians in the War of the Mountain would make them never again live in the Druze Mountain: "A page has turned in the book of history: Christians will never again live in the Druze Mountain" (Hanf, 1993: 285). It is interesting how Sheikh Abu Shakra used the words "the Druze Mountain, or Jabal Al Duruz" to refer to the Chouf. It is not clear whether this terminology of "Jabal Al Duruz" is the historical name of Al Chouf[36] or a mere reference to the demographic,

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[36]Jabal al-Duruz, or the Druze Mountain, is believed to be the historical name of Mount Lebanon; or to be more specific Al Chouf region until 1840. Not only was this terminology used in the official Ottoman documents, but it had also been used by several non-Druze historians, as a historical fact. See Hourani (1981: 151). Also see Harik (1968: 32); see Hitti (1982:2). In her article "La Montagne: un espace de

political and economic supremacy of the Druze community in that geographical entity (Al Chouf) before the Maronites moved to it from the northern part of Mount Lebanon; and started to alter the socio-economic situation in their favor in the mid-nineteenth century (Harik, 1994: 5). Additionally, the use of the terminology "The Druze Mountain" reveals an exclusivist tone towards the Christian inhabitants of the Chouf; especially that such a statement, which has strong historic connotations, came from the highest religious rank, Sheikh Al Aql, of the Druze community.

The discourse of the 1860 sectarian rivalries was not only used by the Druze leadership, but also by the Maronite one. For instance, Paul Andary, an ex-Maronite Lebanese Forces leader and fighter in the Mountain War, referred to *Harb Al Jabal* as "a crime that had its roots in history" (Andary, 2012: 2). Statements like Andary's aspired to justify why the Lebanese Forces decided to fill the vacuum that was left by the Israelis on the 3rd of September in 1983. The Lebanese Forces did not want another crime to happen in the Mountain, echoing the 1860 massacres of the Christians in the Chouf.

With the end of the Mountain War, the Christian population in Al Chouf region constituted only 1% of the total population, unlike in 1975 when it constituted half of the population (Abi Esber, n.d.). The Mountain War, accordingly, was not only about the military defeat of the Lebanese Forces, but it was also about achieving a political victory over the Maronites. This was partially manifested in the re-definition of territories and spaces in Mount Lebanon to reflect new realities of political dominance that were to be in favor of the Druzes. The expulsion of a large number of Maronites from their villages in the Mountain and the subsequent change in the demographic composition in Mount Lebanon (especially in Al Chouf) are examples of new manifestations of political dominance that were brought by the war. In Lebanon, political power is strongly associated with the demographic weight of each confessional community; due to the sectarian nature of its political system. Therefore, demographic power is a guarantee of both political power and political security since political representation is premised on the size of every sectarian group (Faour, 2007: 909-910). This explains why the cleansing of Al Chouf from its non-Druze elements aspired to politically empower the Druzes and enable them to play a bigger role in the Lebanese politics; since they constituted the

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partage et de ruptures", Dima de Clerck explained that her choice of the word "La Montagne" tends to have more of a historic than geographical connotation. Before the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, which witnessed a number of political and socio-economic changes, the southern part of Mount Lebanon was known as: The Mountain of the Druze (*Jabal Al Duruz*) or The Chouf Mountain (*Jabal Al Chuf*). Nevertheless, with the expansion of the Maronites in the Southern part of Mount Lebanon, the name "Mount Lebanon" started to be used to describe the whole Mountain, instead of describing the northern part of the Mountain which was inhabited mainly by the Maronites before their expansion to the Chouf (De Clerck, 2008: 1)

majority of the population of Al Chouf after their victory in the Mountain War. This is, partially, how the Druzes were able to translate their military victory into a political triumph (Zeineddine, 2010: 38; Harik, 1995).

The main purpose of this thesis is not to reconstruct the historical events of the Mountain War, or to take one side against the other. Nonetheless, this thesis endeavors to understand how the specific history of inter-sectarian rivalries between two of Lebanon's confessional communities influenced the dynamics and consequences of their confrontation in the twentieth century. This approach attempts to unpack sectarian conflicts and move away from the arguments that depict communal violence in the Middle East as the culmination of primordialism and the lack of modernity (Makdisi, 2000).

B. Conceptual Framework

Collective memory:

To what extent can collective memory provide an understanding of the persistence of historical events in the memory of a certain group/community?

In an attempt to understand how the 1860 events persisted in the memory of the Druze community and were invoked in the Mountain War in the twentieth century, this thesis is going to use the concept of collective memory. Through the conceptual framework, the thesis will attempt to answer a number of questions: Is the process of remembering an individual or group process? What if a group of individuals or a certain community experienced certain forms of violence, such as genocide or any other form of collective humiliation, can one speak then of group and collective memory of such an event? Would collective memory be the sole and only intermediate variable to interpret and understand the past? Does collective memory de-validate or underestimate the value of individual memory? And more importantly, why would a group of individuals continue to cling to a certain past event in the present time and even, pass it down to their predecessors? To place these questions in a broader perspective, a broader question should be asked and which is: what is the past? What is the relation between the past, the present and the future? Is there a rupture between them? Or Is it possible to speak of "historical continuity" between the past, present and future? These important questions shall be examined through the concept of collective memory.

1. What is Collective memory?

Maurice Halbwachs, a French sociologist and one of Emile Durkheim's students, was the first to use the concept of collective memory. The latter terminology first appeared in

Halbwachs' famous book "*La Mémoire Collective"* (On Collective Memory), which he published in 1922. Halbwachs' approach to memory is more of a sociological one, which celebrates the significance of the social context in the recalling, recreation and the reconstruction of the past. It is in society, or within a certain group that individuals recall past events. This does not mean that individuals do not possess enough reason or consciousness to think about the past events on their own or in an individualistic manner. Nonetheless, it is within group life that individuals' dignity, reason and consciousness are functioning in their best way. In other words, it is in group life that individuals can remember and recreate the past in a coherent manner (Halbwachs, 1992: 22). The use of the words "coherent manner" shows that Halbwachs did not nullify the significant role of human agency in remembering past events, which is among the main critiques[37] of his concept, especially by historians. On the other hand, he argued that when people of the same group have similar past experiences, this enables the whole group to develop better understanding of such experiences and keep them alive; since they are shared among various members of the same group. Thus, although individuals have their own remembrance of a certain event, they still find interest to remember such incident within a certain group. This is because group remembrance helps to fill the gaps that are existent in the individual memory. Collective memory is also very critical for individuals who want to understand past events, which could have happened to their communities, and

[37] Halbwachs' concept of collective memory was criticized by a number of scholars. For instance, Halbwachs is sometimes criticized for attributing the term collective memory to himself while references to the concept of "group memory" had been already made in the writings of several Greek philosophers; and also, in the writings of several French philosophers and sociologists in the sixteenth century. For example, expressions such as *"la mémoire des hommes", "une mémoire éternelle"* and "une mémoire *perpétuelle"* had been used for several times in the writings of many French sociologists in the pre-twentieth century French literature (Russell, 2006: 793). Several historians have also criticized Halbwachs' concept of collective memory, arguing that remembering is a pure mental act, which is an absolutely individual process. Individuals have their own understanding of events; even if such events were public ones that were experienced by the whole society, or certain groups (Funkenstein, 1989: 6-7; Kansteiner, 2002: 184-186). Moreover, the famous French historian Pierre Nora argued that collective memory is central to primordial communities, in which the "remnants of experience still live in the warmth of tradition, in the silence of custom, in the repetition of the ancestral; with collectively remembered values, with skills passed down by unspoken traditions" (Nora, 1989:13: Gedi and Elam, 1996: 30-35). Other historians, such as: Peter Novick, criticized Halbwachs' concept of collective memory for overlooking the "pastness of events" and for advocating for the concept of historical continuity. On the other hand, history believes in the passage of time. Novick also criticized collective memory for reducing historical events to mere "mythic archetypes", that aspire to create eternal truths and facts to foster a sense of group solidarity; along with creating a sense of "collective identity". See Novick (2000: 5-6).

they have not witnessed them. In this case, one has to rely on his/her community to be able to evoke their own past (Halbwachs, 1992: 50-51).

Halbwachs' concept of collective memory has been strongly influenced by the ideas of his professor Emile Durkheim on "Collective Effervescence". Emile Durkheim believed that it was through "Collective Effervescence" that scholars in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries gathered in Paris, discussed ideas and laid the foundation of the renaissance and scholasticism. Thus, it was through the gathering of a number of individuals that the beginnings of human cultural creativity had started (Halbwachs, 1992: 24). Nonetheless, Halbwachs criticized the fact that Durkheim did not explain how groups in the same society are bound together or how members of the same group come together. This is the main gap that Halbwachs filled in his discussion of collective memory. According to Halbwachs, it is not the sole action of gathering people to commemorate or celebrate great events that help them recall and reconstruct the past. Nonetheless, it is through collective memory, a bond and an intermediate variable, that people commemorate events and give them meaning. According to Halbwachs, there is no such thing as empty spots or vacuum in the lives of the societies and groups. Any vacuum is filled with memories that are passed from one generation to another; this is what Halbwachs consistently referred to as collective memory. Halbwachs argued that the connection and bond between members of the same group is fundamentally premised on the idea that the past is always a social construct that is persistently shaped by the present. Thus, it is the present that inspires people to dig into their past, and reconstruct it. According to Halbwachs, "beliefs, interests and aspirations of the present shape our views of the past". This connection between the past and the present is referred to, by Halbwachs, as "historical continuity" (Halbwachs, 1992: 24-25).

Unlike historical memory, which resembles historical events in a condensed way, representing the past in an extremely distant manner, collective social memory focuses on the past as a lived experience; something which Halbwachs referred to as "the living bond of generations". The latter refers to patterns of thought and lived experiences that are passed down from one generation to another. It is not confined to dates or events. Nonetheless, such lived experiences are more about ideas and perceptions of the past that continue to inspire the present, and which definitely help individuals to understand their past (Halbwachs, 1992: 63-64).

2. Collective memory and the Mountain War: How does this concept help in the understanding of the dynamics of *Harb Al Jabal?*

Although several scholars continue to criticize the concept of collective memory, it is still very beneficial for this thesis; since this concept is not only concerned with past events

and their reconstruction for the sake of preserving them per se. Rather, this concept is important since it deals with past experiences as lived experiences, which continue to be strongly present and evident in the present time. Based on that perception of the past, Halbwachs argued that the "lived experience of the past" is relived through traces that are still strongly evident in the surrounding social milieu; the latter is what makes us closely connected to the past more than the books and the records that inform us about the past (Halbwachs, 1992: 68). Those ideas are critical as they show that the past is not distant from the present; or to be more precise, such ideas put more emphasis on what Halbwachs referred to as the historical continuity between the past, the present and the future. What is even more pivotal to point at is the continued presence of what Halbwachs called "traces of the past in the present". This could help explain why certain past events would remain strongly evident in the present. It is also very essential to point out at the consistent act of remembrance that is key to keeping past events strongly existent in the present and even the future. Remembrance, through listening to testimonies, keeps the memory of a past event persistently existent in our present times (Halbwachs, 1992: 68-69).

According to Halbwachs (1992: 69), reliance on the historical conceptualization of a certain past event renders it obsolete and meaningless; it is only through remembrance that the social framework of any historical event becomes filled. This would bring another important issue into question, which is whether remembrance is an individual or group act. According to Halbwachs (1992: 72), remembrance is both a mental and social process that has its individualistic and collective dimensions. Nevertheless, it is through group membership that the individual is able to renew his/ her own personal remembrances. Individuals do not have full or complete remembrance of their past; and thus, it is through the group to which they belong that a more coherent image of the past is developed. Along with remembrance, it is when "a precise path" to the past appears that traces of past events start to be more obvious (Halbwachs, 1992: 76). Those traces could be political crises or renewed cycles of violence that might remind a certain group of people of a similar past/lived experience.

By looking at the way the Druze political and religious leaderships used the 1860 events to mobilize the Druzes politically and militarily against their Maronite counterparts, it does not show that the 1860 events were a mere historical event in the history of Lebanon in general, and the Maronite-Druze relations in particular. Also, the 1860 events do not tend to be a mere historical clash that occurred between the Maronites and the Druzes, and which was confined to the past. On the other hand, the Druzes had kept the 1860 events strongly existent in their collective memory so that when the precise path for that incident appeared, which is the Mountain War or the political crisis leading to the Mountain War, the memory of the 1860 events was present and could be readily invoked. By looking at the Lebanese *zajal*, popular poem, of the Druze poet Tali Hamdan, one

could find that the events of 1860 were quite integral to the Druze popular culture in Mount Lebanon before *Harb Al Jabal* occurred[38]. Unlike the Maronites, the Druze historians, apart from Kamal Joumblat, started in the mid-1980s to write about the history of Mount Lebanon, Lebanon and the community's history. This made the Druze community dependent on popular poetry, which was a principal means of transmitting the Druzes' perception of Lebanon's history (Hazran, 2013). In Hazran's words, "the diffusion of the Druze narrative into *Zajal* could be interpreted in the light of the intertextuality between written texts and oral tradition and a method to conduct a polemic against the Maronite establishment, historiography and politics" (Hazran, 2012: 169). Although *Zajal* is not peculiar to the Druzes in Mount Lebanon, as it has been practiced in numerous villages in Mount Lebanon that have non-Druze inhabitants (i.e. Maronite and/or Shi'ite inhabitants), it has been an important tool through which many Druzes developed a relatively collective understanding of their history and that of Mount Lebanon (Hood, n.d.: 18). While it is difficult to measure the extent to which *Zajal* has been diffused in the everyday lives of the Druzes in Mount Lebanon (since my sample of interviewees was limited), most of the interviews that I conducted with the Druze ex-fighters in the Mountain War reveal the significant role of oral history in the development of a relatively (Druze) collective understanding of the history of Mount Lebanon and Greater Lebanon. While oral history should not be equated with *Zajal*, the latter remains an important tool for the dissemination and maintenance of oral history[39].

In some of the literature on collective memory, emotions, just like historical events, are depicted as something that can be remembered. Emotions can be crucial since they are sometimes the basis upon which the processes of remembering and "the conscious recollection of facts and events" are premised. Accordingly, the question of one's emotional experience in regards to a certain event is no less important than that of the process of remembering the event itself. People remember how they felt and their emotional experience regarding a certain historical event that they have experienced on the level of their group. Sharing the emotional experience of a certain event is part of constructing the group's collective memory of this incident. This does not necessarily mean that such collective memory is an accurate or objective representation of the reality. Nevertheless, the memory of one's or a group's emotions in regards to a specific event could be the result of selective or reconstructive memory, which is the outcome of subjective understanding of the event. This means that religious, social, political and cultural biases can play a significant role in how individuals and members of a specific group can perceive a certain historical event. Such biases can be influenced by specific personal stances or emotions. This means that even when collective memory is depicted as a memory that represents how a group of people think, it does not negate the

[38] Tali Hamdan's Zajal will be examined in chapter three.

[39] For more information on the importance of *Zajal* in the Lebanese context, see Haydar (2014: 8-10).

significance of personal and individual memories of a specific event (Lambert, Scherer, Rogers & Jacoby, 2009: 194-202).

Given that, it was not only the memory of a specific historical event (1860 events) that was invoked during the Mountain War, but also the memory of the Druze emotions of such events; emotions of the fear of another political loss, fear of more loss of their social prestige that is associated with their territorial control over the Chouf and also, the fear of experiencing the same humiliation that the Druzes of the 19th century experienced; this was expressed by the Druze interviewees as it will be thoroughly examined in chapter three. Although the idea of loss, such as the loss of land or experiencing displacement, does not involve an immediate "deadly dynamic", it should be understood in the light of its long-term consequences. This, accordingly, "allows for a more comprehensive historical understanding that demands a different notion of temporality" (Milich and Moghnieh, 2018: 6). The political defeat of the Druzes in 1860 had long term impact on their role in Greater Lebanon, which was reduced to a minimal and marginalized role. Throughout the twentieth century up until *Harb Al Jabal*, the Druze political leadership (led by the Joumblat family) consistently expressed the impact of the Druzes' political loss in the 1860 events, which was accompanied by loss of lands and properties, on the socio-economic and political marginalization of the Druzes in Greater Lebanon. Although one could argue that the political leadership had its own political and socio-economic interests behind such statements, given the fact that the Joumblat family was among the most influential *muqata'ji* families in Mount Lebanon up until the mid-nineteenth century, such statements had an impact on many of the Druze fighters who fought in the Mountain War (as some of the Druze interviewees stated, and which will be discussed in chapter three).

In regards to the Maronites, the memory of the 1860 sectarian rivalries invoked the fear of experiencing the same horrors that their ancestors witnessed, part of which was due to the lack of unity and organization among the Christians. This explains why Bachir Gemmayel, the leader of the Phalangist militia and Lebanon's president from the 23rd of August 1982 till the 14th of September 1982, used the discourse of the 1860 events to justify his military actions against the other Christian factions (the Tigers[40] militia that was led by Dany Chamoun and the Marada[41] militia that was led by Suleiman Franjieh).

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[40] On the 7th of July, 1980, Bachir Gemmayel's militia, Al Kataeb/the Phalangists, committed a massacre against the Tigers. This massacre was known as: The Safra massacre or the "Day of the Long Knives". This massacre was one of Bachir's attempts to unite the Christian front in the Lebanese Civil War under one leadership, which was his (Shaw and Demy, 2017: 485).

[41] In 1978, the Phalagists committed one of their most horrendous massacres in Ehden, where they killed Suleiman Franjieh's son, Tony Franjieh, his wife and daughter. This was also part of Bachir Gemmayel's attempts to unite the Maronite community under his leadership; even if that meant the use of violent methods (Naor, 2016: 328-329). For more information on the inter-Maronite divisions before and during the Lebanese Civil War, See Abu-Khalil (1990: 77-80).

In 1980, Bachir forcibly[42] united the different Christian factions (Kataeb/ Phalangists, the Tigers and the Marada) under the Lebanese Forces (LF) militia (Makdisi and Sadaka, 2003:15). This, briefly, shows how the Maronite political leadership conjured the memory of the 1860 sectarian rivalries in a different manner than the Druze political leadership. Emotions of fear of more loss and emotions of hope of restoring their hegemony over the Mountain made the Druzes envision the Mountain War as their last opportunity to avenge their ancestors for the 1860 political defeat. For the Druzes, the Mountain War was not only about protecting their community, but also about achieving political gains that would alter their situation; or at least, this is how their political and religious leaderships depicted the conflict.

The relation between memory and emotions is very critical not only for remembering the past, or a specific historical event, but also for the present time. Highlighting the memory of a group's emotions in regards to a specific event can sometimes be very important since it can help draw resonance and symbiosis with a similar contemporary emotional experience. This is called 'episodic memory' through which people do not only remember, but they also tend to "re-experience" the emotional content of the same experience that happened before (Lambert, Scherer, Rogers & Jacoby, 2009: 194-203). This is very similar to what Halbwachs discussed with regard to historical continuity and the fact that the past is not divorced from the present. This is also very similar to what he referred to as the "precise path to the past", in which there are moments in the present time that will bring memories of the past into the present in an obvious manner; and with them, memories of emotions will be brought and experienced as well in the present time. Episodic memory reflects strong emotions, such as anger, depression, grief, or feelings of loss, that a person might not have experienced individually, but his group could have encountered such emotions in a certain historical event. The fact that the person might belong to a certain group can make him/her experience the same feelings when something in the present reminds him/her of a similar past experience (Lambert, Scherer, Rogers & Jacoby, 2009: 194-203).

C. Methodology

This thesis will rely on qualitative methods. It will use oral history as one of its main tools to develop a better understanding of the Mountain War (1983-1984), its reasons, dynamics and consequences. The Mountain War is one of the most sensitive phases in the Lebanese civil war, and very limited literature has been produced on that topic since the

end of the war. Additionally, most of the available literature tends to overlook the impact of the nineteenth century Maronite-Druze rivalries on the dynamics and consequences of the Mountain War; focusing more on investigating the international, regional and local factors that paved the way for this war to occur. This, accordingly, culminated in bolstering the Lebanese state-sponsored approach towards the Lebanese civil war in general, and which is premised on oblivion and forgetfulness; which is the approach that the Lebanese state has adopted towards the civil war, following its issuance of the General Amnesty Law in 1991. This law exempted the Lebanese warlords from the war crimes that they committed. The fact that most of those warlords became politicians and *zu'ama* (leaders) of their communities in the post-war period made the civil war, in general, a sensitive topic in Lebanese society. Thus, the state tends to adopt the approach of oblivion towards the war, as if it did not happen (Lebanon: Human Rights Developments and Violations, 1997: 7).

Given this context, this thesis will rely on oral history to provide the subaltern and sidelined voices with a space to express themselves. This does not mean that the official narratives on the Mountain War will be ignored. Nevertheless, the thesis will use oral history to fill the gaps that the official historical narratives were not able to fill or deliberately ignored. Oral history is one of the oldest methods that historians have used, and continue to use, to investigate historical events. Oral history refers to the process of collecting information about a certain past event via a number of in-depth interviews with participants who have witnessed or experienced a certain past event. It is also interested in the recollection of personal experiences, encounters and reflections on past events (Oral History, 2018).

Although oral history is a very old tool in the field of history, it has been revived in the mid-twentieth century by the Italian historian Alessandro Portelli, one of the world's leading practitioners of oral history. Portelli's interest in oral history was the culmination of his realization of the extent to which historical records were politicized and ideologized to serve certain political interests[43] (Stille, 2001). Portelli, accordingly, became highly interested in the revival of the field of oral history in an attempt to break away from official historical narratives that are mainly found in books and historical

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[43] In the 1970s, Portelli was doing an oral history of a small working class in Italy and he asked the interviewees about the death of the trade union protestor Luigi Trastulli. Portelli found that the majority of his interviewees said that Trastulli died in the demonstrations of 1953 that were held against the mass firing of workers from local factories. Portelli was surprised that almost none of the interviewees said that Trastulli died in the 1949 working class demonstrations against Italy's decision to join the NATO. Associating Trastulli with the 1953 demonstrations is basically about the Italian state's endeavors to confine the working class activism to issues that relate directly to them (i.e. being fired from local factories). On the other hand, associating the death of Trastulli with the 1949 demonstrations meant that the working class in Italy, during the twentieth century, was extremely politicized and active in demonstrations that were not directly affecting their livelihoods; which is a narrative that the Italian state would not be interested to let it prevail (Stille, 2001).

records. Oral history, on the other hand, gives other subaltern voices and opinions the room to exist, instead of being persistently sidelined by official historical narratives. The importance of this tool also lies in the fact that it bridges the gap between memory and history since oral historians tend to rely on both methods in the in-depth personal interviews, along with written historical records and archives. The reliance on both tools enables historians to approach historical events in unconventional ways where contradictions might result between what intervieews might say and what is written in historical records. This further challenges historians and encourages them to fill the gaps that might exist in the historical production of a certain past event; and to even, challenge the knowledge produced about a specific historical event (Stille, 2001). The interviews that I have conducted with a number of Druze ex-fighters in the Mountain War revealed the role of the discourse of the 1860 events, which was deployed by the Druze political and religious leaderships in the Mountain War, in motivating many Druzes to fight against their Maronite counterparts. The understanding of the impact of the specific history of Maronite-Druze inter-sectarian relations in the nineteenth century on their violent encounter in *Harb Al Jabal* is, accordingly, central to the understanding of the Maronite-Druze violent encounter in the Mountain War; which is something that is slightly covered in secondary literature on the Mountain War.

One of Portelli's important contributions to the field of oral history is the idea that history can manipulate memory (see *The Order Has Been Carried Out: History, Memory And The Meaning Of A Nazi Massacre In Rome* (2003)). Additionally, even if oral history is subject to vagaries or biases, which is a normal characteristic of human behavior especially in the process of narrating stories/incidents, this is not hugely different from other historical sources. Correspondences, memoires, diaries, official texts, newspapers and archives are all subject to biases and different interpretations by individuals (Reti, 2013).

Oral History is also of great significance as it sheds the light on what trauma and loss mean for individuals, and their communities; and how and why they persist in personal and collective memories (Blight, 2005: 5-7). Portelli draws our attention to how the idea of loss is very central to some individuals and how it persists in their memories, especially when loss (materialistic or symbolic) has consequences that go beyond the end of a certain incident. The trauma of a certain historical incident is not only associated with how horrible the incident was, but it is fundamentally linked with the consequences of this incident; and that is why traumas persist (Portelli, n.d.).

It was not only Portelli who put emphasis on the importance of oral history and personal testimonies, but also the French Philosopher Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur encouraged historians to avoid their excessive reliance on archives that represent permanent testimonies. On the other hand, historians have to pay more attention to oral testimonies which connect memory to history, and make the relation between them both dynamic. Ricoeur added

that even when historians might disagree with him in regards to the credibility of the witnesses who give their oral testimonies, Ricoeur stated that this would be the greatest role of historians to critically asses these testimonies. History should be approached from a critical and analytical perspective, which would make it persistently subject to revision; this would hinder any attempt to establish official history or biased narratives, which even if they would exist, at least they will not be hegemonic (Ricoeur, 2005: 11-13).

In this thesis, I have conducted eight semi-structured interviews. Four of the interviewees are from Deir El Qamar village, which was one of the villages that the Druzes targeted in 1860 and 1983. The four interviewees did not participate in the Mountain War. The majority of them were witnesses of the war. Two of them experienced the Druze siege of Deir El Qamar, while the other two were in East Beirut, which was and continues to be a Christian neighborhood. Those four interviews that were conducted in Deir El Qamar were extremely challenging since the participants did not feel very comfortable to speak about the Mountain War, believing that it would open the wounds of the past; as they have put it. They also stated that this is such a sensitive topic, which they prefer to keep in the past and not to bring back to the present. The sensitivity of this topic, along with the geographical location of Deir El Qamar that is surrounded and encircled by Druze villages, made many people in Deir El Qamar unwilling to be interviewed. Additionally, one of the interviewees asked to remain anonymous and another one was very cautious in his answers to my questions. In regards to the other five interviews that I conducted, they were all Druzes. Four of the interviewees are ex-militia fighters who fought in the Mountain War. Not all of them were members of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) militia, as one of them was member of the Lebanese Communist Party. Nevertheless, what is interesting here is that when the Mountain War started, they all fought with the PSP against the Lebanese Forces. The last participant is a Druze woman who was a witness of the Mountain War, as her village was among the villages, in which Christians were massacred and others were expelled. The five Druze interviewees are currently members of the "Fighters for Peace" Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), through which I was able to conduct the interviews on the Mountain War. The fact that those Druze ex-fighters reconciled with their past and joined Fighters for Peace NGO made them more open and more willing to answer my interview questions.

This thesis will also rely on other primary sources, along with oral history, which include: The Druze newspaper "Al Anbaa" and two Maronite newspapers "Al Maseera and Al 'Amal", which I had access to via the American University in Beirut (AUB) microfilms section.

In regards to the primary sources on the 1860 events, the thesis will rely on the historical chronicles of Christian and Druze historians, who lived in Mount Lebanon in the nineteenth century; and some of them were active participants in the 1860 sectarian clashes. In looking at the narratives of the 1860 events from the Druzes' perspective, the

thesis will use the chronicle of Husain Ghadban Abu Shakra, *Harakat Fi Lubnan Ela ‘Ahd Al Mutassarefeyya.* In regards to the Christian chronicles, the thesis will use the work of Iskandar Abkariyus *Nawādir al-zamānfīwaqā’i‘JabalLubnān* and the chronicle of Mikhail Mishaqa, which is under the title of *Kitāb mashhad al-‘iyān bi-ḥawādith Sūriyā wa-Lubnān.*

In regards to secondary sources, the thesis will use academic books and journals that focus on the Maronite-Druze inter-communal relations in the 19th century[44]. In respect to the War of the Mountain, the thesis will rely on chapters from books[45].

Division of Chapters

The thesis will be divided into three chapters. Chapter one will examine the history of the development of the Maronite-Druze inter-sectarian relations in Mount Lebanon from the sixteenth until the mid-nineteenth century. First, the chapter will examine the socio-economic and political organization of the *Iqtaa’* system in Mount Lebanon up until the beginning of the nineteenth century. Second, the chapter will examine the prevalence of feudal loyalties over sectarian affiliations till the mid-nineteenth century. Third, the chapter will examine the development of communal-based identities by the beginning of the nineteenth century as a result of a number of factors, which included: The internal transformations of the Maronite community and the emergence of reform-minded clerics who led the (Maronite) peasants’ revolts in 1820, 1840 and 1858; the policies of Emir Bachir II and the Egyptian occupation of Mount Lebanon in 1831; and the Tanzimat reforms of 1838 and their sectarian-based interpretations by the different actors in Mount Lebanon. The 1841 and 1860 sectarian clashes will be examined as a manifestation of the replacement of class-based identities with sectarian ones. Additionally, this chapter will attempt to understand how the Druze landlords and Druze peasants’ perceived the socio-economic and political developments in the Mountain, along with the Maronite peasants’ revolts. And finally, the chapter will endeavor to understand why the Druze peasants, despite the fact that they shared similar grievances with their Maronite counterparts, supported their landlords and did not participate in the peasants’ revolts.

[44] Example of the books that will be used to discuss the Maronite-Druze inter-communal relations in the 19th century are: *Lebanon 1860-1960* by Claude Kanaan (2005), *Beirut* by Samir Kassir (2003), *All Honorable Men: The Social Origins of War in Lebanon* by Michael Hudson (2001), *Lebanon’s Predicament* by Samir Khalaf (1987), *A House of Many Mansions* by Kamal Salibi (1988) and T*he Culture of Sectarianism* by Ussama Makdisi (2001).

[45] *Where Were You During The War?* by Ghassan Charbel (2011), *The War of the Mountain: Israel, Christians and Druze in the 1983 Mount Lebanon Conflict Through the Eyes of a Lebanese Forces Fighter* by Paul Andary (2012), *A History of Modern Lebanon* by Fawaz Traboulsi (2007) and *The Modern History of Lebanon* by Kamal Salibi (1976).

Chapter two will examine the socio-economic and political statuses of the Druze community in the Lebanese society in the period from the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 till the beginning of the Lebanese civil war in 1975. There will be an examination of how the Druze political leadership dealt with the Lebanese political establishment after the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920. There will be an investigation of how the Druze political leadership moved from adopting a conciliatory and accommodating approach towards the French mandate and the Maronite dominated political leadership to a confrontational approach with the Lebanese political establishment starting from 1943 till the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975. Accordingly, there will be an examination of how Kamal Joumblat endeavored to exploit a number of political crises that occurred in Lebanon in the twentieth century to alter his community's socio-economic and political marginalization. Thus, Kamal Joumblat's stance on the 1943 National Pact will be examined. Moreover, his role in the 1958 mini-civil war and the 1975 civil war will also be investigated. In the examination of Kamal Joumblat's struggle, there will be an understanding of what he aspired to achieve from his confrontational posture towards the Maronite-dominated political establishment, the alliances he made to fulfill his goals and the extent to which he succeeded in his political struggle.

Chapter three will focus on the Mountain War. The chapter will examine the role of the inter-sectarian Druze-Maronite enmities in enflaming the crisis that started with the May 17 accord, turning it into a bloody clash between the Druzes and the Maronites. The chapter will also look at the particularism of the Mountain War for the Druze community, especially after the failure of Kamal Joumblat to eradicate the Maronite hegemony over the Lebanese political system up until his assassination. The chapter will then examine how both the Maronites and the Druzes envisioned *Harb Al Jabal*. Did both communities look at the Mountain War as a repetition or extension of the 1860 sectarian events. This will be done via using the interviews that were conducted in Lebanon in August 2017. Although the sample of the interviews is limited due to the sensitive nature of the topic, there are secondary sources that support the testimonies of the interviewees; and which will be used. There will be an examination of the other factors that enabled the Druzes to win the Mountain War, along with their leadership's successful dwelling on the 1860 events. These factors include: The value of the land in the Druze community, the role of the religious leadership in mobilizing the Druze masses during the war and the unity and cohesiveness of the Druze community in times of crises. The chapter will also examine the consequences of the Mountain War that ranged from the ethnic cleansing of the Christians till the occupation of their villages, their lands and their homes. The chapter will end by examining how the Druzes were able to transform their military victory into a political triumph; re-imposing their hegemony over the Mountain. In this chapter, newspaper articles from Al Anbaa (Druze newspaper), and Al Maseera and Al 'Amal (Maronite newspapers) will be used to show how *Harb Al Jabal* was addressed by both

the Maronite and Druze intelligentsia; in a way that placed the 1860 events in the core of the Mountain War.

Chapter One

Mount Lebanon and the nineteenth century socio-economic and political changes: From feudal rivalries to Maronite-Druze inter-sectarian conflicts

A. Introduction

Mount Lebanon witnessed in the nineteenth century a number of clashes between two religious groups: The Maronites and the Druzes. Before the nineteenth century, both groups co-existed. This does not mean that religious discrimination did not exist. Nevertheless, a culture of "religious tolerance" prevailed since the Mountain's rivalries, up until the nineteenth century, were mainly fueled by conflicts over land. This rendered communal and religious identities peripheral in comparison to identifications based on wealth and status. Accordingly, violence in Mount Lebanon did not assume a sectarian character before the nineteenth century. In Ussama Makdisi's words (2000: 183), "while violence existed in 'traditional' pre-1860 Ottoman Lebanese society, it consisted primarily of elite violence deployed to reaffirm an extremely rigid non-sectarian social hierarchy". Nevertheless, this socio-economic and political order, which was premised on a strict distinction between the aristocratic feudal class and the commoners or *'amma*, was not immune to the socio-economic and political changes that swept Mount Lebanon in the nineteenth century, challenging the feudal order that had long prevailed in the Mountain (Makdisi, 2000; Khalaf, 2002; Khalaf, 1987; Hudson; 2001).

Mount Lebanon witnessed peasant uprisings in 1820, 1840 and 1858. Those uprisings were partially a reflection of reformist values, which were introduced by nineteenth-century changes. These changes encompassed the emergence of a group of reform-minded Maronite clergy who rejected the Maronite church's subordination to the landlords and the increased European missionary presence in Mount Lebanon, which was accompanied by increased levels of Western education, especially among the Maronites. This is besides the increased European demand for silk, which Maronite peasants were mainly responsible for cultivating, and which resulted in the improvement of the socio-economic status of many Maronite peasants. In turn, many found themselves able to lend money to their former landlords. During the same period, wider political changes were sweeping the Mountain with the rise of Emir Bachir II to power in 1789, the Egyptian occupation of Mount Lebanon in 1831 and the introduction of the Tanzimat. All these developments curbed the powers of the landlords in the Mountain. The majority of the landlords were from the Druze community, which could partially explain why the Druze landlords depicted such changes as "religious", inducing the Druze peasants to resist them and not join the peasants' revolts. The Maronite peasants and clergy were the main

participants in those revolts, which, accordingly, assumed a confessional nature, at least for the non-Christian communities. Among the consequences of the peasant revolts was the emergence of a new form of class consciousness among the commoners of the Maronite community. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, such consciousness was not sectarian as much as it was premised on the discourse of public interests (*al-Salih al-umumi*) of the commoners. This was especially the case with the 1820 peasant revolts.

In response to those internal developments that were happening in the Maronite community, the Druze landlords, with the support of the Druze religious leaders, were investing in a different form of communal and sectarian consciousness, premised on fear and distrust of the other. Hoping to rally the Druze peasants, the Druze landlords placed the Druze community's survival in Mount Lebanon in a dichotomous posture vis-à-vis the Maronites' existence. It was via this discourse that the Druze landlords, with the help of the Druze religious leaders, turned the class-based revolts of 1840 and 1858 into sectarian rivalries (Khalaf, 1987: 34-35).

Despite the fact that sectarian disputes plagued the Mountain during the mid-nineteenth century, they should not be viewed as an expression of the triumph of sectarianism and primordialism in Mount Lebanon. The deployment of sectarian violence, especially by the Druze community against their Maronite counterparts, must be unpacked and situated within the wider realm of Mountain politics in the nineteenth century. In this sense, sectarian violence was an expression of the Druze landlords' resistance to the nineteenth century changes, which challenged their feudal authority. The landlords were threatened not only by the rise of reform-minded Maronite clergy and their instigation of reformist values among the Maronite peasants, but also by the policies of Emir Bachir II (1789-1840), the Egyptian occupation of Mount Lebanon in 1831, and the Tanzimat reforms of 1838, accompanied by increased European intervention in Mount Lebanon. These socio-economic and political changes gradually culminated in the erosion of feudalism, which made sectarian violence the means by which the Druze landlords, who constituted the majority of the feudal families, could re-establish their power over their territories and subjects. According to the Lebanese Druze scholar Naila Kaiedbey (2011: 8), the Druzes' deployment of sectarian violence in the nineteenth century was the culmination of the polarization of sectarian identities, which replaced class-based identities, following the decline of feudalism in Mount Lebanon. In Kaiedbey's words (2011: 8), "Total elimination of the "Other" was the only guarantee of safety. Sectarian violence was hitherto freed from accountability to the old regime; all boundaries were lost".

While unpacking sectarian violence in Mount Lebanon is central to a discussion of the impact of nineteenth-century socio-economic and political changes on Maronite-Druze relations, it is not the only concern of this chapter. The issue of the Druze peasants' non-participation in the peasants' revolts and their choice to stand, instead, with their landlords is pertinent to the understanding of how this community acted during times of

crises. Did the community have specific characteristics that fostered cohesion and solidarity? The majority of the Druze and non-Druze literature on the study of Druze communities in the Middle East depict the Druzes peasants' mobilization in the nineteenth century as having ethnic motives, which sets them apart from other groups and makes them prioritize their ethnic interests over any class-based or factional divisions (Aboultaif, 2011: 9-10). Such literature perceives Druze communities in the Middle East as a minority that acted throughout its history as a political unit whose members managed to create an informal state-like hierarchy that is governed by informal and traditional institutions; these managed to thrive via the community members' reliance on "principles such as 'preserving of brotherhood', their imagination of themselves as belonging to a larger community and the inter-subjectivity around the prominence of certain clans, notables and religious leaders that allowed the minority to behave as a community" (Halabi, 2018: 977-978).

This approach is very reductionist since it portrays the Druze community as a uniform and monolithic group without any consideration for the differences between the different Druze communities that reside in different geographical locations in the Middle East. Furthermore, such an approach is problematic as it fails to account for the changes that the Druze communities could have witnessed throughout their history. There is a tendency to depict the Druze communities in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine/ Israel and Jordan as isolated and immune to the socio-economic and political changes that swept the Middle East in the nineteenth century[46]. Moreover, such an approach depicts the Druze communities as having succeeded to preserve their unity due to the persistence of their traditional institutions, without referring to any class-based or factional divisions inside such communities.

In the case of Mount Lebanon, while the Druze landlords and religious leaders managed to ensure the community's cohesion in times of crises in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this could not be justified in the light of their abilities to shield the community from its surrounding contexts. For instance, while the Druze peasants did not join the revolts of 1820, 1840 and 1858 and chose to side with their landlords, this does not mean that they were voiceless or lacking agency, or that their loyalty to their landlords was uncontested or unrivalled. Rather, the Druze peasants had their own fears and sensitivities regarding the rise of the Maronite community to power in a way that corresponded with the landlords' sectarian narratives. Understanding these fears helps shed light on the Druzes' collective reaction to the Maronite peasant revolts in Mount Lebanon. Additionally, while the Druzes acted in a collective manner during those revolts, their motivations might have been varied. Acting collectively does not necessarily mean that all members of a group have the same interpretation of events. Giving preeminence to

[46] Such changes include: The 1860 sectarian clashes in Mount Lebanon, the 1925 Syrian Great Uprising, 1936-1939 Palestinian Great Revolt and the 1948 Zionist-Arab War. See Halabi (2018: 977-997).

individual motives within the wider realm of collective and communal actions is essential if we are to avoid a linear interpretation of the complicated history of civil conflicts in Mount Lebanon; which tends to interpret such conflicts in the light of sectarian affiliations. According to May Tamimova (2018: 2-3), during crises, loyalties tend to be polarized and develop across confessional lines as a result of actors' contradictory ideologies that fluctuate between individual and group motivations. While violence could be committed in the name of a certain group or community, its individualistic nature should not be overlooked. Although sectarian violence could be practiced and deployed in a collective manner, this should be understood in the realm of war as a "collective experience" by virtue that could witness the convergence of individual and collective interests.

This chapter will argue that the socio-economic and political marginalization of the Druze community in Mount Lebanon in the nineteenth century enabled the Druze landlords to place the issue of "the preservation of the Druze community's survival" at the core of the Druze-Maronite inter-sectarian struggles, maintaining a strong sense of collective responsibility among the members of the community. Druze collective consciousness was, consequently, centered around the preservation of the community's existence in the Mountain. In other words, the nineteenth century context, which included the rise of the Maronite community to power, the increased intervention of the Maronite church in the politics of the Mountain, the sectarian policies of Emir Bachir II, the 1831 Egyptian intervention in the Mountain and the Tanzimat policies, paved the way for Druze peasants' and elites' motivations to converge and to be translated in collective actions, even if both groups had divergent interests. The political defeat of the community in the 1860 sectarian clashes, and the impact of this defeat on the community's further marginalization within Greater Lebanon (1920), was another reason for the community's configuration of a collective memory of the 1860 events and continued belief that Maronite dominance was a direct menace to the Druze community's survival in Lebanon. The issue of survival, accordingly, preserved the Druzes' cohesion in times of crises; and helped shape their collective memory of historical events that undermined their position on the Mountain.

I have used the term "collective" rather than "shared" memory to describe the Lebanese Druze memory of the nineteenth century sectarian violence since the term "collective" accommodates the idea that the elite imposed a top-down interpretation of certain events in the name of the community's collective interests. Despite this monolithic interpretation, different groups within the community experienced the events in different ways. In contrast, describing the memories as shared suggests that all members of the community experienced the events in similar ways (Masalha, 2018: 11). In the case of the Druzes of Mount Lebanon, while the Druze peasants had their own grievances, the Druze

landlords managed to create the illusion of symbiosis between the erosion of their feudal authorities and the survival of the entire community.

In an attempt to examine those issues, the following ideas will be examined. First, the chapter will examine the socio-economic and political organization of Mount Lebanon up until the beginning of the nineteenth century. Second, the chapter will examine the prevalence of tribal and land-based loyalties over religious affiliations till the mid-nineteenth century. Third, the chapter will examine the development of communal-based identities by the beginning of the nineteenth century as a result of a number of factors, which included: The internal transformations of the Maronite community and the emergence of reform-minded clerics who led the (Maronite) peasants' revolts in 1820, 1840 and 1858; the policies of Emir Bachir II and the Egyptian occupation of Mount Lebanon in 1831; and the Tanzimat reforms of 1838 and their communitarian interpretations by the different actors in Mount Lebanon. The 1841 and 1860 sectarian clashes will be examined as a manifestation of the replacement of class-based identities with sectarian ones. Additionally, this chapter will attempt to understand how the Druze landlords and Druze peasants perceived the socio-economic and political developments in the Mountain, along with the Maronite peasants' revolts. And finally, the chapter will endeavor to understand why the Druze peasants, despite the fact that they shared grievances with their Maronite counterparts, supported their landlords and did not participate in any of the peasant revolts.

B. Mount Lebanon and the system of *Iqtaa*: Land as the source of socio-economic and political power in Mount Lebanon

From 1585 to 1841, the principality (Emirate /*Imarah*) of Mount Lebanon was subject to the system of *Iqtaa'*[47]. This system refers to a political order in which a "number of autonomous hereditary aristocratic chiefs were subordinate in certain political aspects to a common overlord." The system of *Iqtaa* denoted both the political and the socio-economic order in Mount Lebanon (Harik, 1965: 405-406). In his book *Lebanon's Predicament*, the Lebanese sociologist Samir Khalaf (2002:64-65) illustrated how the *muqata'a* (district) that landlords owned in Mount Lebanon did not only entail political obligations to the Mountain's ruler (the Emir), but it also provided them with political rights; through which they could maintain the socio-economic order of the Mountain.

In order to understand how the system of *Iqtaa* functioned in Mount Lebanon, it is important to highlight the autonomous or semi-autonomous status of Mount Lebanon

[47] For more information on the system of *Iqtaa* in Mount Lebanon, See Harik (1965: 405-421). See Khuri (1969: 29-44). See Harik (1968: 200-289).

from the Ottoman Empire up until the mid-nineteenth century. In return for this status, the Mountain's Emir had to pay his annual tribute, known as the *miri* (the land tax), to the Ottoman treasury. This was done with the help of the landlords who controlled the *muqata'as* (tax farms) of Mount Lebanon. The landlords were responsible not only for collecting taxes from the peasants, but also for implementing justice and maintaining order and stability in the Mountain. For instance, they were responsible for crushing the peasant revolts, which could threaten the Mountain's stability and, therefore, its autonomous status. Nevertheless, the peasants were not the only source of instability in the Mountain. There were many instances when the landlords had conflicting interests and engaged in battles against each other (e.g. the Ayn Dara battle in 1711) (Makdisi, 2001: 31). In such cases, the Emir had to interfere and settle such conflicts; and in other cases, the Emir pitted powerful families against each other to get rid of some and empower others, which will also be further examined in this chapter. The Emir was subordinate to the authority of the Wali of Saida, who was subject to the higher authority of the Ottoman Sultan. Despite this hierarchical relation, neither the Ottoman Sultan nor the Wali (except in the case of Ahmed Pasha Al-Jazzar (1776-1804)) meddled in the internal affairs of the Mountain till the mid-nineteenth century when violence occurred and the landlords' authority was undermined (Khalaf, 2002:64-65; Traboulsi, 2007: 3-10; Salibi, 1961: 74-76).

Before the nineteenth century, the landlords maintained the Mountain's stability through a number of socio-economic arrangements, and the support of the religious leaders; who were also under the authority of the landlords. In regards to the socio-economic arrangements, taxation was one of the main tools that enabled the landlords to control their peasants. The landlords collected different types of taxes from their peasants. The *miri* was the official and common tax among all the peasants in the Mountain. The tax was collected on the basis of the crop sown. Nonetheless, this was not always the case and the amount usually changed with the fluctuating circumstances in Mount Lebanon. In addition to the *miri*, there were other taxes, such as the *Kharaj* or *Jizya*, the latter of which was imposed on non-Muslim peasants. With the introduction of the system of sharecropping in the early nineteenth century, more obligations were placed on the cultivators. For instance, they had to pay a certain share of their harvest to their landlords, along with a number of personal obligations and subservience. The sharecroppers could not leave the landlords without their permission, yet the landlords could forcibly transfer the sharecroppers to other peasants. Additionally, the sharecropper could not marry without the approval of his landlord, along with being forced to carry out corvée labor (free labor) for the construction of palaces, forts and some public works. The subordination of the peasants to their landlords was not solely maintained via taxation and other personal obligations, but also via a social structure that blocked any form of social mobility. Class demarcations were very strong, and "the distribution of social prestige among the different families was not arbitrary, but reflected a continuity of

traditional considerations". The following elements were determinant of the degree of social prestige that the landlords enjoyed: First, the titles[48] of the landlords were reflective of the actual power they possessed. Examples of titles include: Emir, *muqaddam* and Sheikh. Second, the older the family's genealogy, the more powerful and influential they were. Third, titles determined the esteem that the landlords enjoyed in the eyes of the ruling Emirs. Titles were pertinent in the determination of a family's social prestige. These elements turned marriage into a vital institution for the preservation of kinship. This further stratified the society and sharpened class and social demarcations. It was almost impossible for someone from the *'amma* (common people) to marry into the big landowning families (Khalaf, 1987: 26-29; Khater, 1996:331; El Khazen, 2006).

From this brief examination of the political and socio-economic structure of Mount Lebanon from 1585 till 1840, it could be argued that class-based interests were predominant over communal ones.

The maintenance of strong relations between the landlords and the religious figures, with a special focus on the Maronite and Druze religious leaders, enabled the landlords to largely control their *atba'* (followers). Both the Maronite clergy and the Druze religious leaders fostered the rule of local Druze notables who constituted the majority of the landlords in Mount Lebanon; and controlled the majority of the lands. The Maronite church provided the Druze sheikhs with Maronite peasants to work on their lands. In return, the Druze landlords provided the Maronite church with lands to build monasteries and churches. In regards to the Druze religious leaders, some of them were judges and advisors to the Druze elites (Makdisi, 2000: 184). As for the relation between the Maronite church and the Maronite landlords, the latter, who were geographically concentrated in the area of Kisrawan in North Lebanon, provided protection to the church in return for the clerics' allegiance to the Khazin *muqata'ji* family; whose authority dates back to the eighteenth century. The fact that the Khazin landlords controlled the majority of the lands in the Northern region of Mount Lebanon made them exercise considerable control over the Maronite church. They interfered in the selection of the bishops and archbishops up to the election of the patriarchs (Khalaf, 1987: 31-32).

The above examination of the socio-economic and political organization of Mount Lebanon could help in the understanding of how loyalties in Mount Lebanon were mainly divided along class-based divisions that denoted strict distinction between the landlords and the peasants.

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[48] The Ottoman Sultan, the Ottoman Wali or the Emir of Mount Lebanon used to grant such titles to the powerful and wealthy landlords in Mount Lebanon. See Traboulsi (2007:4).

C. The prevalence of tribal and class loyalties over religious affiliations until the mid-nineteenth century

Before the nineteenth century, factional divisions between the Qaysites and the Yemenites, which existed between the north and south Arab tribes that settled in Syria around the time of its conquest by the Arabs in 634, existed among the Druzes in Mount Lebanon. While the genealogy of such divisions is still contested, they, as put by Makdisi, "did not run along religious lines (Makdisi, 2001:184). The Christian chronicler Iskandar Abakarius[49] noted that the Maronite landlords and peasants were divided in their loyalties among the Qaysite and Yemenite factions. Even when the Qaysites defeated the Yemenites and the conflict became between two sub-Qaysite factions, the Maronites were still divided between those groups and fought on opposite sides (Abakarius, 1885: 83-84).

The Druze historian Abu 'Abbas Husain Ghadban Abu Shakra, who witnessed and participated in the 1860 events in Mount Lebanon, also asserted that family loyalties prevailed over religious affiliations until the beginning of the nineteenth century. From 1789 to 1822, religious animosity did not feature in relations between the Maronites and the Druzes in Mount Lebanon. Moreover, the Mountain's stability also stemmed from the presence of a kind of nominal and implicit division of labor among the two communities, in which the Druzes owned the land and the Maronites worked as peasants in their fiefs (Abu Shakra, 1952: 25-26). In other words, the Druzes were committed to the military defense of the Mountain, which included the protection of the landlords' holdings. The Christians, on the other hand, were responsible for production in the Mountain, which included their labor on Druze lands and in a range of other professions. Conflicts in Mount Lebanon were between contending political factions; as Abu Shakra put it: "Conflict in the Mountain was related to variance in bloodline and lineage, which is honorable, and not a conflict of faith and creed, which is dishonorable and ignoble" (Abu Shakra, 1952: 26). For instance, conflicts were mostly between Al Joumblat and Al Nakad over the payment of taxes. Al Joumblat, being the most powerful of the Druzes' factions, used to collect the taxes from the different Druze landlords and give them to Emir Bachir II. As part of their attempt to challenge the authority of Sheikh Bachir Joumblat, Al Nakad dynasty sometimes resisted the payment of their taxes; this led to conflicts between the families (Abu Shakra, 1952: 2-5). Abu Shakra referred to the division of labor between the Maronites and the Druzes as one reason why the Mountain

[49] Iskandar Abakarius is one of the most critical Christian historians in the nineteenth century who settled with his family in Mount Lebanon, after they left Armenia due to their persecution by the Ottomans. In his account on the events that took place in Mount Lebanon in 1860, Abakarius referred to the strong relations that were between his father Ya'coub Abakarius and Ibrahim Pasha, and which granted the former an advantageous and prestigious social and economic position in Mount Lebanon. This background information on Abakarius' family is essential as it will help us understand his perception of the 1860 events in Mount Lebanon (Abakarius, 1885: 83-84).

was stable up until the nineteenth century. A closer look at this division of labor would reveal the subordinate position of the Maronites to the Druzes. This could help explain why the Druze landlords were uneasy about the internal structural transformations in the Maronite community, which empowered some of the Maronite peasants, resulting in the rise a new class of merchants, middlemen, and tenants who were no longer subordinate to their landlords. This will be further examined in the next section.

D. The nineteenth century and the beginning of sectarian tensions in Mount Lebanon

During the nineteenth century, a number of socio-economic and political changes were introduced in Mount Lebanon. Those changes had a far-reaching impact on the re-organization and redefinition of power relations in Mount Lebanon; whereby previously disadvantaged groups (the Maronite peasants and clergy) were empowered and formerly powerful and dominant groups (the Druze landlords) were weakened. The re-organization of such power dynamics were reflected in land and property ownership, which was no longer confined to the landlords' families. However, this process did not happen in a smooth manner; and in various cases, the Mountain's Emir (Emir Bachir II) confiscated properties from the landlords and allocated them to the peasants. Many of the lands confiscated, furthermore, were owned by Druze landlords and reallocated to Maronite peasants. Although this depicts the situation as if changes were only imposed from above, the nineteenth century changes not only challenged the distribution of power between the Maronite and Druze communities, they also did the same between the members of the same community. This, accordingly, requires an understanding not only of the nineteenth century changes, which were introduced to Mount Lebanon via the interplay of local, regional and international factors; but also of how those changes were internalized by the communities of Mount Lebanon; with a special focus on the Maronites and Druzes. While the peasant revolts were the Maronite peasants' and clergy's expression of their understanding and internalization of the nineteenth century changes and reformist values, sectarian violence was the tool through which the Druze landlords expressed their rejection of such changes.

D.1. The internal reforms in the Maronite Church and the peasants' uprisings of 1820: How did these factors contribute to the articulation of different forms of "communal consciousness" in Mount Lebanon?

By the end of the eighteenth century, a number of reform-minded Maronite clerics, who were influenced by the internal reform of the Western Catholic church in the seventeenth century and who received their religious education in the Maronite college in Rome, started to challenge the unlimited powers of the *muqata'ji* families in North Lebanon (Aulas, 1985: 5). This was done through two fundamental changes: The first was the rationalization of the church bureaucracy and the second was working on the church's

economic independence from the landlords of the North. Besides those changes, the election, appointment and promotion of the clerics started to be premised on merit and achievement criteria rather than nepotism. These reforms were far-reaching and they assisted in curbing the powers of the landlords and in achieving economic independence for the church. The monastic organizations and orders played a vital role in fostering the church's economic independence, via its disciplinary system, which caused the monks to lead an austere yet productive life. It was through donations, gifts, their own labor and religious services that monasteries were able to accumulate wealth and land. Colonel Churchill estimated that by the mid-nineteenth century, the Maronite church controlled one fourth of the lands in Mount Lebanon. Not only were the monasteries able to generate their own source of income, but they were able to secure a decree in 1812 that stopped the *'ayan* from levying taxes on the monasteries (Khalaf, 1987: 32). The monasteries not only curbed the powers of the landlords in North Lebanon, but by 1812, they started to compete with the *muqata'ji* families in the collection of the *miri* tax. This represented the utmost challenge to the landlord families of North Lebanon. By the end of the eighteenth century, "The Maronite church was the largest, most organized and the wealthiest organization in the whole of Mount Lebanon" (Harik, 1968: 125).

Despite this consolidation, contentions existed between the upper and lower clerics of the Maronite church, especially that the former's interests were associated with those of the landlord families in North Lebanon. Nonetheless, the lower clerics were more powerful to do two things: first, to control the monastic orders and ensure their economic independence; and second, to develop strong links with the peasants (*'amma*). Many of the lower clergy monks received their education in the Maronite college in Rome. Following their return to Mount Lebanon, they monopolized the monasteries' educational services, which were modelled on the Western systems of education, and the printing press in Northern Lebanon, which played a central role in spreading the ideas that European missionaries promoted. It was through the provision of the educational services that those clerics were able to develop strong links with the peasants. In Marie-Christine Aulas' words (1985: 6), "The Maronite church's monopoly on education gave it ideological tutelage over the entire community, particularly as it made itself the conduit for Western culture". Additionally, the monks and the priests, especially the ones who came from a peasant background, were involved in the everyday life of the peasants. Their tasks were not only limited to the spiritual aspects (baptism, communion, marriage and last rites), but they were also involved in settling disputes between the peasants, finding them jobs in the villages, along with acting as mediators between the disputing factions in the villages. These diverse roles made the Maronite monks and priests "the most ubiquitous figures in their villages" (Khalaf, 2012: 170)

These internal transformations in the Maronite community played an important role in the emergence of a new form of collective consciousness to counter-balance the landlords'

class consciousness. While these developments were happening over the course of a century (during the eighteenth century), the peasants' conditions were severely deteriorating. Under the *Iqtaa* system in Mount Lebanon, although some peasants owned small plots of lands, they were not enough to sustain a family. As a result, many peasants were involved in sharecropping activities with the *muqata'jis*. By the eighteenth century, some peasants were able to own more lands via the system of cultivation contracts, which stipulated that the landowner should supply the cultivator with the land, tools and materials to plant trees and tend them for a period of time that ranged between three to twelve years. When the trees were fully mature, quarter of the land or the trees only became the property of the peasant. Additionally, some *muqata'jis* used to sell small plots to the peasants when they needed cash. In the early nineteenth century, the peasants became subject to higher taxes. Consequently, many peasants lost their lands to pay the taxes. These precarious conditions, along with the emergence of the Maronite church as a powerful institution led by reform-minded clergy, created ripe conditions for the first peasant revolts in Mount Lebanon in 1820. The Maronite Bishop, Yusuf Istfan (1759-1823), led the 1820 peasant revolts. Furthermore, he organized the peasants into village communes and made them choose *wakils* (representatives). There are important remarks about such revolts that should be highlighted. First, the Maronite peasants and clergy were the main participants in those revolts. Second, although there were Maronite peasants working in the lands of the Druze landlords in the Shuf in the southern area of Mount Lebanon, the revolts were principally carried out against the Maronite *muqata'jis* in the northern area of the Mountain (Beinin, 2001: 29-30). This means that those revolts remained limited in their actors and geographical target.

Joel Beinin, in his book *Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East*, attributed the minimal participation of the Druze peasants in the 1820 revolts to the fact that their leader sheikh Bachir Joumblat did not make them pay the additional taxes that were imposed on their Maronite counterparts. He urged the Druze *muqata'jis* to either pay the additional taxes or eschew collecting them from the Druze peasants. The taxes were only collected from the Maronite peasants of the Maronite *muqata'as* in the northern area of Mount Lebanon (Beinin, 2001: 30-31). The strength of Bachir Joumblat's leadership was also expressed by Samir Khalaf (1987: 33): "The Druze community in the South was solidly united under the leadership of Sheikh Bachir Joumblat and would have certainly resisted such demands". Khalaf added that the participation of the Maronite clergy further bolstered the sense of unity among the Druzes. Some scholars see the involvement of the Maronite clergy in the revolts as the "beginning of the creation of communal and sectarian consciousness", describing them as "articulators and carriers of a new Maronite ideology" (Khalaf, 1987: 32). There is very minimal literature on how the Druze peasants envisioned the 1820 peasants' revolts. However, a few Druze sources refer to the role of the Druze religious leaders in bridging the class and factional divisions in the Druze community during the 1820 peasant revolts; the latter was depicted by the Druze

religious leaders as motivated by having sectarian motives (Firro, 1992:58). Although such explanations seem valid, they do not fully explain why the Druze peasants did not join the revolts since the uprisings were not only a response to the additional taxes that were collected at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but also an expression of dissent and dissatisfaction with the *Iqtaa'* system in Mount Lebanon, which was oppressing the peasants, regardless of communal affiliation.

The 1820 revolts reveal a number of issues. First, the revolts were a departure from personal allegiances to the *muqata'jis* and augured the development of new forms of allegiance. This delivered an important message to the landlords that the *Iqtaa* system was not immune from internal transformations even if it seemed to be a closed system. Second, choosing a *wakil* to represent the demands of his village was an expression of the emergence of new actors in Mount Lebanon. The Mountain was no longer divided into two classes: The aristocrats and the common people. Third, the peasants started to articulate their demands in the language of the public interest (*al-Salih al-umumi*). Although the revolts challenged the landlords, they did not succeed in ending the *Iqtaa'* system. But, most importantly, those revolts failed to include the Druze peasants who "remained loyal to their landlords and refused to heed the call of class or public consciousness articulated in the North". The call for political change remained an essentially Maronite phenomenon, confined to the northern *muqata'as* (Khalaf, 1987: 34-35). This issue, along with the sectarian policies of Emir Bachir II, the Egyptian occupation of Mount Lebanon and the introduction of the Tanzimat to the Mountain, enabled the Druze landlords to develop a sectarian discourse around the nineteenth century changes; and use it to mobilize their commoners under the guise and façade of serving the community's collective interests. The next sections will analyze the policies of Emir Bachir, the Egyptian occupation of the Mountain and the Tanzimat to differentiate between the impact these policies had on the Druzes (both peasants and landlords), and how the Druze landlords developed a sectarian-based discourse based on such changes.

D.2. Emir Bachir II (1789-1840) and the Egyptian occupation of Mount Lebanon in 1831

The era of Emir Bachir Shihab II was one of the most turbulent in the history of Mount Lebanon. A number of socio-economic and political developments were introduced in the Mountain, especially with the Egyptian occupation of Mount Lebanon in 1831. These developments, along with the internal structural transformations in the Maronite community that were discussed above, further challenged the powers of the aristocratic families in Mount Lebanon. While the 1820 peasant uprisings challenged the landlords of Kisrawan, the era of Emir Bachir II resembled a direct attack on the Druze landlords. Nevertheless, this turbulent situation did not arise from the beginning of the reign of Emir

Bachir II who came to power with the support of the Druze leader Sheikh Bachir Joumblat. The latter was known for mediating between different Druze factions (Abu Shakra, 1952: 7). From a Druze perspective and based on the chronicle of Abu ‘Abbas Husain Ghadban Abu Shakra (1952:18-26), by 1822, Emir Bachir started to shift his allegiance from the Ottoman Empire to Mohamed Ali Pasha of Egypt. The latter annexed Sudan to Egypt and was planning to occupy Ottoman Syria and Mount Lebanon, becoming the most powerful vassal of the Ottoman sultan. Mohamed Ali and his son Ibrahim Pasha occupied Mount Lebanon in 1831. To bring the Mountain under his central authority, Mohamed Ali ordered increased taxes and corvée labor, along with introducing the practice of conscription. The latter policy aimed to target the Druzes, who were allegedly known for their military prowess and autonomy (Abu Shakra, 1952:18-26).

In 1838, many Druze landlords and peasants revolted against the policy of conscription. As a result, Ibrahim Pasha ordered Emir Bachir to arm Christian peasants to resist the Druze rebellion; Bachir promised the Christians they could keep their weapons and take over the confiscated properties of the defeated Druze landlords. The Druzes were defeated, and many of them including their landlords (i.e. Sheikh Bachir Joumblat) were expelled to Hawran Mountain. Moreover, Emir Bachir confiscated their properties and lands and allocated them to the Maronite peasants (Abu Shakra, 1952:18-26). Samy Swayd, a Lebanese Druze scholar, highlighted that many of the Lebanese Druze scholars and historians argue that the armed Maronite peasants did not only defeat the Druzes, but they desecrated their shrines, mutilated their religious manuscripts and destroyed many of their homes and lands. Although these aspects have rarely been reported in historical chronicles, they had “a lasting impact on the Druze psyche and collective memory” (Swayd, 2015: 19). Abu Shakra and Swayd, who are both (Lebanese) Druzes, had common elements in recounting Emir Bachir and Ibrahim Pasha’s reaction to the 1838 Druze rebellion. They both depicted such reaction as part of a bigger plot to weaken the entire Druze community by arming the Maronite peasants. The way the 1838 events are articulated in the majority of the Lebanese Druze literature reveals a number of issues. The first is the presence of similar patterns among the Druze scholars in their description of such events as part of bigger strategies that both Emir Bachir II and Ibrahim Pasha had put in place to undermine the entire Druze community. The second remark is the tendency of some Druze sources to depict the Maronite peasants as active participants in the Emir and Ibrahim Pasha’s plot against the Druzes, and not as a tool through which the Emir and the Pasha’s plot was implemented. The third remark, which supports the second one, is the tendency of some Druze sources to depict the 1838 events as purely sectarian, by emphasizing the role of the Maronites in desecrating the Druze shrines and mutilating their religious manuscripts. While such depictions of 1838 might have some elements of truth, an important consequence of depicting such events as solely sectarian was the formation of a Druze collective memory of such events and their impact on other

developments in the nineteenth century. In other words, sectarian readings informed Druze actions even long after the 1838 events had come to an end.

The political decisions of Emir Bachir and Ibrahim Pasha adversely affected the Druze community in Mount Lebanon, and Ibrahim Pasha's economic policies further disadvantaged and marginalized the community. According to the Druze scholar Kais Firro (1992: 65-67), Ibrahim Pasha's economic policies were more advantageous to the Christians than the Druzes. Ibrahim Pasha encouraged agricultural activities and thought that linking Lebanese trade with Europe would further boost the agricultural sector in Mount Lebanon. The Christians were the main beneficiaries from this policy due to their strong relations and contacts with the Europeans. Many of the Maronite peasants, who worked in the lands of the Druze *muqata'jis,* became their money lenders by the end of the era of the Egyptian rule. On the other hand, the Druze peasants were excluded from such benefits, especially with the exile of their landlords, and became more dependent on both European markets and their Maronite counterparts.

Very few Druze sources mention non-sectarian explanations for the declining power of the Druze landlords in the nineteenth century. Unlike Abu Shakra, whose chronicle tended to depict the political and economic deterioration of the Druze community in Mount Lebanon as premised on the Emir's betrayal of the Druzes, Firro's interpretation tends to be more inclusive, since he incorporated his explanation of the Druze situation under the rule of Emir Bachir into the bigger context of the Emir's anti-Iqtaa' system policies since his rise to power. Emir Bachir's attempts to consolidate his power in Mount Lebanon had to come at the expense of the traditional power of the landlords. In 1807, the Emir imposed a new method of taxation in Kisrawan. Instead of having the *muqata'jis* collect the taxes, he made the *nazirs* (supervisors, who were government officials) do that. In the south of Mount Lebanon, a number of *wakils*[50] (agents) were selected to collect the taxes instead of the landlords. The replacement of the traditional landlords with the *nazirs* and *wakils* was the Emir's first step towards breaking the traditional institutions of the *Iqtaa' system* in Mount Lebanon. The second step that the Emir took to weaken the landlords was the policy of divide and rule, which he mainly applied among the Druze landlords as they were the most powerful and constituted the majority of the landlords in the Mountain. The Emir allied with the Joumblats and the Yazbaks to undermine the Abu Nakads. He then relied on the Joumblats to weaken the Yazbaks. This involved driving both the Abu Nakads and the Yazbaks from the territories they controlled. Factional divisions, which were already an integral feature of the *Iqtaa'* system in Mount Lebanon, enabled the Emir to apply the divide and rule policy

[50] The idea of appointing a wakil was the outcome of the Ottoman-European negotiations on the system that should be installed in Mount Lebanon in the aftermath of the 1841 sectarian rivalries between the Druzes and the Maronites (Makdisi, 2001: 202). Although the Wakils were appointed after consultation with the notables and clergy of each community (the Maronites and the Druzes), they replaced the landlords/notables in the implementation of judicial and tax collection functions (Traboulsi, 24-25).

effectively. The landlord families of Kisrawan were already weakened by the Maronite peasant revolts of 1820. This turned the Emir's attention to Sheikh Bachir Joumblat who remained as the most powerful landlord in Mount Lebanon after he managed to curb the powers of the other Druze *muqata'ji* families, with Joumblat's help. With the Egyptian occupation of Mount Lebanon in 1831, the Emir found in Ibrahim Pasha's policies the perfect way to curb the power of Sheikh Bachir Joumblat in particular and of the landlords in general (Firro, 1992: 53-55). While such an explanation is offered by some Druze scholars (such as Kais Firro), it has little effect on the Druze collective memory, which is mostly influenced by sectarian discourses and confessional explanations of the nineteenth century changes, as is clear from the writings of the Druze leader Kamal Joumblat in the twentieth century (chapter two) and the *zajal* of the Druze poet Tali Hamdan (chapter three). This could be, partially, explained in the light of the continued socio-economic and political marginalization of the Druzes in Greater Lebanon, and which made the sectarian narrative of the mid-nineteenth century developments more credible; especially that it was persistently stressed upon by Kamal Joumblat in his writings and political statements (as it will be examined in chapter two).

D.3. The Tanzimat and the controversies over their interpretation

In 1838, the Ottoman Empire introduced the Tanzimat, a series of reforms that aimed at modernizing the Ottoman Empire via a number of educational, administrative and legal measures. There are some arguments that suggest that such reforms aimed at increasing the Empire's control over the peripheries, especially through the re-organization of the Ottoman army and the administrative reforms, while presenting concessions to the Europeans, such as the Empire's decision to promote equality between its Muslim and non-Muslim subjects ("Tanzimat", 2016). The main concern of this section is to focus on how such reforms were perceived differently by the different groups in Mount Lebanon.

The Lebanese scholar Ussama Makdisi referred to the ambiguity of the Tanzimat and the disruption between its textual formation and its application, especially when it was introduced to Mount Lebanon. The latter had already started to witness the polarization of religious affiliations, especially with the rise of Emir Bachir II to power and the Egyptian occupation of Mount Lebanon in 1838 (as discussed above). Such a context invited sectarian interpretations of the reforms to prevail in Mount Lebanon. As for the Druze landlords, they interpreted the Tanzimat as an attempt by the Ottoman Empire to tighten its control over the peripheries, including Mount Lebanon. The fact that the Ottomans relied for a long time on the *muqata'jis*, the majority of whom were Druzes till the beginning of the nineteenth century, to maintain control and stability in Mount Lebanon made many of the Druze landlords interpret the *Tanzimat* as a great opportunity to project themselves as allies of the Ottomans, who could restore stability in the Mountain and bring it under the control of the Ottomans. In order to strengthen their position, some

Druze landlords, such as Al Nakad, started to speak in the name of the entire community although they used to control only certain areas in the Shuf. As for the Maronites, they interpreted the *Tanzimat* in the light of freedom and equality for non-Muslims (Makdisi, 2001:59). This was especially the case with the Empire's issuance of the Gulhane edict in 1839, which called for the establishment of institutions that would guarantee security of life, honor and property to all the subjects of the Empire, regardless of their religion and ethnicity ("Tanzimat, 2016). Given that, the Maronite church perceived the Tanzimat as a golden opportunity to maximize the Maronites' benefits from such reforms. The church started to speak in the name of the *ta'ifa* (community) in issues that were related to the abolition of the *jizya* tax (Makdisi, 2001: 59). The *Jizya* was among the taxes that the Druze landlords collected from the non-Muslims, especially the peasants, in Mount Lebanon. This explicit involvement of the Maronite church in the politics of the Mountain broke with the traditional political order, in which representation of power was limited to the landlords (Makdisi, 2000: 62). Such contending sectarian interpretations of the Tanzimat could be also interpreted in the light of attempts by different actors in Mount Lebanon to impose new power relations, as the Maronite church and peasants sought to do, or to reestablish traditional power relations as defined by the *Iqtaa'* system, as the Druze landlords aspired to do. None of the two groups was able to fully impose its interpretation of the Tanzimat on the ground. This made them seek different ways to implement their goals. In regards to the Druze landlords, one could argue that they saw in turning the peasants' class-based revolts of 1840 and 1858 an opportunity to restore their traditional hold on power.

On the 8th of June 1840, the Druze and Maronite commoners united and decided to resist both Emir Bachir and Ibrahim Pasha. Despite the fact that communal identities were becoming sharper in the aftermath of the Egyptian occupation of Mount Lebanon, the commoners' common fear and hatred of the foreign troops (the Egyptian army), fear of conscription and disarmament and the high taxation united them. Nevertheless, the Maronite church appointed priests and monks to lead *al-qiyam al-jumhuri* (the popular uprising), which the church portrayed as leaderless. This gave the uprising a sectarian nature. Following the intervention of the church, a number of landlords, including a number of Khazin landlords, swelled the ranks of the revolts, endeavoring to become the military commanders of the rebellion. As a result, the Druze peasants stopped supporting the rebellion, which was soon turned into a sectarian rivalry (Makdisi, 2000: 63). The 1840 revolts offered an opportunity for the contending factions in the Mountain to reveal their understanding of the Tanzimat. For the Maronite church, the 1840 revolts were a good chance to apply the values of equality and rejection of hierarchy that was fostered by the system of *Iqtaa'*. The Druze landlords attempted to re-establish their traditional power by turning the uprising into sectarian rivalries in 1841. Following their return from exile, the Druze Abu Nakad sheikhs, who used to control Deir El Qamar town, aspired to retrieve their lands and property from the Maronites who used to be their peasants. The

Abu Nakad landlords were reluctant to accept the fact that Deir El Qamar's demographic composition and economic status was in favor of the Maronite community. They thought that with the end of Emir Bachir's rule and the Egyptian occupation in 1840, they could re-establish their traditional power. Nevertheless, this was not the situation. Insisting on the restitution of their full rights, from property ownership to the collection of taxes, the Druze Abu Nakad landlords were able to manipulate an incident that occurred in 1841 between a Christian from Deir El Qamar and a Druze from Baakline village. By 1841, those villages had assumed a confessional nature as a reflection of their demographic composition. Thus, Deir El Qamar was treated as a Maronite town while Baakline was dealt with as a Druze village (Makdisi, 2000: 62-64). It is interesting to shed the light on the 1841 incident as narrated by the Christian chronicler Mikhail Mishaqa:

A Christian from Deir al-Qamar was hunting with his gun on Baakline land, and a Druze from there objected. Bad blood surfaced between them, and helpers came to both sides, the fray ending with the discharge of weapons. The cry reached Deir al-Qamar that the people of Baakline had killed their men, so the Nakad sheikhs got on their horses and rode to the place to quell the disturbance, and the men of Deir al-Qamar too came armed and running. When they arrived they found the men of Baakline gathered together and some men were slain. Shots were fired and a fierce battle was fought until the Baakline men were driven back with all those who had come to help them.

Mishaqa, 1908: 227

Mishaqa's use of the words "Baakline land" sheds the light on how villages and towns in Mount Lebanon assumed a sectarian nature as reflection of their demographic composition by the mid-nineteenth century. Although this situation was contained, violence erupted in the town of Deir El Qamar when the Abu Nakad landlords knew about Emir Bachir Qassim's visit to the Chouf to re-organize the collection of taxes. The Abu Nakads, in an attempt to resist this issue and re-assert their power, laid siege on Deir El Qamar with the emir trapped inside it. After three weeks of siege, the Druze landlords and some of their Druze peasants attacked and pillaged the village, killed many of its Maronite inhabitants, and ambushed the Emir. It is important to highlight that the Abu Nakads, in their attack on Deir El Qamar, brought Druze peasants from the neighboring villages that had a majority of Druze inhabitants. Following what happened in Deir El Qamar, sectarian violence spread to other neighboring villages. Sectarian violence degenerated and spread to other parts of the Chouf region and many people were massacred from both sides (Shidiyaq, 1861: 479). Although one cannot know whether the clash between the Christian from Deir El Qamar and the Druze from Baakline was premised on sectarian motives or not, one could argue that the way the clash was turned into a sectarian conflict reveals the ambitions of the Druze Abu Nakad landlords to re-assert their control over the town of Deir El Qamar that they used to control. Additionally, by turning this clash into a sectarian one, the Abu Nakad landlords stopped

Emir Bachir Qassim from re-organizing the collection of taxes that would have further undermined the powers of the *muqata'jis*. While the Druze-Maronite clashes could be easily labelled sectarian, one could argue that the Druze landlords' class-based interests were strongly embedded in such clashes (as it was revealed from the above examination of the 1841 clashes). Such rivalries would not have happened without the presence of a context that was ripe for sectarianism to prevail over co-existence. Sectarianism had already started to develop in the Mountain in the aftermath of the 1820 peasant revolts; it was then fostered during the era of Emir Bachir, the Egyptian occupation of Mount Lebanon and the introduction of the Tanzimat.

Despite the fact that sectarian identities were already developing since the 1820 peasant revolts, no direct sectarian clashes took place until 1841. The clashes that occurred then eliminated the networks managed by the Druze landlords and replaced them with institutionalized confessional identities. In the aftermath of the 1841 rivalries, a new system, known as the qaimmaqamiyya was introduced to the Mountain, dividing it to a northern region that was ruled by a Maronite qaimmaqam and had a majority of Maronite inhabitants, and a southern region (Al Chouf), which had a mixed population of Druzes and Maronites and was under the rule of a Druze qaimmaqam. This system marked the institutionalization of sectarianism and confessional identities, signifying the demise of the *muqata'ji* system in Mount Lebanon. This system was a compromise between the Ottomans and the British, who backed the Druzes, from one side and the French, who backed the Maronites, from another side. This installation of this system in the Mountain generated debates and disputes on the identity of the land. The Maronite church demanded that the Maronites in the mixed population of the south fall under the jurisdiction of the Maronite qaimmaqam of the North. In regards to the Druze landlords, they contested the validity of this system, asserting their "historical" right to rule over the entirety of Mount Lebanon, which they insisted on calling "*Jabal al-Duruz*" (Traboulsi, 2012: 24:25; Hazran, 2015: 354).

Following the division of Mount Lebanon in 1843, both the Druzes and the Maronites started to contest the identity of the land. For instance, the Christian inhabitants of Zahleh, who were under the rule of the Druze qaimmaqam, sent a memorandum to the French consul in 1843. They referred to their historical right over Mount Lebanon and the fact that it was a Christian territory, depicting the Christians as the original inhabitants of Mount Lebanon. They also stated that their ancestors welcomed the Druzes to the Mountain, following their escape from Egypt. This was described, by the Lebanese historian Fawwaz Traboulsi, as a reversion of historical realities to serve the Christians' sectarian interests. He argued that it was the Druze landlords of Zahleh who received the Christians from the upper Matn and the Ba'albek regions (Traboulsi, 2012: 25). This chapter is not concerned with unravelling the history of settlement of the Mountain's

communities as much as it is concerned with highlighting the prevalence of such discourses in the aftermath of the installment of the qaimmaqam*iyya* system.

The instability in Mount Lebanon increased in the years that followed the renewal of the violence in 1845 as a result of the attack of some Maronites on a Druze rally at the Mukhtara palace of the Joumblat family. There were several reasons behind this increasing instability in the Mountain. First, landlords from both communities continued to resist the qaimmaqamiyya system, in an attempt to restore their traditional authority. In the north, the Khazins resisted the Maronite qaimmaqam Bachir Haydar Abi-l-Lama; and in the south, the Joumblat landlords resisted the authority of the Druze qaimmaqam Amin Arslan. The qaimmaqams of the northern and southern regions were chosen from families that were rivals with the prominent *muqata'ji* families. This was part of the Ottoman Empire's policy of undermining the system in Mount Lebanon. Second, in 1858, the Ottoman Empire issued the Land Code in an attempt to create a peasant-led market economy, through which the Empire could collect more taxes. However, Christian and Druze landlords were able to block this code. This further antagonized the peasants in the northern region. Third, by 1858, four villages in Mount Lebanon expelled their landlords and establish an elected council to run the affairs of the villages. The councils consisted of middlemen, merchants and silk producers, all of whom were Maronites. The villages that witnessed such changes were: Ámchit in Jbeil, Ghazir in Kisrawan, Deir El Qamar in the Chouf and Zahleh. All these were Christian (Maronite) villages (Traboulsi, 2012: 28-29; Rodogno, 2012: 93).

As a result of this turbulent situation in Mount Lebanon, in 1858, Tanious Shahin, a Maronite cleric from a peasant background, led a huge peasant rebellion in Kisrawan against Al Khazin landlords. This revolt was a class rebellion against the powers of the *muqata'jis* of the northern qaimmaqamiyya. The peasants were able to expel the Khazin family from their lands and properties and confiscate them. Although this rebellion was successful in challenging the authorities of the *muqata'ji* families in Kisrawan, its success remained both local and limited to the Maronite peasants. Such revolts failed to influence the peasants in the south. Some accounts, mainly Druze, state that the Maronite peasants of the north tried to influence their co-religionists in the south; while other sources state that the Maronite peasants of the North tried to encourage the peasants of the south to revolt against their landlords. Whether the Maronite peasants were trying to influence their co-religionists in specific or not to revolt, the end result was that this rebellion was turned into sectarian confrontations in the Chouf. The Druze landlords, with the help of the Druze *uqqal*, deflected the grievances of their peasants and depict the peasants' uprisings of the north as an attack against the Druze community and an attempt to drive it out of its territories (Khalaf, 1987: 68; Khuri, 2004: 59-61; Fawwaz, 1994: 49-53; Harik, 1994:470). By 1860, sectarian tensions had already escalated and sectarian violence broke out in Mount Lebanon, resulting in the 1860 sectarian clashes; in which an

estimated number of twelve thousand Christians lost their lives, many Maronite villages were entirely destroyed and pillaged and thousands of Christians were displaced. The Maronite town of Deir El Qamar was besieged for the second time and a horrible massacre occurred in it. The Druze ferociously fought against the Maronites who outnumbered them and they were able to achieve a military victory over the Maronites (Khalaf, 1987: 68).

Conclusion

This chapter attempted to understand the socio-economic and political reasons that underlie the mid-nineteenth century Druze-Maronite sectarian rivalries. While sectarianism in the Middle East is often depicted as an endemic disease that characterizes Middle Eastern societies, this chapter endeavored to unpack sectarianism in Mount Lebanon to counter-argue such an orientalist approach. In order to understand the history of sectarian rivalries in Mount Lebanon, the chapter examined the socio-economic and political organization of the Mountain in the pre-nineteenth century era. Before the mid-nineteenth century, Mount Lebanon was ruled through the system of *Iqtaa'*; which provided the landlords with a number of privileges over the tenants, in return for the maintenance of the Mountain's stability and the provision of a certain amount of money to the Ottoman Empire's treasury. In return for that, the Mountain had a semi-autonomous status vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire. Under the *Iqtaa'* system, the majority of the landlords came from the Druze community and the majority of the peasants came from the Maronite community. Additionally, the first Maronite *muqata'ji* family, Al Khazin, was awarded this socio-economic and political statuses by the Druze Emir Fakhr El Din Al Ma'n in the seventeenth century; following his expansion in the northern region of Mount Lebanon and his desire to appoint someone to collect the taxes from the tenants. Till the mid-nineteenth century, landlords ensured that a strict class division between the *muqata'ji* families and the *'amma* existed. When violence used to erupt between the different *muqata'ji* families, it was over land ownership and collection of taxes. While clashes were often between the Druze factions (the Qaysites and the Yemenis; followed, then, by the Joumblat and the Yazbak factions), the Maronites were split between both sides. This clearly reveals that clashes and divisions in Mount Lebanon, before the nineteenth century, were not motivated by sectarian motives.

Although the landlords maintained strong control over their peasants, via a number of measures that varied between collection of taxes and maintenance of strong relations between the landlords and the religious figures (with a special focus on the Maronite and Druze religious leaders), the *Iqtaa'* system was not immune from being challenged by local, regional and international factors. As for the local factors, they included the rise of a number of reform-minded Maronite clergy in the Maronite church by the end of the nineteenth century, their instigation of reformist values that rejected the unrestricted

powers of the landlords and the subordination of the Maronite church to the landlords, and their involvement in the everyday lives of the masses had all paved the way for the peasants' revolts of 1820, who were already suffering from the high taxation and other forms of control from the landlords. The 1820 peasant revolts were mainly carried out by the Maronite peasants and joined by a number of Maronite clerics against the *muqata'jis* of the northern region of Kisrawan. The Druze peasants neither joined it nor embarked on similar revolts in the Chouf region; where they were highly concentrated. There are very few sources on why the Druze peasants did not participate in such revolts. The majority of the sources refer to the strong role of the Druze religious leaders in discouraging the Druze masses from such revolts by depicting them as a threat to the Druze community's existence. Other sources suggest that such the involvement of the Maronite clerics in such revolts gave it a sectarian nature, discouraging the Druze peasants from joining them. Despite the fact that the revolts did not succeed to uproot the *Iqtaa'* system from Mount Lebanon, they managed to challenge it and to create class-based consciousness that revolves around *al-Salih al-umumi*, as the Maronite peasants and clergy depicted it.

As for the regional factors that paved the way for the rise of sectarianism in Mount Lebanon, they encompass the rising power of Mohamed Ali Pasha of Egypt and his decision to occupy Mount Lebanon. In 1831, Ibrahim Pasha, Mohamed Ali's son, occupied Mount Lebanon. He imposed conscription to the army on the Mountain's inhabitants. The Maronite peasants, being protected by the European missionaries and consuls, were exempted from this decision. In order to carry out this decision, Ibrahim pasha relied on Emir Bachir II, who ruled Mount Lebanon from 1789 to 1840. The Druze landlords had already perceived the Emir as their enemy since he embarked on a set of policies to curb their powers, which they perceived as directed against the Druzes, in particular. As a result, the Druze peasants and landlords revolted in 1838 against the conscription policy. In order to contain the rebellion, the Emir and Ibrahim Pasha armed a number of Maronite peasants and ordered them to keep their weapons and to receive the confiscated lands and properties of the defeated Druze landlords. Following the defeat of the Druzes, the majority of them were sent into exile in Hawran Mountain and many of their leaders were executed and had their properties and lands confiscated. This was the first sectarian clash between the Druzes and the Maronites, which resulted in the development of sectarian identities and communal consciousness.

With the return of the majority of the exiled Druze landlords to Mount Lebanon, in the aftermath of the death of Emir Bachir II and the withdrawal of the Egyptian army, they did not succumb to the new socio-economic and political setting in Mount Lebanon, in which the *Iqtaa'* system was not the major determinant of power relations. Although this system had not withered away, new actors started to emerge in the Mountain. These include Maronite merchants, middle men and peasants-turned-landlords who, as a result of the increased European missionary schools and the increased European demand on the

silk cash crop that the Maronite peasants excelled in its production, started to accumulate lands and expand geographically at the expense of the Druze community. This coincided with the increase in the demographic composition of the Maronite community; exceeding its Druze counterpart. The increased European trade that benefited the Maronites and the issuance of the Tanzimat reforms by the Ottoman Empire (partially perceived by some scholars as the Empire's way to present concessions to the Europeans while embarking on the re-organization of the army and administration to increase Istanbul's control over the periphery) are among the international factors that fueled sectarianism in the Mountain. Given such context, the Druze landlords were able to turn the 1840 and 1858 Maronite peasants' revolts into sectarian rivalries in an attempt to restore their traditional powers, which they used to enjoy under the system of *Iqtaa'*. The latter had been gradually undermined not only through the peasants' revolts, but also through the Qaimmaqamiyya system that was installed in Mount Lebanon in the aftermath of the 1841 sectarian rivalries. While the Maronite peasants and clergy expressed their interpretation of the nineteenth century socio-economic and political changes in the form of peasants' revolts, the Druze landlords, with the help of the Druze *uqqal*, expressed their resistance to such changes by turning the revolts into sectarian rivalries. The latter involves the massacre of the Christians, the confiscation of their lands and properties and their expulsion from the Chouf in an attempt to restore their control over the Chouf. The 1860 sectarian rivalries witnessed the military triumph of the Druzes. However, they were politically defeated in the aftermath of the intervention of the French navy to protect the Maronites.

Chapter Two

The Druze political leadership in Greater Lebanon (1920-1975): From accommodation to confrontation with the Maronite-dominated political establishment

"To create a country is one thing; to create a nationality is another"

(Salibi, 1988:19)

A. Introduction

The 1860 sectarian rivalries in Mount Lebanon ended with the installment of the system of Mutasarrifiyya, in which a majlis (council) was created, comprising twelve members: Two Maronites, two Druzes, two Greek Orthodox, two Greek Catholics, two Sunnis and two Shi'ites. In 1861, the majlis signed a protocol that signified the end of the *Iqtaa'* system and religious strife in Mount Lebanon. Additionally, it played a central role in the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920, following the end of WWI, on a confessional basis. The fact that a Christian governor headed the majlis, along with the political triumph of the Maronites following the intervention of the French to stop the Druze massacre of the Maronites, gave the latter an advantageous status vis-à-vis the other communities in influencing the process of the creation of Grand Liban. Between 1915 and 1920, the elites of the majlis, along with those of Beirut[51], were torn between contending visions on a number of issues that relate to the newly created entity of Greater Lebanon. Among the issues that stirred debate among the different Lebanese confessional groups were Greater Lebanon's relation to Greater Syria (in specific), the Arab world (in general) and the West. While the majority of the Maronites had their eyes on the West, the majority of the Sunnis, who constituted the second largest group (after the Maronites) in Lebanon in the beginning of the twentieth century, showed their allegiance to Amir Faysal (son of the Hashemite leader in Hijaz, Sharif Husayn); and aspired to associate Greater Lebanon with the Arab world (Simon, 1996: 120-123).

Following the retreat of the Ottomans from Beirut in 1918 and the end of WWI, the Maronite patriarch Huwayyik was able to bring the Maronite Pasha Habib al-Sa'd as the new governor of the majlis of Mount Lebanon (Simon, 1996: 120-123). The appointment of Habib al-Sa'd as the head of the majlis was important for a number of reasons: First, he was a Maronite from Mount Lebanon, which was not the case before since the Ottomans used to appoint a Christian from outside the Mountain. Second, he embarked on the re-structuring of the majlis. The new structure encompassed four Maronites[52],

[51] The majority of the elites in Beirut were Sunnis.

[52] Dau'd Ammun from Deir El Qamar, Sulayman Kan'an from Jezzine, Sa'dallah al-Huwayyik from Batrun and Khalil 'Aql from Matn

three Druzes[53], two Greek Orthodox[54], one Sunni[55], one Shi'ite[56] and one Greek Catholic[57] (Simon, 1996: 124).

This new composition of the majlis, which continued to have twelve members, further empowered the Maronites, who were already empowered through their strong relations with the French. This new majlis represented the Lebanese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. In the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, the French supported the Maronites' ideas of the creation of Greater Lebanon as an extension of Mount Lebanon. This meant that the Maronites, who were the most powerful group in the Mountain in the post-1860 events, were to enjoy the same advantageous status in Greater Lebanon. In 1920, Greater Lebanon was created under the auspices of the French, who imposed their mandate over Syria and Lebanon. Thus, the newly established political entity in Lebanon benefited the Maronites more than the other Lebanese sects (Simon, 1996: 124). From this brief examination of how Greater Lebanon came into existence, one could argue that Greater Lebanon was not the culmination of the agreement of its various confessional groups. Nonetheless, this newly created political entity was mostly reflective of the Maronite and French interests; and not the different communal interests of Lebanon's diverse sectarian groups. This, accordingly, explains Salibi's quote that "to create a country is one thing and to create a nationality is another" (Salibi, 1988: 19).

Although the Druze community had representation in the Lebanese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, they were highly marginalized in the aftermath of the creation of Greater Lebanon. The Druze community's socio-economic and political marginalization in the twentieth century further buttressed the way the Druze political leadership, led by Joumblat family[58], configured the community's collective memory of the 1860 events (in particular) and the nineteenth century developments (in general). The Druze political leadership managed to depict the community's socio-economic and political marginalization in the twentieth century as a continuity to and culmination of their nineteenth century socio-economic and political marginalization. This was apparent in the writings of Kamal Joumblat, his statements and his political stances, in which he depicted his struggle against the Maronite-dominated political establishment as a continuation to his ancestors' struggle against a Maronite sectarian and exclusivist

[53] Fu'ad 'Abd al-Malik from the Chouf, Mahmud Joumblat from Jessine and Muhammad Sabra from Matn

[54] Ilias Shuwayri from Matn and Niqula Ghusn from Kura

[55] Husayn al-Hajjar from Matn

[56] Muhammad Muhsin from Kisrawan

[57] Yusuf Baridi from Zahle

[58] Following the 1860 events, two important Druze families dominated the political scene in the Druze community. These two families were the Arslan and the Joumblat families. The former tended to have more conciliatory and less confrontational approach with the Lebanese political authorities while the latter had more confrontational stances with the Maronite-dominated political establishment; to the extent that his revolutionary ideas were perceived as a threat to the Arslan family (Hazran, 2010: 161; Hazran, 2010:157-176).

project, which had its roots in the nineteenth century (all of which will be discussed in this chapter).

This, accordingly, explains Kamal Joumblat's exploitation of a number of political crises that occurred in Lebanon between 1920 and 1975 to eradicate confessionalism, which he believed would improve the Druzes' political role in Lebanon (in general) and help restore Joumblat family's traditional power in the Druze community (in particular). While the post-1860 era witnessed a conciliatory approach by the Druze political leaders towards the Maronite-dominated political establishment, this did not last for a long time. Starting from 1943, and after the Maronite and Sunni political leaders signed the National Pact, Kamal Joumblat started to adopt a more confrontational approach towards the Maronite-dominated political entity; which he considered to be excluding the Druzes from Lebanon's political system.

This chapter will address a number of issues. First, this chapter will examine the Druze leaders' preliminary reaction to their political defeat in 1860 and the establishment of Greater Lebanon in 1920. Second, the chapter will briefly examine the Druze political leadership's reaction to the most important political developments in Lebanon's history, following the creation of Greater Lebanon. These political events include the 1943 National Pact, the 1958 and 1975 civil wars. This section will examine how Kamal Joumblat used the rhetoric of the Druze collective victimization, dating back to the mid-nineteenth century, to justify his confrontational stance against the Maronite-dominated political establishment in 1943, 1958 and 1975. Such discourse was also embedded in the writings of Kamal Joumblat, which include: *Lubnān wa harb al-taswiyyāh* (1977), *Pour le Liban*[59] (1978) and *Hadhīhī Wasiyyāti* (1978). Finally, this chapter will end with the examination of Kamal Joumblat's assassination in 1977 and what it meant for the majority of the Druze community; and more importantly, how the assassination of Kamal Joumblat influenced his son's political and military strategies in *Harb Al Jabal.*

B. The post-1860 phase in Mount Lebanon: The creation of Greater Lebanon (1920) and the Druze political leadership's "temporary" adaptation to the new political setting

> "More often than not, the past appears as a devastated landscape full of corpses, dashed illusions, failed myths, betrayed promises, and unprocessed memories"
>
> (Tismaneau & Iacob, 2015: 1)

[59] Pour Le Liban and Hazīhī Wasiyyāti were published in 1978, following the assassination of Kamal Joumblat in 1977.

Social, economic and/or political injustices, when left unresolved and unaddressed, render the past problematic and turn it into a traumatic experience with "unprocessed memories". Most of Lebanon's confessional communities' sectarian confrontations ended with the slogan of "No Victor, No Vanquished"[60] , known in Arabic as: *La ghalib wala maghloub*, leaving each community with its own memory of the past. Such memories could be turned into myths, upon which the political and religious leaderships could mobilize the masses of their communities (especially in times of crises) against other communities, especially if some communities had unresolved rivalries. Such unprocessed memories could result in a context in which communal politics becomes confrontational to state politics, which is already very fragile, resulting in state collapse, in some cases. Communal rivalries, with their conflicting memories, could lead to the disintegration of the state. According to Arfi (1998: 15), state collapse happens when the elites of the different communities manipulate communal rivalries that are rooted in "historical memories and conflicting communal identities to ignite and sustain fictionalization of political loyalty"[61].

Since the end of the 1860 disturbances in Mount Lebanon, *ta'ifiyya* or sectarianism became the prevalent political system in Mount Lebanon; and later on, in Greater Lebanon (1920-onwards). This system gave precedence to communal loyalties above national loyalty (Makdisi, 1996: 23). The system of Qaimmaqamiyya, which was installed in the aftermath of the 1840 massacres, gave precedence to communal and sectarian identities; which started to be reflected in the creation of sectarian enclaves in certain parts of the Mountain (i.e. the northern area of Mount Lebanon). This, partially, explains why some revolts as the 1858 peasants' revolt was depicted by the Druze political leadership as a Maronite plot to oust the Druzes from their territorial enclave in the Chouf mountains (Harris, 2012: 151-153). In the aftermath of the 1860 sectarian events and the political defeat of the Druze landlords, sectarianism was institutionalized[62] with the installment of Mutasarrifiyya/ Le Règlement Organique. Although the Druze political leadership accepted the Mutasarrifiyya/ Le Règlement Organique, as the new modus operandi between them and the Maronites, they were not satisfied with it. Their acceptance was motivated by their desire to prevent any more political and socio-economic losses (Hazran, 2010:159).

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[60] For more information on this concept, See Haugbolle (2010: 30).

[61] In this article, Arfi uses the case of Yugoslavia to further elaborate on the interplay between communal politics and state collapse. For more details, See Arfi (1998: 15-42). Also, see Puniyani (2003).

[62] The formal institutionalization of sectarianism started with the installment of the system of *Qaim-maqam* in 1840, following the Druze-Maronite sectarian clashes. Later on, after the 1860 sectarian rivalries, the system of *Mutasarrifiyya/ Le Règlement Organique was* installed in Mount Lebanon, and which further aggravated the system of sectarianism in Mount Lebanon. This system further empowered the Maronites in Mount Lebanon as it created a council of twelve members and headed by a Christian (Hakim ,2013: 130-134)

Although the Druze community had representatives in the Lebanese delegation that attended the Paris Peace Conference, the majority of the Druzes rejected the idea of Greater Lebanon as they perceived it to be another step in undermining their political position in Lebanon. The majority of the community also envisioned Greater Lebanon as another step that further empowered the Maronites, whom they continued to perceive as their rivals. Additionally, many Druzes perceived Grand Liban as the embodiment of the Maronite vision of Lebanon and a fulfillment of their political interests. Nonetheless, the Druze political leadership did not continue to have an openly confrontational position, as they used to do in Mount Lebanon in the nineteenth century; this is why they had representatives in the Paris Peace Conference. Their leadership was pragmatic enough towards the French mandatory powers that preserved two powerful positions for the main Druze families in the Druze community, the Arslans and the Jumblats, in the mandate government (Hazran, 2010:159). The Druze political leadership learnt its lesson from the 1860 events, realizing the repercussions of the French intervention which altered the whole situation for the favor of the Maronites, turning the Druze military victory into a major political defeat. This made the Druze political elites more pragmatic in dealing with the French Mandate and the Maronite-dominated political establishment. So, the Druze political leadership's willingness to co-operate with the mandate power could not be translated to an acceptance of the national project of Greater Lebanon, which the Druze political leadership continued to see as entirely different and even contradictory to the historical Lebanese entity of Mount Lebanon (which the Druzes were its principal founders). In Hazran's words, "this conciliatory attitude did not necessarily reflect a recognition by the Druzes of the Lebanese state's ideological foundations. In fact, they were frightened that the French might react aggressively; renewing the sectarian bloodshed of the 1860s which they feared could cost them their leading role within their community" (Hazran, 2010: 160).

When the idea of the National Pact started to materialize in 1943, the Druzes' political role was further restricted. The National Pact (*al mithaq al watani)*, as Salibi described it, was an implied agreement between both the Maronites and the Sunnis as they constituted the majority of the Lebanese population at that time (Salibi, 1988: 11). According to El Khazen (1991: 55-57), the Druzes were excluded from the negotiation process over the National Pact because their role was already reduced to that of a minor political force in Mount Lebanon since the nineteenth century, under the rule of Emir Bachir Shihab II. Since that time, the Druzes were not able to restore the political influence that they used to enjoy before the mid-nineteenth century. On the other hand, the Maronites were undergoing a remarkable political, socio-economic and demographic transformation that enabled them to play a major role in Greater Lebanon and to be a major actor in the making of *al mithaq al watani*. In El Khazen's words (1991: 57), "The Maronite leading role in post-1943 Lebanese politics could be seen as the culmination of Maronite communal ascendancy throughout the centuries". El Khazen's words reveal the important

link between the communities' demographic and socio-political developments in the nineteenth century and the role they played in the twentieth century. This also explains why the Druze community could not abandon the memory of the 1860 events since it massively influenced and determined their status in the twentieth century, which was reduced to a marginalized and limited role. Nonetheless, one of the reasons why the nineteenth century developments continued to impact the communities' role in the twentieth century was the persistence of the sectarian system in Lebanon; and most importantly, turning it into becoming Lebanon's recipe for the "peaceful co-existence" between its diverse confessional groups. *Al mithaq al watani* marked the beginning of "post-independence" confessional politics in Lebanon (El Khazen, 1991: 3).

Confessionalism restricted loyalty to one's sect rather than the state, theoretically a more encompassing entity (Salame, 1986: 2). This was the time when the Druze political leadership became more confrontational with the Maronite-dominated Lebanese political establishment. This is because the National Pact not only further reduced the role of the Druzes in Lebanon, but this role became identified and reflected in the Lebanese constitution and in the parliamentary elections (Pokrupová, 2010: 74). The 1943 National Pact, along with the Lebanese constitution, were two important developments in the history of the Druze community in Lebanon since they marked another turning point in the community's marginalization. These two documents turned the Druzes from a community that once ruled Mount Lebanon and played a major role that did not reflect its number into a marginalized community whose role was now limited to and reflective of their numbers. These developments coincided with the rise of Kamal Joumblat as one of the most prominent leaders and leading figure in the Lebanese left wing in his community and in Lebanese politics.

C. The rise of Kamal Joumblat: Towards a more confrontational relation between the Druzes and the Lebanese state

The rise of Kamal Joumblat as a prominent figure in both the Druze community and the Lebanese political left was an important development in the community's history. This is because of several reasons: First, among the various reasons that contributed to the minor role of the Druzes in the Lebanese politics was the absence of a strong Druze political leadership since the execution of the prominent Druze figure Ali Joumblat in the aftermath of the 1860 events. The Arslans, who represent the Yazbak faction and the main rival of the Joumblat family, were not powerful enough to challenge the Maronite political leadership in the twentieth century. Shakib Arslan's political and ideological stances remained personal and he was not able to transform his ideas into a political platform, through which he could mobilize the Druze community (El Khazen, 1991: 64).

Second, Kamal Joumblat's educational background[63] and political views turned him into one of Lebanon's most significant political figures who enjoyed uncontested political support from the majority of the Druzes and the majority of the political left. This gave Kamal Joumblat more room to influence the course of Lebanese politics in the twentieth century more than the Arslan family (El Khazen, 2006: 178).

Unlike the Arslan faction, Kamal Joumblat expressed his deep dissatisfaction with the National Pact (1943) since he believed that it was meant to further weaken his community's political position. Joumblat was against the institutionalization of confessionalism in the post-1943 independence phase in Lebanon. He referred to how the Druze Emir Fakhr al Din II achieved Lebanon's independence, ending its subordination to the Ottoman tutelage, via his reliance on all the different religious groups that lived in Mount Lebanon. Unlike Emir Fakhr al Din, the Maronite political leaders, along with the Sunni political leaders, excluded the other communities in their articulation of the National Pact in 1943. Since then, Kamal Joumblat joined various opposition movements in Lebanon. He endeavored, by all possible means, to challenge the Maronite-Sunni alliance. This was partially translated in creating his party, the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). One of the main aims of the PSP, since its creation in 1949, was the abolishing of the confessional system in Lebanon and the creation of a secular system instead (Hazran, 2010: 161). There are some scholars who believe that Kamal Joumblat's political struggle against the Maronite hegemony over the Lebanese political establishment was mainly motivated by his desire to maintain the leading position of his family in the Druze community. Although Kamal Joumblat used the modern tools of democracy (i.e. establishing a political party to channel his political ideas and concerns), some scholars argue that his main concern was to restore his family's leading role in the Druze community and to maintain a stronghold on the Druze masses (Ghalyun, 1986: 175). Other scholars argue that the creation of the PSP aimed at revitalizing the "historical" role of the entire Druze community in Lebanon; even if that was under the guise of "progressivism and revolutionism" that Kamal Joumblat propagated through his party (Hazran, 2010:161).

The PSP was a transformation in the relation between the Druze political leadership and the Lebanese state; a relation that moved from accommodation to confrontation. This is because of three reasons: First, after a long time of "political accommodation" with the Lebanese authorities, a Druze political leader decided to challenge the Lebanese state. Second, Joumblat was aware that he had to use a modern political frame, in which he should establishing a political party would enable him to reach out to both the Druze and the non-Druze communities. Thus, instead of depicting the Druzes as a community that

[63] For more details on how Kamal Joumblat's educational background influenced and shaped his political stances, See El Khazen (2006: 178-205).

had been persistently challenging the ruling authorities, Kamal Joumblat created a secular party that included Druzes and non-Druzes to frame the cause in a more generic context. This, accordingly, made the opposition look more diverse than a mere Druze opposition to the Maronite hegemony over the Lebanese political establishment. Third and most importantly, Kamal Joumblat managed to frame the party's program as progressive and revolutionary, in contrast to the state's "stagnant" confessional and sectarian system, which was championed by the Maronites (Hazran, 2010: 162).

The establishment of the PSP did not mean that the confrontation with the Lebanese authorities would only occur through the official channels of political opposition; since violent confrontations were also used to express dissent. In 1957, Kamal Joumblat lost the parliamentary elections against the Yazbak representatives, who were supported by Lebanon's president at that time, Camille Chamoun. This made Joumblat more antagonistic towards the Chamoun regime. The overthrow of the regime became Joumblat's ultimate goal. Additionally, this was the time when he believed that armed confrontation was inevitable. Thus, in 1958, a civil war took place between the leftist groups that were mostly resembled in the Druze leadership of Kamal Joumblat, along with some groups from the Sunni and Shi'ite communities. Although the 1958 civil war[64], like all the other civil wars that took place in Mount Lebanon and Lebanon, involved external factors and players, there were already internal reasons for this civil war to occur. This chapter does not intend to dig deep into the reasons behind the 1958 civil war, as that is not the main goal; nevertheless, this section is mainly concerned with how Kamal Joumblat articulated this civil war and drew symbiosis between the context that led to the 1958 civil war and the context that paved the way for the 1860 events. In his book, *Haqiqat al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyah* (1987: 93-104), Kamal Joumblat referred to the 1958 civil war as a "historic opportunity" that the Lebanese missed to overthrow not only Chamoun's regime, but the confessional system in Lebanon".

Kamal Joumblat's writings show deep frustration with the Maronite political establishment. Joumblat used the discourse of the Maronite hegemony over the Lebanese political establishment, to mobilize the Druze community in moments, which the political leadership considered to be "historic opportunities". In his book *Lubnān wa harb al-taswiyyāh*, Kamal Joumblat questioned if Lebanon was over with its political crises and sectarian clashes. His answer was that Lebanon was still struggling with sectarian rivalries between its communities as the Maronite political leaders were still conspiring against the Druze community (in specific) and the rest of the Lebanese confessional groups (in general). According to Joumblat, the way the Maronite political leaders were

[64] The 1958 civil war mainly occurred because president Camille Chamoun did not respect the 1943 National Pact when he allied with the Americans and the British. For more details on the context and reasons of the 1958 civil war, See Rowayheb (2011: 414-436).

managing the Lebanese political establishment in the twentieth century was paving the way for new wars to occur; wars that had their origins in the nineteenth century, and especially in the era between 1840 and 1860. The Maronites managed to impose and maximize their political hegemony over Mount Lebanon during the nineteenth century through Emir Bachir's sectarian policies. Although some Maronite clergy instigated a number of peasants' rebellion in the nineteenth century in the name of the liberalization of the peasants from the system of *Iqtaa*, the hidden agenda behind those revolts was the establishment of a confessional state; in which they can impose their political hegemony over the other confessional groups in the Mountain (Joumblat, 1977: 37). In his analysis of the pitfalls of the Lebanese confessional system, Joumblat referred to the nineteenth century as the epoch that paved the way for the sectarian crises that happened in the mid-nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The year 1845, according to Kamal Joumblat, laid the basis for all the sectarian crises that followed later on. This is because it was in 1845 that the system of Qaimmaqamiyya was introduced; this was then followed by a number of sectarian clashes between the Maronites and the Druzes, and which ended with the 1860 sectarian clashes that was a turning point in the history of Mount Lebanon; as they were followed by the intervention of the French to protect the Maronites and the creation of the system of the Mutasarrifiyya. In the twentieth century, the 1926 constitution, the 1943 National Pact, and the sectarian crises (1958 and 1975) that ensued were the culmination of the sectarian-based policies that were adopted by Emir Bachir II (Joumblat, 1977: 9-10). From the above discussion, it is clear that Kamal Joumblat established, in his writings, historical continuity between the sectarian rivalries of the mid-nineteenth century and those of the twentieth century to justify the social and political injustices that the Druze community experienced in the twentieth century.

The previous ideas were also discussed in his book *Pour le Liban*. In the latter book, Joumblat started with an introduction on the history of the Druzes' immigration to Mount Lebanon in the eleventh century, which he referred to as their "historic homeland". Joumblat, then, referred to how the Joumblat family played important political roles in the history of Mount Lebanon; giving the examples of Sheikh Bachir Joumblat and Sheikh Ali Joumblat. According to Kamal Joumblat, his family (in specific) and the Druze community (in general) played an important role in the preservation of the independent (or *Quasi*-independent) status of Mount Lebanon till the rise of Emir Bachir Shihab; whose sectarian policies invited the foreign intervention in Mount Lebanon. Accordingly, the idea of "an independent political entity" for Mount Lebanon should be attributed to the Druzes before anyone else. Nonetheless, the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920, under the auspices of the French Mandate, ended this independent status of Mount Lebanon. Greater Lebanon was an embodiment of the exclusivist Maronite hegemony that started over Mount Lebanon since the mid-nineteenth century. Joumblat, then, referred to the difference between the Maronite and the Druze hegemony. According to Joumblat, the Maronite hegemony was premised on the Maronite

perception of their supremacy above the other Lebanese communities. On the other hand, when Mount Lebanon was under the Druze hegemony (before the mid-nineteenth century), the aristocratic Druze class did not rule on confessional basis. On the other hand, they were tolerant enough to invite the Maronite peasants to work in the Druze lands in the "Druze Mountain". This status of co-existence in Mount Lebanon was then disturbed by the sectarian policies of Emir Bachir II, and which were followed by a number of sectarian clashes (from 1842 till 1860); which were quite similar to what Lebanon was witnessing in the twentieth century (from 1958 till 1975)[65]. Joumblat explained this in the light of the narrow sectarian mentality of the Maronites who, via all the sectarian clashes in the history of Mount Lebanon and Greater Lebanon, wanted to maximize their authorities and impose an uncontested hegemony over the Lebanese political entity (Joumblat, 1978).

In this publication, Kamal Joumblat used the rationale of the historical continuity between the events that took place in the mid-nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Additionally, Kamal Joumblat's reference to the Chouf as the Druze Mountain, along with calling it "the historic home" of the Druzes, clearly reveal how the Druze political leadership envisioned itself and its community as the initial inhabitants of the Mountain; having been superior to the Maronites, who worked as peasants in their lands. Depicting the Druze hegemony on Mount Lebanon as more just and efficient than the Maronite one by using the example of allowing the Maronites to work as peasants on the lands of the Druze landlords is an assertion of the Druze political leadership's uneasiness towards the socio-economic and political changes that happened in the mid-nineteenth century; and which altered the sectarian balance of power in the Mountain. The dilemma here lies in the fact that Kamal Joumblat, despite being classified as a revolutionary in his ideas, was not critical of the idea of the system of *Iqtaa*. This could justify some authors' argument that Kamal Joumblat family was first and foremost concerned with restoring his family's leading status in the Chouf above that of the Druze community. Another point that is important to highlight here is how Kamal Joumblat was aware of the presence of other factors behind the rise of the Maronite community in Mount Lebanon, such as the changes in the demographic composition of the Mountain in favor of the Maronites, their involvement in the silk production and how they turned to be the lenders of their landlords, along with other factors that were already discussed in chapter one (Joumblat,1978: 47). Thus, it was not only the policies of Emir Bachir II that paved the way for the rise of the Maronite community in Mount Lebanon, but there were other reasons that the Druze political leadership ignored. Nevertheless, Kamal Joumblat and later on, Walid Joumblat chose to focus on the discourse of collective injustice and collective victimization, throughout the twentieth century up to *Harb Al Jabal.*

[65] For further examination of the symbiosis that Kamal Joumblat drew between the mid-nineteenth century events and the political crises of the twentieth century, see Joumblat (1987: 20-26).

While Kamal Joumblat was highly critical in his writings of the Lebanese confessional system, he continued to occupy important positions in the government. This was especially the case under the rule of President Fouad Shihab who came to power in 1958, following the crisis that happened in the same year. Although Shihab, who was the commander of the Lebanese army before becoming Lebanon's president, drew many lessons from the 1958 crisis, his policies never meant to abolish sectarianism. Nevertheless, he aspired to establish what Fawwaz Traboulsi called "sectarian equilibrium". He did that by "injecting the sectarian system with large doses of economic and social justice" [66](Traboulsi, 2007:140-141).

One of the main targets of Fouad Shihab was to give Kamal Joumblat important political posts in the government. This was because of two main reasons. First, Fouad Shihab was aware of the fact that Lebanon's confessional system was unfair and unrepresentative of some communities, especially the Druzes whose small numbers confined them to a limited role in the Lebanese political system. He was also aware of how this political marginalization shaped Kamal Joumblat's defensive attitude towards the Lebanese political establishment. Accordingly, President Fouad Shihab aimed to contain Kamal Joumblat's radical political activism. However, he failed to do that as Kamal Joumblat never abandoned his main aim, and that was to overthrow the Lebanese confessional establishment. Additionally, when he accepted his political post in the Shihab government, his main aim was to use this position to expand both his sphere of influence and his support base; which he aspired to encompass both Druze and non-Druze members. The outbreak of the 1969 violent demonstrations[67] in Beirut, Sidon and Tripoli clearly reveal how Kamal Joumblat never ceased to use any opportunity to get rid of the confessional system in Lebanon. It was only via ending this sectarian system that the Druzes could have an opportunity to regain their previous glorious role in Lebanon. The 1969 demonstrations were also regarded by Joumblat as a golden opportunity and a revolutionary event for the Druzes to alter their socio-economic marginalization. This is because of several reasons: First, Joumblat was aware of the significance of the moral, logistical and military assistance of the Palestinian resistance. Second, Joumblat was aware that if he succeeded to depict the Lebanese left as the only supporter of the Palestinian resistance, he could render the Sunni traditional leaders weak in the eyes of the Lebanese Sunni community; which meant that he would be able to rally the Lebanese Sunnis behind the Lebanese political left. Joumblat succeeded to depict the Lebanese political left, via his role in the 1969 demonstrations, as the only legitimate and genuine

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[66] For more information on the policies of President Fouad Shihab, See Traboulsi (2007: 139-157).

[67] In 1969, a series of violent demonstrations broke out in Beirut, Sidon and Tripoli against the Lebanese army. These demonstrations were mainly led by the Lebanese Sunnis and the Palestinians who inhabited these three cities against the Lebanese army's actions towards the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon. Those demonstrations were backed by Kamal Junblat and other leftist radical parties. For more details, See Al-Khazen (2000:143-144). See Traboulsi (2007: 139-157).

protagonist of the Palestinian resistance. His support for the Palestinian cause was bound up with more critical matters, which included: Lebanon's inter-communal politics and the Druzes' position within Lebanon's sectarian system (Hazran, 2010:164-165).

From 1969 to 1975, the Lebanese press declared Joumblat the "king of the Lebanese left" who managed to unite the different leftist factions under his leadership, openly declaring two main goals: Abolishing the confessional system in Lebanon and offering unreserved support to the Palestinian resistance. This period (from 1969 to 1975) made Joumblat convinced that the demise of the Lebanese confessional establishment was inevitable and that all the conditions that were required to end this system were already present (Hazran, 2010:164-165).

D. The 1975 civil war: Was it a coup de grâce to the Lebanese confessional political establishment?

The 1975 civil war in Lebanon was a turning point in the country's history. Unlike the 1958 civil war that was brought under the control of the Lebanese state, with the help of the Lebanese army and the US military forces, the 1975 civil war was hard to contain. As a result, it gradually culminated in the disintegration of the Lebanese state and its institutions. Although Kamal Joumblat was not the first to start the fight in 1975, he did not endeavor to reconcile the disputing factions (mainly the Maronites led by the Phalangists and the Palestinians). On the other hand, Joumblat made sure that he could use all the possible opportunities to deconfessionalize the system. According to Joumblat, the 1975 civil war was an irreplaceable opportunity for the Lebanese left (in general) and the Lebanese Druzes (in particular) to get rid of confessionalism. Joumblat believed that he should not miss this opportunity, especially after he failed to use the 1958 civil war to alter the Druze socio-political marginalization. Kamal Joumblat regarded the 1975 civil war as the coup de grâce to the Lebanese confessional political system. In August 1975, four months after the Lebanese civil war started, Joumblat was among the first Lebanese political leaders to develop a reform program as his solution to the violent political turmoil that swept the country in 1975. This program had five main pillars: Abolishing the confessional system in Lebanon, ending the Maronite hegemony over the position of the high command of the military, secularizing all the state political institutions, amending the Lebanese citizenship law and reforming the parliamentary electoral law to be premised on a system of proportional representation (Hanf, 1993:135-136). The reform program that Kamal Joumblat presented ignored the economic dimension of the crisis, and he prioritized the political dimension; which had been his priority since he started his political activism. The abolishing of the Lebanese confessional system and ending the Maronite hegemony that dates back to the mid-nineteenth century had been the ultimate goal of Kamal Joumblat. This had been expressed in Farid al-Khazen's

words that “Joumblat’s political projection cannot be separated from the historical background of the Druze in Lebanon and their ancient rivalry with the Maronites reaching back to the nineteenth century” (Al-Khazen, 2006: 191-198).

This desire to avenge for the past political defeat and humiliation of the Druze community was not only enshrined in Kamal Joumblat’s writings, but also in his statements during the 1975 Lebanese civil war. For instance, in a meeting that was held between the Syrian President Hafez Al Assad and Kamal Joumblat in 1976 to discuss the Lebanese crisis, Joumblat stated the following: “let us discipline them. We must have decisive military action. They have been governing us for 140 years, and we want to get rid of them”. Such a declaration made the Syrian president state in one of his speeches in July 1976 that when Joumblat said this statement, it became quite obvious that the Lebanese civil war was not a conflict between the Christians and the Muslims or one between the left and the right. Nevertheless, the Lebanese civil war was “one of vengeance, a matter of revenge, which dates back 140 years” (Hazran, 2010: 168-169). Although Joumblat showed through such statement that the mid-nineteenth century Maronite-Druze inter-sectarian rivalries was strongly embedded in the Druze collective memory, the Lebanese civil war cannot be reduced to this historic hostility between those two communities. The reasons behind the Lebanese civil war are more complicated, diverse and intermingled than Hafez Al Assad’s statement that the war was a matter of revenge for a past hostility. Nevertheless, this section of the thesis used such statement by Joumblat to show how the Druze political leadership viewed the Lebanese civil war as a historic opportunity that should be used to alter the community’s socio-political marginalization that dates back to the mid-nineteenth century.

Kamal Joumblat’s attempts to deconfessionalize the Lebanese system were doomed to fail as a result of the Syrian intervention in Lebanon in 1976 and his assassination in 1977 by an order of the Syrian regime. Nevertheless, his vision of Lebanon’s political crises as “historic opportunities” that should be used to correct what he perceived as “historic injustice” remained integral in the strategies of his son, Walid Joumblat (Hazran, 2010:10).

The investigation of the change in the relationship of the Druze political leadership to the Lebanese political establishment since the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 is extremely important in the understanding of the dynamics of the Mountain War. The latter was not the only encounter between the Druzes and the Maronites since the 1860 sectarian clashes. Nevertheless, there were different phases in which the Druze political leadership, resembled in Kamal Joumblat, tried to alter the socio-political situation of the Druzes by using the rhetoric of the 1860 political defeat of the community. The period from 1860 to 1983 (*Harb Al Jabal)* witnessed a series of tensions between the Druze political leadership and the Maronite-dominated political establishment. These political tensions included the Druze political leadership’s resistance to 1943 National Pact, the

1958 civil war and eventually, the 1975 civil war. In all those crises, Kamal Joumblat was able to rally the community behind his cause because of three main reasons: First, the family's historic role in the protection of the community and its well-known fighting tradition, his charismatic personality and the reliance on the rhetoric of collective victimization that date back to the mid-nineteenth century. Although Joumblat benefited from relying on the Palestinian resistance and from embracing the Palestinian cause, he did not succeed to maintain unity among the different factions of the Lebanese political left. Additionally, Joumblat's clash with the Syrian regime was his biggest mistake, which ended with his assassination. Given this background, one could understand how *Harb Al Jabal* was central for the Druze political leadership (and which will be covered in the next chapter).

Conclusion

This chapter examined how the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 was the outcome of the convergence of the Maronite and French interests in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Although the Druzes were represented in the Lebanese delegation that was sent to Paris Peace Conference in 1919, they did not fully accept the idea of Greater Lebanon; which they believed that it only fulfilled the interests of the Maronites, and further empowered them. The chapter continued to examine how the Druze political leadership, led by Kamal Joumblat, dealt with the Maronite-dominated political establishment under Greater Lebanon; adopting a policy of accommodation, and not reconciliation. This policy was premised on the pragmatism of the Druze political leadership who did not want to repeat their ancestors' experience with the French, whose intervention in 1860 aggravated the socio-economic and political losses of the Druze elites. Nonetheless, this policy of accommodation did not last for a long time, and with the Maronite-Sunni signing of the National Pact in 1943, the Druze leader Kamal Joumblat expressed his deep frustration with this pact. This was not only because it excluded the Druzes from the process, but it also institutionalized confessionalism; reducing the Druze political role in Lebanon to that of a minority due to its limited numerical size. The signing of the National Pact in 1943, and which coincided with the rise of Kamal Joumblat as a significant leader in the Lebanese left, marked the change in the Druze political leadership's relation with the Lebanese state, from one that is premised on accommodation to confrontation.

From 1943 until the 1975 Lebanese civil war, Kamal Joumblat exploited all the political crises that occurred in Lebanon to challenge the Maronite political establishment that imposed its hegemony over Lebanon. The examination of his writings and publications reveal that he envisioned such crises as historic opportunities to overthrow Lebanon's confessional system, which he believed would enable the Druzes to play a bigger role in

Greater Lebanon. To amass support from his community, his anti-Maronite statements and writings relied on putting emphasis on the historical continuity between the nineteenth century developments and Emir Bachir's sectarian politics, and the policies of the Maronite dominated political establishment in the twentieth century. It is crucial to state that Kamal Joumblat did not narrow his struggle to that of his community's demands. On the contrary, he was able to integrate his communal interests in the midst of wider interest, which he depicted as national ones. Thus, he created the Progressive Socialist Party in 1949 to widen his national base and garner support from the different Lebanese sects; framing his demands in the contour of a number of national, revolutionary and progressive ideas. Although Kamal Joumblat's ideas received support and found resonance with many Lebanese from different sects, the 1975 Lebanese civil war did not allow his ideas to materialize due to several factors, such as the divisions that occurred in the Lebanese left, the Syrian intervention in 1976 and finally, his assassination in 1977 by an order from the Syrian regime.

Although Kamal Joumblat did not succeed in ending Lebanon's confessional system, his ideas were adopted by his son, Walid, who sought to implement them using different methods (as will be illustrated in the next chapter on the Mountain War).

Chapter three

The Mountain War (1983-1984): The revival of the Druze-Maronite mid-nineteenth historical enmities in Al Chouf in *Harb Al Jabal*

"We either live here or we die here

(A statement by a Druze commander during the Mountain War,

as cited in Mackey, 1989: 63).

A. Introduction

Baakline, a Druze town in Al Chouf mountains, witnessed in 1983 the destruction of the bronze statue of Emir Fakhr al Din Maan[68] by its Druze inhabitants. Although Emir Fakhr al Din Maan is a famous and significant Druze historical figure, the destruction of his statue in Baakline had significant political and historical connotations for the Druzes. This could be explained in the light of two reasons: First, this statue was erected by the Lebanese authorities in 1974 in celebration of the third centennial of Emir Fakhr al Din's birth. According to the majority of the Druzes, this statue resembled the Maronite falsified historical version and perception of the Emir since it was erected by the Maronite ruling authorities, serving their political interests. The Maronites glorified the Emir for his religious tolerance and for allowing them to immigrate to Al Chouf in the seventeenth century and work in the lands of the Druze landlords; which paved the way for their incremental hegemony over Mount Lebanon and their eventual rise to power. For the majority of the Druzes, the only statue of Emir Fakhr al Din that they respected was the one that was erected in the main hall of Al Moukhtara Palace[69]. Second, the destruction of the statue in 1983 was also an expression of the Druze jubilant victory over the Maronites in the Mountain War/ *Harb Al Jabal*. In Kamal Salibi's words: "The triumph of Druzes in the Shuf war was hardly complete when the statue of Fakhr al-Din in the town of Baakline was unceremoniously brought down with a charge of dynamite". The Mountain War enabled the Druzes, for the first time in three centuries, to regain control over their "historical home" (Salibi, 1988: 200). Salibi's use of the words "historical home" could help in the understanding of the quote that is used in the beginning of the chapter. For the majority of the Druzes, there is this belief that they have no other home except for the lands that their ancestors inhabited centuries ago; and which they continued to occupy.

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[68] Emir Fakhr al Din Maan is a Druze historical figure who is regarded by many Lebanese to be the father of modern Lebanon. See Olsaretti (2008: 709-740).

[69] Al Moukhtara Palace is the historical residential place of the Druze Joumblat family.

Salibi's use of the words "historical home" also sheds the light on the complexity of the Mountain War, whose reasons, dynamics and consequences could be understood in the light of the specific history of the Maronite-Druze inter-sectarian rivalries (1840 and 1860) that date back to the nineteenth century. Although both wars happened in different contexts, the "essential ingredient" that paved the way for such sectarian confrontations to occur again remained the same. This ingredient is resembled in the prevalence of sectarianism and confessional politics in both the political entity of Mount Lebanon and that of Greater Lebanon; and which created immense imbalance between Lebanon's communities ever since sectarianism was introduced in the early nineteenth century (Fawaz, 1985: 378).

In the light of these ideas, this chapter will examine the following issues: First, the chapter will look at the historical specificity of this war, and how the 1860 discourse of collective victimization was used by the political leaderships of the Druze and Maronite communities to fuel the war; with a focus on the Druze political leadership, resembled in Walid Joumblat. Second, this chapter will shed the light on the particularism of *Harb Al Jabal* for the Druzes, in comparison to the other political crises that happened in Lebanon (1943, 1958, 1969 and 1975). Third, the chapter will investigate the role of the Druze collective memory of the 1860 events in fueling the Mountain War, and shaping the war's dynamics and consequences. Under this section, the chapter will look at other reasons that enabled the Druze community to win this war, and which include: The unity of the Druze elites under the Joumblat leadership during the war, the Druze community's early history of persecution and its role in fueling *Harb Al Jabal* and the effective role of the Druze religious leadership. Fourth, the chapter will highlight the political victory of the Druzes in the Mountain War, and their ability to turn their military triumph in a political one; which makes this war significant in the history of the community. This will be examined in the light of the change in the demographic composition of the Mountain, as a result of the expulsion of the Christians from the Chouf during the Mountain War. This section will also shed the light on the political gains that the Joumblat family accumulated from this war.

B. The Mountain War: How did the specific history of Maronite-Druze sectarian rivalries in the mid-nineteenth century ignite the Mountain War?

On the 3rd of September 1983, the Israeli army withdrew from the strategic positions it was occupying in the Chouf region in Mount Lebanon. This vacuum was quickly filled by the Maronite Lebanese Forces (LF) militia whose declared aim was the protection of the Christian villages in the regions of Aley and the Chouf[70], identified as the Druze

[70] Although the Chouf had villages with mixed population of Maronites and Druzes, it was the heartland of the Druze community, as it was the area that the Druzes first settled in when they escaped persecution in Egypt in the eleventh century. Moreover, after the installation of the

heartland. This decision signified the beginning of the Mountain War / *Harb al Jabal*, which was one of the bloodiest confrontations between the Maronites and the Druzes after almost a century of "nominal" peace. Although the Mountain War had a local, regional, and international context (outlined in the introductory chapter), it cannot be isolated from the specific history of the rivalries between the Druzes and the Maronites in Mount Lebanon, which date back to the mid-nineteenth century. In Walid Phares' words: "*Harb el-Jabal* or the battle of the Mountain was almost a reedition of the 1860s scenarios". The Lebanese Forces were strongly defeated by the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) militia, led by Walid Joumblat and supported by the Syrian artillery and the Palestinian infantry. The Druzes were able to isolate the LF, along with thousands of civilians, in, the town of Deir al Qamar. This is besides the massacres of thousands of Christian civilians in other villages, the destruction of hundreds of Christian towns and villages and the expulsion of thousands of Christians from the Chouf (Phares, 1995: 146).

Although the failure of the May 17 accord and the withdrawal of the forces from the Chouf created the conditions for the Mountain War to occur, it would not be sufficient to draw direct link between both incidents. In a meeting between Samir Geagea, who led the Lebanese Forces during the Mountain War in 1983, and a delegation from the PSP to celebrate the commemoration of the Maronite-Druze Mountain reconciliation[71] Geagea stated that the Mountain War was entirely absurd and unjustifiable. If this war was to be justified by any means, it would be only understood in the light of "a war of existence," in which each side aimed at preserving its own survival ("La guerre de la Montagne, une guerre absurde", affirme Gaegae devant une délégation du PSP, 2016). He once again described *Harb al Jabal* as an existential war in an interview with the Lebanese journalist Ghassan Charbel when he was asked why the Lebanese Forces decided to go to the Chouf in September 1983.Geagea answered that the Lebanese Forces had historical fears[72] that date back to a century before the Mountain War started. He added that what

system of Qaimmaqamiyya in 1842, Mount Lebanon was divided into two regions: the northern area of the Mountain, a Maronite-controlled area, and the southern area of the Mountain, Al Chouf, which was mostly inhabited and controlled by the Druzes. Although the Mountain was divided, some villages in both regions remained mixed until the outbreak of the Mountain War in 1983.

[71] The Mountain reconciliation occurred in August 2001 when the Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Nasrallah Sfeir visited the Druze leader Walid Joumblat in his palace Al Moukhtara. This visit aimed at encouraging the Christians to return back to their homes in the Chouf after being displaced, as a result of the Mountain War in 1983. For more information, See Kanafani-Zahar (2012: 46-48)*;* see Picard (2005: 127-141).

[72] References to such historical fears were also made in *Al Maseera* newspaper articles, which were the official newspapers of the Phalangists during the Lebanese civil war. See "A Holy Mass Held In Commemoration Of The Martyrs Of Kafr Matta: Assaad Raad: We do not accept an alternative to our Mountain" (Al Maseera, 1983). See "Our history is now full of martyrdom and daily suffering" (Al Maseera, 1983: 33)

caused the Mountain War to occur as well was the desire of some factions to impose full and absolute political control over the Mountain Geagea accused the PSP of being largely responsible for *Harb Al Jabal* due to their insistence on imposing an uncontested and absolute hegemony on the Mountain, which he perceived as being incompatible with the demographic composition of Mount Lebanon and the policy of co-existence that should have prevailed in the Mountain (Samir Geagea, as cited in Charbel, 2011: 160-176). Geagea's statements clearly reveal the prevalence of the memory of the mid-nineteenth century historical rivalries in the context of the Mountain War.

Although Geagea endeavored to put the blame on the Druze PSP militia for not trying to reach compromise with the Lebanese Forces over the political and military control of the Mountain, his statement cannot be fully discarded. This is because, although the PSP was not the faction that ignited the war, they envisioned *Harb al Jabal* as the last opportunity to protect their community from the Maronite threat, given the inability of Kamal Joumblat to end Maronite hegemony over the Lebanese political establishment. According to De Clerck (2014: 187), the Lebanese Forces' decision to fill the vacuum left by Israeli withdrawal from the Chouf should not be perceived as a declaration of war on the Druzes. In her opinion, there was still room for reaching political compromise with the PSP over how the Mountain should be ruled. Nevertheless, Walid Joumblat would not accept another political victory for the Maronites in the Mountain. He would not tolerate the idea of power-sharing in the Chouf. A war against the past was the prelude to the Mountain War.

In other words, the war was not imposed on the Druzes; on the other hand, they definitely exploited all the possible conditions to get rid of the Maronite presence in the Mountain and achieve a massive historical military and political victory over the Maronites. This had been clear even in the years that preceded the Mountain War. For instance, in 1977, following the assassination of Kamal Joumblat, as they were traveling to his home Al Moukhtara in Al Chouf, some Druze decided to avenge Joumblat's death and massacred around 170 Christians in villages that were close to Al Moukhtara. This massacre happened even though it was known that Kamal Joumblat was assassinated following an order by the Syrian regime. Samir Khalaf summed up the incident as follows: "Instead of killing those they wanted to kill, they ended up victimizing those they could ... [in a] vengeful act of impassioned *quid pro quo*[73]" (Khalaf, 2012: 61-62).

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[73] Both the massacres of 1977 and 1983 reveal deep feelings of revenge that were strongly prevalent among the Druze community, and had their roots in historical rivalries.

There is no evidence that the 1977 massacres, for instance, were carried out based on orders from Walid Joumblat to the Druze masses. Such massacres tended to be more of a mass-based reaction to a century of grievances that the Druzes had experienced as a result of their political defeat following the 1860 events. The 1977 massacres were the beginning of the end of the "proverbial" Christian-Druze co-existence in the Chouf, which was given the final death blow in the Mountain War (Khalaf, 2012: 62). Khalaf emphasizes that co-existence between the Druzes and the Maronites in the Chouf from 1860 to 1983 was not based on genuine co-existence and harmony. Rather, it was a sort of "temporary" co-existence that threatened to fail and collapse at any time, especially if faced with a political crisis (as what happened in *Harb al Jabal).*

Walid Joumblat referred to how the sectarian policies of Emir Bachir II ended the co-existence between the Druzes and the Maronites in Mount Lebanon, leading to the 1860 massacres that ended with the socio-economic and political marginalization of the Druzes, along with their humiliation. In this understanding of events, the military and political victory of the Druzes in 1983 enabled them to alter their marginalized status and obtain revenge for their community's political defeat in 1860 (Walid Joumblat as cited in Charbel, 2011: 292). Although Walid Joumblat fought in *Harb al Jabal* to restore what he portrayed as his community's lost social and political prestige, he also had personal aspirations, which included his desire to avenge his family's political defeat and humiliation in 1860. On the 15th of February 2009, Walid Joumblat hosted a delegation of American journalists in his ancestral palace, Al Moukhtara. He was asked about a mural in the palace's reception hall. Joumblat said that the mural depicted the French navy that came to Lebanon in 1860 to punish his ancestors for killing the Maronites; "however, a century later I took my revenge" (Walid Joumblat as cited in Rabah, 2013: 1). It is interesting how Joumblat used the word "killing" when he stated that the French came to Mount Lebanon to punish his ancestors for "killing" the Maronites. This shows that Joumblat was aware that the Druzes committed massacres against the Maronites, yet he was happy to avenge his ancestors. The fact that this comment was said after twenty-five years following the end of the Mountain War and eight years following the 2001 Mountain Reconciliation, which was initiated by Walid Joumblat, reveals that Joumblat has continued to perceive the Mountain War as a jubilant success.

The Mountain War was, accordingly, a war of existence and survival for both communities according to the rhetoric of both Samir Geagea and Walid Joumblat. Although it was not the first encounter between the Druzes and the Lebanese state in the twentieth century, it was perceived as the most important of all their confrontations with the Maronites. The next section will focus on the reasons why the Mountain War was regarded as the "historical moment" for the Druzes to end the Maronite hegemony in Lebanon, and not only the Mountain.

C. Why was this war more important to the Druzes than any other political encounter with the Lebanese political establishment?

Harb al Jabal, unlike any other political crisis that pitted the Druzes versus the Maronite-dominated political establishment, was a direct assault on the Druzes in their homeland; and thus, from the Druze perspective, it was a direct menace to their very existence. In the previous political crises that occurred in Lebanon in the twentieth century, Kamal Joumblat's main aim was to get rid of the confessional system to enable his community to play a bigger role in Lebanese politics. In the case of *Harb Al Jabal,* either the Druzes or the Maronites would stay in the Chouf. In Latif Abul-Husn's words: "The struggle for power and authority in Mount Lebanon bears some resemblance to "a game of King of the Mountain". Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Druze hegemony over the Mountain was unchallenged. Nonetheless, by the mid-nineteenth century, it became clear that the Druze power was declining as a result of the demographic, socio-economic and political changes that were taking place in Mount Lebanon for the favor of the Maronites. Since that time, the distribution of power between the Druzes and the Maronites in Mount Lebanon was seen as a zero-sum game: "what the Maronites gained, the Druzes saw as their direct losses (Abul-Husn, 1998: 20).

Although the Druzes under the leadership of Kamal Joumblat had several opportunities in the twentieth century to challenge the Maronite hegemony over the Lebanese political institutions, none of those opportunities was as important or successful as *Harb al Jabal.* This is because of the following reasons: First, although the political crises (1943, 1958 and 1975) that happened in Lebanon in the twentieth century were perceived as historic opportunities to end the Maronite hegemony over Lebanon, Kamal Joumblat concealed his communal goals under the guise of bigger slogans that encompassed Arabism, socialism, secularism and revolution. Second, in all the political crises that happened in the twentieth century, Kamal Joumblat endeavored to ally himself with other leaders from different sectarian groups to depict the struggle as a national one, and not one that pitted the Druzes against the Maronites. Nevertheless, this rationale proved wrong since the Lebanese civil war aggravated the divisions among the different Lebanese factions that used to be allied before. Third, the failure of the program of the Lebanese left, which was mostly led by Kamal Joumblat, undermined the whole struggle against the Maronites and their hegemony over Lebanon. Fourth, Kamal Joumblat's struggle against the whole entity of the Lebanese state made it extremely difficult to achieve his narrow sectarian goals. Lastly, his assassination put an end to his struggle against Maronite hegemony.

Following his father's assassination, Walid Joumblat sought to pursue his father's main goal, which was the elimination of Maronite hegemony in Lebanon, but without using the same methods. He was aware that challenging Maronite hegemony on the level of the

state, even if the context was the Lebanese civil war when the state was already quite fragile, was doomed to fail. Walid Joumblat learnt from the mistakes that his father made; and that was clear when in his relation with Syria. Kamal Joumblat's clash with the Syrian regime, led by Hafez al Assad, culminated in his assassination. This made Walid more pragmatic in his relation with Syria. In many cases, he used to praise Syria's concern with Lebanon's security and sovereignty (Joumblat's Appraisal of Syria's Political Stances, 1983: 4). Walid Joumblat was also aware that by confining the struggle against the Maronite hegemony to its communal limits and contours, he could achieve better results. This is why he relied on two main discourses: The first was the struggle for the Druze existence and which he placed in a dichotomous relation with the Maronite hegemony. The second rhetoric was the collective victimization of the whole Druze community, and which dates back to the mid-nineteenth century. Given this background, Walid Joumblat believed that the struggle against the Maronites should be undergone solely by the Druzes. Although the Syrian artillery and the Palestinian infantry were involved in the Mountain War, it was the Druze militia, the PSP, which mainly fought against the Maronite Lebanese Forces militia (Hazran, 2015: 358).

Given this context, when the Lebanese Forces encroached upon the Druze homeland in Al Chouf in 1983, Walid Joumblat believed that this was the only opportunity left, through which he could restore his family's political prestige; and which was negatively affected by the inability of his father to end the Maronite hegemony over the Lebanese state. In this war, the aim was not to achieve a military victory only, but to translate such victory into political gains (De Clerck, 2014: 176). Walid Joumblat believed that if the Maronites were politically and militarily defeated in the Chouf, this would have huge negative repercussions on their military and political prowess on the wider scale[74].

Walid Joumblat could not have achieved this huge victory in the Mountain War without the Druze masses who were fueled by the discourse of the 1860 events. His father had referenced these events in all the political crises that he endeavored to exploit to get rid of the Maronite hegemony in the twentieth century. This sheds light on a number of

[74] Mount Lebanon, which had been the cradle of the modern Lebanese state, had always been the center from which each community fought its battle and augmented its hegemonic role. The Maronite political victory in 1860, following the French intervention to protect them against the Druze massacres, determined their hegemonic political role in Lebanon till the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975. On a similar note, the political defeat of the Druzes in 1860 in Mount Lebanon also determined their marginalized role in Greater Lebanon. The Mountain, thus, was the entity that determined the size of each community's role in Greater Lebanon. This could explain Walid Joumblat's decision, following his father's assassination, to concentrate the Druzes' efforts in the protection of their canton and the purification of the Chouf from the non-Druze elements. The belief that a victory in the Mountain was to determine the status of his community in the rest of the Lebanese entity proved to be right. From the Maronite perspective, the same logic and rationale was adopted. This was clear in Samir Geagea's words, before the Mountain War started in 1983, when he stated the following: "prepare for the mission. If we are not in the Mountain, we are not safe anywhere in Lebanon" (Geagea as cited in Andary, 2012: 1).

important questions. First, to what extent were the Druze masses involved in the Mountain War? Second, was the 1860 discourse equally effective among the Druzes and the Maronites? The latter's political leadership relied on the 1860 discourse during *Harb al Jabal*, but it failed to mobilize the Christian masses in the same manner the Druze masses were mobilized. These questions will be examined in the next section.

D. The Mountain War: To what extent is this war an extension of the 1860 events/massacres?

The perception that the Mountain War was an extension of the 1860 sectarian rivalries was the discourse that both the Maronite and Druze political leaderships used; and it was also common among the fighters of both militias. Paul Andary[75], an ex-Maronite Lebanese Forces fighter, stated in his memoir on the Mountain War that *Harb Al Jabal* was a crime that had begun earlier and had its roots in history. He added that the Mountain War, with all its dynamics from the massacres committed against the Christians, the siege of the Christian town of Deir El Qamar up to their displacement, reminded the Maronites of what their ancestors had gone through during the 1860 sectarian rivalries (Andary, 2012: 2). The 1860 discourse was equally strong among the Druze PSP militia fighters. For instance, a Druze ex-fighter in the PSP, stated that during the Mountain War, and specifically in the nine-day battle of the village of Al-Qraya, the Druze fighters killed Bachir Gemmayel's nephew, Ernest Gemmayel; which was not part of the tactics of the battle as it was specified by the PSP militia. The target was to prevent the fighters of the Lebanese Forces from reaching their comrades in the southern parts of the Mountain. Nevertheless, the Druze fighters perceived *Harb Al Jabal* as a war of "existence and dignity". According to this fighter, he was doing what his father did in 1958 and what his ancestors did in 1860; "I was defending my land and dignity, just like my father did in 1958 and my great-grandfather before him in 1860" (Rabah, 2013: 8).

Although the 1860 events rhetoric was strongly deployed by the leaderships of both communities, it did not have the same impact on their masses. This is because to revive the memory of certain events or massacres in times of crises, and capitalize on them, is different than living on certain historical memories and keeping them alive and present so that when a political crisis happens, those memories are ready to be deployed. The Maronite political leadership dwelled upon the discourse of the 1860 sectarian clashes mostly in times of crisis. For instance, whenever the Maronite political elites used to encounter any threat to their independence (as with the rise of Arabism in Lebanon in the 1950s and the 1960s, as part of the wave of Arab nationalism that swept the Arab world in the same period), they used to refer to what the Maronites encountered in the 1860

[75] Paul Andary wrote his memoir of the Mountain War, under the title of "*Al Jabal, Haqiqa La Tarham*"; and which was translated into English, under the title of "*War of the Mountain: Israelis, Christians and Druzes in the 1983 Mount Lebanon Conflict through the eyes of a Lebanese Forces Fighter*"

sectarian clashes on the hands of the Druzes. In Sandra Mackey's words, "The events of 1860 became the touchstone of Maronite psychology; and when the question of security from 'the Muslim threat' arose in the Maronite minds as it did increasingly with the rise of nationalism throughout the Arab world, the 1860 events became a potent symbol of what could not be allowed to happen again" (Mackey, 1989: 41). Although the Maronite political leaders tended to dwell on the 1860 memory, this was the case mostly in times of crises. They were not able, unlike the Druze political leadership to develop a strong sense of collective consciousness that evolves around the 1860 events. This is because of several reasons: First, the lack of a clear sense of identity among the Maronites. The latter tended to be torn between affiliating themselves with the West to preserve their independence and separateness from the Arab world from one side; and from another side, their inability to detach themselves from their Arab roots. Second, the Maronites had been unable to maintain a sense of unity among the Christians. Finally, the Maronites were highly divided during the Lebanese civil war in a manner that rendered them very weak (Mackey, 1989: 41-42).

The understanding of who keeps those memories alive is very central to the discussion here. Was the discourse of the 1860 massacres only used by the Maronite political leadership as frequently as it was used by the Druze political leadership? Was the memory of the 1860 massacres always present in the collective memory and consciousness of the Maronites as it was the case among the majority of the Druzes? Is the strength and effectiveness of collective memory associated with the intensity of the experiences of injustice? Those are questions to bear into consideration to be able to understand how different groups could capitalize on the same memory, yet the outcome would be entirely different.

D.1. The Maronites and *Harb Al Jabal:* What did the memory of the 1860 massacres mean for them in the midst of the Mountain War?

In August 2017, a Lebanese friend introduced me to an Egyptian driver who has been living in the Maronite town of Deir El Qamar for twenty-five years. He knows almost all the inhabitants of the town and has gained their respect and trust (to a great extent). It was through him that I was able to conduct four interviews for my fieldwork. However, it was still very challenging to conduct my interviews due to several factors: First, the topic is of great sensitivity and I heard comments as: *Tinzikir ma tin'ad* (May we remember this war, but never repeat it again), *ma badna ne'alaa' ma'on* (we -- the Maronites -- do not want to get into another confrontation with them -- the Druzes), and *kanit ayam ma badna ne'ida* (these were days that we do not want to repeat). I even encountered situations when some of the inhabitants acted as if they do not remember what happened, and others acted as if they do not know what I am discussing. The second factor is the

geographical location of the town of Deir al Qamar, which is surrounded by Druze towns and villages and is thus always accessible to the Druzes. I assume that this played a role in making the town's inhabitants also not very open to the discussion of such a sensitive issue. Third, the fact that the town's inhabitants did not know me, in the sense that I did not live among them for a while before conducting the interviews, created a psychological barrier between us. Even those who accepted to be interviewed were sometimes very cautious in their answers. One of the four individuals that I interviewed, who used to occupy a critical position in the Lebanese state before retiring, was very cautious in his answers; and sometimes, the answers tended to be more generic even though the questions were sometimes very specific. Although the sample of the Maronites that were interviewed was quite limited due to the circumstances stated above, along with the fact that they are not the main focus of this study, their answers on how they perceived *Harb al Jabal* did not reflect the presence of a strong Christian or Maronite collective memory, in regard to the 1860 massacres. One of the Maronites I interviewed, and who requested to remain anonymous, stated the following when I asked him whether he envisioned the Mountain War as an extension of the 1860 massacres or not:

"I do not think that *Harb Al Jabal*, by any means, is an extension of the 1860 massacres. Both of them happened in different contexts. Although both of them reflected the Druzes' ingrained hatred and envy of the Christians, both wars were not linked. *Harb Al Jabal* happened mainly as a result of the foreign intervention in Lebanon; and especially, the Israeli occupation of the Mountain. The Druzes exploited the chaos in the Mountain to create their own canton. They had always been interested in creating an independent Druze state in the Mountain. They wanted to preserve their autonomy and control the Mountain. Their suspicion of their surrounding milieu had motivated them to subdue the Maronites to their authority, and control them. When the Maronites refused to continue being subjugated to the Druzes, they were massacred in 1860. The Druzes had been willing to get into wars since they believe that they do not die; their souls get re-incarnated in other bodies, which explains why they are willing to die for their land"[76].

The belief that there were external players who ignited the sectarian tensions between the Druzes and the Maronites in the Mountain War was also expressed by Mrs. Leila Maoushe, who currently resides in Deir El Qamar:

"I was not in Deir El Qamar when the Mountain War happened. I heard from some relatives of mine that they felt that there were some unusual moves close to their village in the Chouf. They were also informed in the next morning that the Druzes were attacking some nearby villages. So, they moved to Deir al Qamar, where my parents had

[76] Interview with a Maronite inhabitant of Deir El Qamar town, August 15th 2017. The interviewee requested to remain anonymous because of his pre-retirement sensitive position in the Lebanese state.

been staying. Before leaving the Mountain, the Israelis ignited the tensions between both the Maronites and the Druzes; the latter already had ingrained hatred and envy towards the Christians. They also had tendencies of avenging from the Christians, which could have played a role in the clashes that happened"[77].

Mr. Melhem Habib, Mrs. Leila's husband, stated that the Syrians were the main external players who enflamed the situation in the Mountain:

"The Syrians were the ones who ignited the sectarian tensions between the Druzes and the Maronites since they wanted to expel the Christians from the Mountain due to the tensions that existed between the Syrian regime and the Phalangists" [78]

Although the Maronites that were interviewed differed in their opinions on who exactly ignited *Harb Al Jabal,* they tended to agree that the Mountain War was enflamed by external players; whom they referred to as "*ghuraba'"* (strangers). Nevertheless, the answers of the first two interviewees tended to refer to their belief that the Druzes had ingrained hatred and envy towards the Christians, which further helped in aggravating the situation. The use of the words "hatred" and "envy", along with Mrs. Leila's use of the words "the Druzes wanted to avenge from the Christians", refers to the awareness of the presence of historical tensions between both communities; and which could have roots in history (according to how they envisioned it). Nevertheless, they did not deal with such tensions as being shared from their side, but mainly from the Druzes' side.

Although the Maronite political leadership endeavored to draw an uninterrupted link between the 1860 massacres and the 1983 Mountain War and capitalize on it during the war, this was not successfully implemented among the Maronite community. This does not mean that the Maronites did not remember the 1860 massacres during *Harb Al Jabal*. Nevertheless, they did not envision both sectarian clashes as linked to each other. Accordingly, the 1860 massacres do not constitute a common element in the Maronite collective consciousness. According to Mrs. Leila, the 1860 massacres are very painful memories for the Maronites, yet they happened in the past:

"When the Mountain War happened, our parents remembered the 1860 massacres. But, no one perceived *Harb Al Jabal* as an extension of the 1860 massacres. Most of the Maronites of Deir El Qamar remembered how the same town was also under siege in 1860 and how its people were massacred. They were afraid to experience the same situation again. It was only when the same incident happened that people remembered the 1860 massacres. Usually, we consider such painful events as something that happened in

[77] Interview with Leila Maoushe, an inhabitant of Deir El Qamar, August 15th 2017.
[78] Interview with Mr. Malhem Habib, a Maronite inhabitant in Deir El Qamar, August 15th 2017.

the past; they do not constitute part of our present life. We do not have any engrained animosities towards the Druzes”[79]

This was also asserted by Mr. Samir Emile Baz, who is the owner of the Marie Baz wax museum in Deir El Qamar, and who stated that:

“The Maronites definitely know about the 1860 massacres that were committed against their ancestors by the Druzes; nevertheless, we consider such events as dreadful incidents that happened in the past. We do not raise our children on such events. We do not want to raise them on hatred of the other” [80]

From the previous answers, it is clear that there was a divergence between how the Maronite political leadership dealt with the two events of 1860 and 1983, from one side, and how the Maronite masses perceived both events. Although the sample that I interviewed could not be largely reflective of the Maronite community, Andary’s memoir tended to stress on the same point. According to Paul Andary, the lack of unity among the Christians in the Mountain was among the main factors that rendered the use of the 1860 discourse during the Mountain War ineffective. This lack of unity dated back to the 1860 events. He argued that the Christian leaders, since 1860, had been mostly concerned with winning the elections. They had not done anything to maintain unity among the Christians in the Mountain or to ensure that the Christians in Mount Lebanon had strong infrastructure that was not dependent on their surrounding Druze villages. According to Andary, “not a single Christian village could be accessed without passing through a Druze village. And there were no hospitals or services, even in the town of Bhamdoun, which had a majority of Christian population”. On the other hand, the Druze political leadership was more connected with its masses whom, in return, were all committed to their leadership during *Harb Al Jabal* (Andary, 2012: 45).

Andary referred to a critical point which is the relationship between the Druze political leadership and the Druze masses, and which played a critical role during the Mountain War; especially that this relationship had been premised on the issue of maintaining the community’s survival. In Andary’s words, “The Druze villages were fully inhabited, from children to the elderly, who were all mobilized and prepared for military work” (Andary, 2012: 66). According to De Clerck (2014: 176), the frustration and injustices that resulted from 1860 were behind the massive participation of the Druze masses in the Mountain War in 1983. This is besides that the social configuration of the Druze community and their historical concentration in the Mountain as a “rural community”, enabled them to develop a strong sense of “collective consciousness” of the 1860 events. These two factors, along with their leadership’s investment in the areas that had Druze

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[79] Op.cit., 14.

[80] Interview with Mr. Samir Baz, an inhabitant of Deir El Qamar town and the owner of the Marie Baz wax museum in the same town, August 15th 2017

concentration and their strong military tactics, which they had been historically known with, played a central and decisive role in *Harb Al Jabal.*

Several Maronite writers and intellectuals wrote, during the Mountain War, on the effective role that the Druze collective memory of the 1860 rivalries played in fueling *Harb Al Jabal.* This defeat remained in the community's collective memory since they perceived it as a blow to their historical right in the lands of Mount Lebanon. This context created a psycho-sociological complex in the Druze collective memory against the Maronites. This made the Druzes believe that the Maronites had confiscated their historical right in ruling Mount Lebanon via their co-operation with the foreign powers (especially France in 1860). Even the name "Bachir"[81] continued to intimidate the Joumblat family since it reminded them of Emir Bachir Shihab II, whom the majority of the Druzes accuse of ending their hegemony over the Mountain. The Bachir of the twentieth century (Bachir Gemmayel) had also been intimidating for the Joumblat family because he had an independent and nationalist vision of what Lebanon should be: One that belonged to all instead of one faction (the Druzes) that wanted a Lebanese political entity that is subordinated to their own power and control (Walid Joumblat and the complex of Bachir Gemmayel: The psychological approach to the understanding of history, 1982).

D.2. The Druzes and *Harb Al Jabal:* An investigation of the factors that enabled the Druzes to win the Mountain War

When *Harb Al Jabal* started, the Druze political leadership showed a great ability to mobilize the members of the community to participate in the war. This strong and effective mobilization was eased through capitalizing on the 1860 events, which were already strongly present in the community's collective memory. According to the Lebanese Druze scholar, Suleiman Taqi al-Din (2015: 462), the Druzes saw in the Mountain War a golden opportunity to renew their military glories and avenge for their past political defeat (1860). The Druzes were able to win the Mountain War due to a number of factors. First, the success of their leadership in the deployment of the 1860 discourse, and its successful internalization by the Druze masses. Second, the unity of the Druze political leadership in times of crises, and their support by the Druze masses. Third, the high value of the land in the eyes of the Druzes, and its equation to one's honor and dignity. Fourth, the effective role of the Druze religious leadership in rallying the Druze masses behind their political leadership.

[81] Here, the author meant that Kamal Joumblat, and his son, continued to be intimidated from Bachir Gemmayel who was the head of the Phalangists (Kataeb), and was Lebanon's president from the 23rd of August 1982 till the 14th of September 1982. Bachir Gemmayel was assassinated after twenty two days from being elected as Lebanon's president.

D.2.1: The discourse of the 1860 political defeat and its role in the mobilization of the community in the Mountain War

The Druze community, unlike the Maronite one, was able to create a sense of collective memory of the 1860 events because of a number of factors. First, the Druzes internalized the belief that their military victory in 1860, even if it was followed by political defeat, was a sign that they were defending a just cause; which they should continue defending. Second, the continuous capitalizing of the Druze political leadership (Kamal and Walid Joumblat) on the 1860 events helped keep this discourse live in the community's collective memory. Third, the belief that their ancestors had already paid the price for the 1860 events, and the feelings of unfairness that the Druzes continued to be marginalized in the twentieth century further motivated the majority of the Druze to avenge for their ancestors. Fourth, the urge to continue their ancestors' tradition in the defense of their lands and their community had also kept the memory of the 1860 events alive in the collective memory of the community (De Clerck, n.d.: 12).

The persistence of the memory of the 1860 events in the collective memory of the Druzes could also be understood in the light of the powerful role of oral history in the Druze community, relying on *zajal* (especially that of Tali' Hamdan[82]), which had for so long been representative of the Druze narrative on different aspects in their community's history and that of Lebanon (Mount Lebanon included). Hamdan's *zajal* acted as a polemic against the Maronite political establishment and its historiography. Although it did not replace the written texts of the Druze historiography, it offered an intertextuality between written texts and oral history. In Hazran's words, "the use of the *zajal* indicates that the battle for Lebanon's history was not confined to the academic and intellectual elite, but filtered down to many ordinary people". The fact that the *zajal* is written and said in a simple language, which can be understood by everyone, made the reliance on popular poems high. Hamdan's *zajal* highlights a number of important points on the history of the Druzes in Lebanon, and which forms their collective memory and consciousness. For instance, Hamdan's poems stress on the historical right of the Druzes in Mount Lebanon, and the fact that they were the first settlers in this area. In regards to the Maronites, Hamdan's *zajal*, refers to them as refugees whom the Druzes welcomed in their lands (Hazran, 2013: 174-176). In one of Hamdan's poems, these ideas are expressed to counter argue the Maronite historiography that refer to the Maronites as the first settlers of Mount Lebanon:

وقت إللي جلتو على تراب الوطن جولات

[82] Tali' Hamdan is one of the most famous Druze poets who was born in Al Chouf in the village of Ein Enub. In 1964, he started his career as a popular poet. Although his family was a great supporter of the Arslans (the Yazbaki Druze faction), he was a major supporter of Walid Joumblat; especially in the aftermath of the jubilant victory of the Druzes in the Mountain War, which was led by Walid Joumblat (Hazran, 2013:174-175).

When you [the Maronites] came to the homeland, in wave after wave,

وكان التنوخي إجا وكان الأرسلاني

The Tanukh and Arslan were already here,

ولا كانت جبيل ولا كانوا بجونيه وحالات

Jbayl was not founded, nor were they [the Maronites] [settled] in Jounieh and Ḥālāt,

ولا بكسروان إنوجد منهم كسرواني.

And there was not even one Kisrwani in Kisrwan.

الأرض خلقت لنا وقالت في الإثبات

This land was founded for us and [it was] said in a definite way,

يا دروز إلكم أرض لبنان خلقانة

Oh to you, Druze, the land of Lebanon was founded for you.

(Hamdan, as cited in
Hazran, 2013: 176)

This excerpt from Hamdan's *zajal* refers not only to the Druzes as the early settlers in Mount Lebanon, but also to their historical and divine right in the land of Lebanon; referring to Lebanon as the Druze homeland:

ولبنان درزي قبل ما يكون موراني

And Lebanon was the Druze's homeland before it became the Maronites' homeland

(Hamdan, as cited in Hazran, 2013: 177)

In his poems, Hamdan also referred to how the Druzes of Al Chouf had fought for their lands, and had been willing to die for its preservation:

نحنا ما عشنا بهالبلاد مرابعين

We never lived in this country as Murābiʿın

معنا حجج ومسّجلة بدماتنا

We have the deed to the land written in our blood.

انتوا اللي كنتوا لنا خدام بالرزقات

You [the Maronites] were servants in our estates

(Hamdan, as cited in Hazran, 2013: 178)

Hamdan, in the above poem, refers to the historical right of the Druzes in the land of Lebanon, and especially in the Chouf. He also makes much of how the Druze tolerated the Maronites and allowed them to work in their lands. He also stressed on how the socio-economic status of the Druzes was higher than that of the Maronites who were peasants in their lands. The use of the word "servants" reveals the fact that the Druzes continued to be uneasy about the socio-economic changes of the mid-nineteenth century, which altered the situation in Mount Lebanon to be in favor of the Maronites. The memory of the nineteenth century and its sectarian rivalries is apparent in the next extracts from one of Hamdan's popular poems, where he said:

إنظلمنا هون بالشوف وربوعه

Here in the Shuf and its surroundings, we were oppressed,

و من بشيراللي كان خاطي

By Bashır al-Shiha¯bīwho was a sinner

بعهدو للجبل قسم شموعه

During his reign, he divided the mountain's candles (the leader)

هيدا للجنبلاطي رجوُعه وهيدا يزبكي من إحتياطي.

This [title] was given to the Junblātı, and this one was reserved for the Yazbak¯

ولأنو الظلم آخرتو ركوعو

And since the oppressor must submit if oppression is to end

يجي بشير الشهابي اليوم يركع على عتبة بشير الجنبلاطي

Today [the 1980s] Bashır al-Shiha¯bīis coming back to kneel at the doorway of Bashır̄ Junblāt

وما ضل ولا بشير اليوم يشمت على قصر الجنبلاطي وعلى بشيره

And no Bashır remains today to gloat over the Junbla¯ti palace and its [owner] Bashır.

(Hamdan, as cited in Hazran, 2013: 177:185)

The above extract from one of Hamdan's popular poems reveals extremely critical points that acted as a motif for the Druzes in the sectarian rivalries they engaged in against the

Maronites; whether this was the case in 1860 or 1983. It is clear from the above poem that the majority of the Druzes continued to perceive Emir Bachir and his policies as the main reason behind their socio-economic and political decline in Al Chouf. Hamdan referred also to how Emir Bachir's policies negatively influenced the Druze elites, depriving them of their titles and properties, which reveal the important role of the Druze elites in their community; and how their marginalization was central to the community's role in Mount Lebanon. In regards to the last line, it seems that Hamdan said these words in the aftermath of the Druzes' massive triumph in the Mountain War. His words reveal deep satisfaction that the Druzes were able to restore their dignity and their hegemony over the Chouf.

According to Hazran (2013:179), Hamdan's poems were not only cited before the Mountain War; but also, during *Harb Al Jabal* to fuel the Druzes while fighting against the Maronites. The tight-knit structure of the Druze community, their concentration in the mountains of Lebanon, and the scarcity of written texts on their history in Lebanon (which started in the late 1960s, in response to what many Druze intellects saw as the Maronites falsified version of Lebanon's history) made the majority of the Druzes rely on oral history and pass it down to their descendants. [reference? Where does this information come from?]

The discourse of the 1860 political defeat of the Druzes had been passed down from one generation to another; as part of maintaining the community's solidarity and union. According to Badry Abu Diab, a Druze ex- PSP fighter in the Mountain War (and who currently works in the Ministry of the Displaced):

"The rhetoric of Mount Lebanon being, historically, the homeland of the Druzes was passed to us by our parents and grandparents. We used to learn that before 1840, the Druzes used to be the dominant group in the Emirate of Mount Lebanon, which was created by Emir Fakhr al-Din Ma'an. With the rise of the Maronite Emir Bachir Shihab II, the Druzes started to lose their hegemony over the Mountain due to the Emir's sectarian policies. In 1860, our ancestors fought to protect their lands. But, their political defeat marked the end of the Druzes' hegemony over the Mountain. Learning about such wars, in which our ancestors fought in defense of their lands, had been in our sub-conscious; and accordingly, they always created this fear of the other; which had played a role in the Mountain War".[83]

Mrs. Hala Abu Ali, who inhabits a village in the Chouf area that used to be mixed (before the Mountain War) with two-thirds of its population from the Christians and one third from the Druzes, stated that:

[83] Interview with Badry Abu Diab, an ex-Druze PSP fighter during the Mountain War and a member of fighters for peace NGO, in his office in the Ministry of the Displaced in Beirut, August 22nd 2017.

"We used to hear from our parents that Mount Lebanon, long time ago before 1840, used to be divided into two classes: The landlords who were mostly from the Druzes, and the peasants who were mainly from the Christians. By time, and with the increased foreign intervention in the Mountain, the situation started to change in favor of the Christians. Instead of being the dominant group in the Mountain, the Druzes started to feel humiliated and sidelined. Their major humiliation came after they were politically defeated in the 1860 sectarian clashes. Their marginalization continued under Greater Lebanon. I believe that such feelings of marginalization and humiliation continued in the twentieth century, and were evident in how the Druze fought in *Harb Al Jabal*" [84]

Both Abu Diab and Hala's words reveal the significant role of oral history in their community. Although they did not refer to the role of *zajal* in recounting the community's history, they implicitly stressed on how they knew their history via the oral traditions; whose content tends to be very close to the above mentioned popular poems of Tali' Hamdan.

The persistence of those feelings of humiliation and marginalization was stressed upon in an article that was written in the Druze newspaper, *Al Anbaa,* on the 2nd of November, 1983, under the title of "The reality behind the Mountain War". In this article, the Mountain War was described as the culmination of a century of humiliation and marginalization of the Druzes. The massacres and displacement of the Christians in 1983 in *Harb Al Jabal* was referred to as the culmination of the post-1860 oppression. The article referred to how "the continued marginalization and oppression of the Druzes in the twentieth century created the ripe conditions for new cycles of violence to occur in *Harb Al Jabal"* (The reality behind the Mountain War, 1983).

It is critical to note that not all the Druzes believe that the discourse of the 1860 political defeat had been persistently present in the Druze community. For instance, Fadi Nasr Al-Din, an ex-Druze fighter in the Mountain War, and who used to be part of the Lebanese Communist Party militia, did not believe that the discourse of the 1860 events was directly used during the Mountain War. Nevertheless, it was indirectly present. According to Nasr Al-Din:

"The 1860 events had been, indirectly, present during *Harb Al Jabal.* The latter, like any other war, was fueled with the past historical rivalries between the two communities: The Druzes and the Maronites. This was evident in the practices of the Druzes during the war. For instance, the slogan of the Druzes "*Wa inama intasarna"* (and we have won) was used in the Mountain War, as it was used in 1860, following the massacres that were

[84] Interview with Hala Abu Ali, a member of fighter for peace NGO, in Beirut, August 23rd 2017

committed against the Christians, the expulsion of many of them from the Chouf, the destruction of their houses and the occupation of their non-destroyed houses" [85]

Although Nasr Al-Din endeavored to show that the rhetoric of 1860 was not directly deployed during *Harb Al Jabal*, his reference to some words used, such as *wa inama intasarna* has historic connotations; which reveal the presence of old enmities that were expressed during the Mountain War.

Badry Abu Diab also referred to how past historical rivalries (1860) fueled the Mountain War*:*

"There is no doubt that history influences, and sometimes fuels, some present wars. In the case of the Mountain War, it could be said that the 1860 events influenced the fighters during the war. I remember we used to get comments as: You (the Druze fighters) have to protect our lands, they want to expel us as they tried in 1860. Even after the victory of the Druzes in *Harb Al Jabal* and while we were celebrating in Beit al-Din palace in 1984, in the presence of a number of Arab and Lebanese figures, Walid Joumblat said: "*Wa intasarna ya Bachir Joumblat* (and we won, Bachir Joumblat)" [86]

D.2.2: The unity of the Druze political leadership

The second reason behind the Druzes' victory in the Mountain War is the fact that the Druze political leadership was more unified than the Maronite political leadership; and this explains why their deployment of the 1860 rhetoric was more successful. The Druze community was led by the Joumblat family who did not face challenges, during the Mountain War, from the Arslans; the latter did not create any political party or militia during the Lebanese civil war (Harik, 1994: 10). The Druzes were aware of the dangers that the Lebanese civil war, and the Mountain War (in specific), imposed on their status in Lebanon. This explains why they all united under Joumblat's leadership so that they avoid any divisions that could threaten the community's existence (Walid Joumblat as cited in Charbel, 2011: 314-315). It is critical to note that the Druzes' unity had been ensured during times of crises since it had been motivated by the preservation of the community's existence. The latter had been one of the main elements that fostered the community's solidarity and maintained its unity throughout its history. This had also been among the reasons why the Druzes won all the wars they were part of; at least, militarily. This was emphasized by Abu Diab:

"In the old times, the Tanukhids used to fight with the Mamluks in their wars against the Crusaders. Later on, both the Ottomans and the Mamluks started to engage in wars

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[85] Interview with Fadi Nasr Al-Din, an ex-Druze fighter in the Mountain War who fought on the side of the PSP (but, he was originally a member of the Lebanese Communist Party) and he is now a member of fighters for peace NGO, Beirut, August 19th 2017.

[86] Op.cit., 20.

against each other; and both of them asked for the help of the Tanukhids. The latter gathered the Druzes and informed them that they would be divided into two groups: One that supports the Mamluks and another that supports the Ottomans. In all cases, the group that would win should protect the other group. From that time, the Druzes were aware that any divisions among them would weaken them, as a community. Before the Mountain War occurred, the Druzes were divided between the Yazbak and Joumblat families. Nevertheless, when the war happened, Sheikh Al Aql Mohamed Abu Shakra decided that the Druzes should all unite behind Walid Joumblat whom he believed to be more capable of protecting the entire community"[87]

Abu Diab's words show that the Druzes, as any other Lebanese community, had political divisions in their community since their very early history. Nevertheless, what made this community stronger and more cohesive than the others was their unity during the times of crises behind one political leadership, which was usually that of the Joumblat family.

When *Harb Al Jabal* started, the Druzes fighters who were fighting with other political factions (i.e. the Lebanese Communist Party) sidelined their political differences with the PSP; and fought with it against the LF. Mr. Nasr Al-Din explained that:

"After the election of Bachir Gemmayel, the Druzes in my village in Al Chouf (which was a mixed village) started to be persecuted. Although I am secular and communist (as I was part of the Lebanese Communist Party), I am a Druze in the end. The feeling that my community was persecuted was an important factor that contributed to my decision to fight in *Harb Al Jabal*, along with the Progressive Socialist Party. When the Lebanese Forces decided to fill the vacuum of the Israelis on the 3rd of September in 1983, the Druzes started to consider this move as a direct threat to their existence in the Mountain; especially that the Druzes are a minority that had constant historical fears, in regards to their existence"[88]

According to Hala Abou Ali, this unity among the Druze leadership could be attributed to the fact that the question of survival lies at the core of the community's configuration:

"The Druzes had always trusted their leadership as long as it ensured the community's wellbeing and maintained its survival and protection. Even nowadays, although the Druzes know that Walid Joumblat takes a share of 51% of any project that opens in Al Chouf, they still appreciate his leadership because he is able to protect his community and preserve its interests. During *Harb Al Jabal,* the Druzes were able more than the Maronites to preserve their unity due to the lack of divisions among their leaders, which could be attributed to the lack of competition over the posts that they could occupy in the state. The sectarian division of the system in Lebanon made the Maronites eligible to run

[87] Ibid.
[88] Op.cit., 22.

for the post of the president, which magnified the divisions among them. On the other hand, the Druzes could only have a ministerial post or two in the government; something which limited the divisions among the leaders of the community" [89]

Hala's words reveal the fact that many of the Druzes are aware of the narrow political and economic interests of their political leaders, especially Walid Joumblat. Nevertheless, they continue to subdue to his leadership out of the belief that he is the protector of the community. One could also argue that his ability to achieve a massive victory in the Mountain War guaranteed his uncontested leadership of the community.

D.2.3: The Druze community's early history of persecution and its role in fueling *Harb Al Jabal*

The third factor that could explain why the Druzes were able to achieve great victory in the Mountain War was the fact that exactly as the Druzes in 1860 perceived the 1858 peasant revolt as a direct threat to their existence, the same discourse was used when the LF encroached on the Druze heartland. The history of their early persecution, along with the social functionality of some of the tenets of their faith (re-incarnation included), made the Druzes envision their lands as sanctuaries; and not only a marker of socio-economic and political prestige. The preservation of the land had been the main reason why Badry Abu Diab decided to fight in *Harb Al Jabal:*

"I participated only in the Mountain War during the Lebanese civil war. We received military trainings from the Soviet Union from 1980 till 1982. When we returned to Lebanon in 1982, Israel had already invaded the Chouf, and things started to change. For instance, the Christians who were expelled from the Mountain in 1977, following the assassination of the martyr Kamal Joumblat, started to return under the protection of the Israelis. This gave us (the Druze fighters) the impression that this was a move towards the creation of a Maronite homeland whose core is Mount Lebanon, and more specifically, Al Chouf. Thus, we started getting ready to fight for our land, dignity and honor. We were also motivated to fight against our expulsion from our lands. These were the slogans that were persistently used to motivate us to fight. Although I was sixteen years old, and I did not fully understand the political situation, I was encouraged to fight since it is known about the Druzes to be warriors and courageous. Everyone in the Druze community had a role to play to prevent our expulsion from our lands; even, the old men and the young boys had to get armed and prepare for the defense of their land; the women and the young girls were involved in the preparation of meals for the fighters and the provision of medical services for the injured. Everyone was involved out of the belief that we do not have any country to accommodate us in case we got expelled from our lands. We have been raised in our villages on the belief that the Christians had always been backed by

[89] Op.cit., 21.

France, the Sunnis by the Gulf countries and the Shi'ites by Iran. But, in our case, we do not have a country to accommodate us. That is why we strongly hold on to our lands. The land is an essential part of our honor and dignity. Through oral history (*Al Tareekh Al Mankoul)*, we used to know stories about our ancestors who came to defend the coastal cities of modern day Lebanon against the crusaders during the era of Ja'far Al Mansour; and then, they settled in Mount Lebanon. These stories already motivated us to fight for our lands and maintain them. Till our modern days, if a Druze is living in Europe or America, and returned back to his village and found that his brother violated his right to his land, he would engage in a fight with him" [90]

Mrs. Abou Ali also highlighted the importance of the Druze faith in making the Druze always willing to die for their land and community:

"The belief in reincarnation had always been in the favor of the Druzes. The latter know that when they die, their soul will be re-incarnated in other bodies. This belief in re-incarnation had always motivated the Druzes to fight for their lands; whether in the past (1860) or in the Mountain War. The Druzes do not fear death. Also, the fact that the Druze faith is a non-missionary faith, which is not open to non-Druzes to join, made the Druzes eager to preserve their community, and protect it. The Druzes believe that once the *da'wa* was closed in the eleventh century, the Druzes as a community received special protection from God himself. These factors had played a major role in making the community preserve its unity and solidarity in times of crises" [91]

Hala and Abu Diab's words reveal the interlink between both the social value of the land and the tenets of the Druze faith (i.e. re-incarnation). The feeling of being threatened to be expelled shows the prevalence of relations of mistrust with the Maronites who were living with the Druzes in the same villages, in some cases.

Tarek Mla'eb, a Druze ex-PSP fighter in the Mountain War from Baisour village, highlighted how the loss of one's land is looked upon with shame and disgrace in the Druze community:

"It is well known that the Druzes do not initiate any attacks on the others; but, it is also known in the Druze community that it is shameful not to retaliate if you get attacked. This is especially the case with the attack on the lands of the Druzes, which are part of their honor and dignity. If you attacked the lands of the Druze, this is perceived as an attack on his honor" [92]

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[90] Op.cit., 20.
[91] Op.cit., 21.
[92] Interview with Tarek Mla'eb, an ex-Druze PSP fighter in the Mountain War and an member of fighters for peace NGO, in Baisour village in the Chouf mountains, August 26th 2017.

When my interview ended with Mr. Mla'eb, he took me to attend a religious gathering in his village, Baisour, which was held in commemoration of the martyrs who died to protect their families, their lands and the Druze community in Baisour during the Mountain War. This gathering was attended by a number of Druze men, from different age ranges, many of them PSP members, and a number of *uqqals*. The latter were speaking of how the martyrs died in defense of their and their community's honor and dignity, putting emphasis on how the value of the land was equal to that of one's honor and dignity.

D.2.4: The effective role of the Druze religious leadership in *Harb Al Jabal*

The critical role that the Druze religious leadership played in the Mountain War is another factor that contributed to their jubilant triumph in the Mountain War. The Druze Sheikh Al Aql, Mohamed Abu Shakra, had a highly active role during the Mountain War. In an interview with Sheikh Abu Shakra in 1983, he was asked about his opinion on the desire of the Lebanese Army to be present in Mount Lebanon, and more specifically, in the Chouf region. He replied by saying that if that would happen, the Lebanese army should be present instead of the Lebanese Forces; in the sense that the army should fill the sites that were occupied by the Lebanese Forces. Sheikh Mohamed Abu Shakra added that the majority of the soldiers in the Lebanese army who should replace the Lebanese Forces should be from the Druze community so as to ensure that the inhabitants of the Mountain would feel safe. Abu Shakra stated that on the basis that the majority of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon were Druzes. When he was asked about whether *Harb Al Jabal* was considered a sectarian conflict or not, he answered by saying that both the Phalangists and the Lebanese Forces had their own sectarian interests in Mount Lebanon, which tended to threaten the Druzes' existence and the survival of their community. This, accordingly, made the Druzes eager to die while defending their "dignity, honor, and existence" because they had never accepted to live in misery or under anyone's mercy (Sheikh Mohamed Abu Shakra: We will not accept the Lebanese Army's entrance to Al Chouf before reconciliation, 1983).

It is interesting how Sheikh Mohamed Abu Shakra envisioned Mount Lebanon as having a majority of Druze inhabitants. It is not clear whether Abu Shakra was referring to the demographic composition of the Mountain before or during the Mountain War. Although he did not directly answer the question whether *Harb Al Jabal* was a sectarian conflict or not, his previous answer on the demographic composition of the Mountain (which he perceived to be in favor of the Druzes) and the necessity of having the majority of the soldiers of the Lebanese army in the Chouf as Druzes clearly reflect the sectarian nature of the war. What is even more interesting is how Sheikh Abu Shakra, who was the Sheikh Al Aql of the Druze community during the Mountain War, depicted the Lebanese Forces decision to fill the vacuum of the Israelis as a direct assault on the Druzes and a menace to their existence and survival. This had been the same discourse that was used by the

uqqal during the 1860 sectarian rivalries in Mount Lebanon. The use of the words "dignity, honor and existence" also reveal how these issues had always been central to the community's survival, and a cornerstone in ensuring that the community is always unified. It is also interesting how those words had been persistently associated with times when the lands of the Druze community were under threat (whether in 1840, 1860 and 1983).

The strong relation between the Druze religious and political leaderships was also referred to by Mr. Nasr Al-Din:

"The strong relation between the political and religious leaderships made the latter support the former not only via their statements, but also through the mobilization of the youths by turning the struggle into a religious duty. For instance, during *Harb Al Jabal*, some groups were given religious names such as Fassa'il Abu Ibrahim (who is a Druze saint), as an attempt to turn *Harb Al Jabal* into a religious duty. The belief in re-incarnation was also extremely important in the mobilization of the Druzes during the war. The Druzes used to attack some villages in a barbaric manner, in a way that used to be entirely unexpected, under the guise of liberating those villages from the Lebanese Forces or for the occupation of such villages. In either cases, the belief in re-incarnation was among the main reasons why the Druzes did not fear death; and why they were willing to die for their land"[93]

The above factors refer to how the 1860 political discourse was evident and present in *Harb Al Jabal* in a direct way in some cases, and in other cases, it was present indirectly in the practices of the community during the War. Exactly as in 1860 when the Druzes were unified, concerned with the preservation of their lands and had their religious leadership active in the war, the same approach was adopted during the Mountain War. In some cases, the 1860 political defeat discourse was publicly used and in other cases, it was in the subconscious of the Druzes while they were fighting the Mountain War. These factors explain why the discourse and practices of the 1860 sectarian clashes were more effective among the Druzes masses more than the Maronites.

E. The ramifications of the Mountain War: How did Walid Joumblat translate the military victory into political gains?

Walid Joumblat's main target from the Mountain War was not limited to achieving a military victory. Nevertheless, he wanted to achieve a political victory over his Maronite adversaries. This political victory already started during the Mountain War with the re-configuration of the territories in Mount Lebanon, via the displacement and expulsion of the Christian population from the Chouf; in an attempt to reflect new power realities and

[93] Op.cit., 22.

dynamics. The eviction of the Christians from the Chouf meant that Al Chouf was entirely subdued to the Druze control. Exactly as in 1860, the same dynamics of "massacres, displacement and expulsion" of the Christian population were used during the Mountain War. Many Druzes perceived *al qatl* (the murder) of the Christians as a "tragic, yet necessary" act that had been, inevitably, used to restore their lost status and defend their homeland. As in 1860, this same logic was used in the Mountain War under the rationale of "*ya qatil ya maqtool"* (De Clerck, n.d.: 14).

During the Mountain War, the Christian population was massively displaced. It is assumed that 160,000 Christians from Aley and Chouf regions alone were expelled. By the end of the war, the Christians constituted only 1% of the demographic composition of Al Chouf region. This is besides the destruction of their houses, monasteries and churches; along with many cemeteries, fields and orchards that were also demolished. After the expulsion of many Christians from their villages was the infliction of further violence on their properties (Kanafani-Zahar, 2012: 46). Inflicting more violence and destruction on the religious emblems and properties of the Christians after their expulsion from the Mountain could be understood in the light of the desire to express a massive military and political victory, in regards to the intensity of damage that was inflicted upon the other. The second explanation for this could be understood in the light of making sure that the Christians would not return again. According to Hinson (2017: 7), localized communal violence tends to embark on the phenomenon of the "erasure" of the other. In the case of the Mountain War, the Druzes succeeded not only to expel the other (who were the Christians) from their homes, but to cleanse the Mountain from their traces. This explains why religious emblems were also attacked, burnt and then, destroyed.

The second political victory that Walid Joumblat and the Druzes accomplished, following the end of the Mountain War, was their war over "memory" and "history". This was evident via a number of situations. For instance, following the end of the Mountain War, Walid Joumblat celebrated the victory of the PSP in the historic castle of Bayt al-Din, which was built by Emir Bachir II. Walid Joumblat gave the castle a new name, which was "The People's Palace". This was perceived as an attempt to liberate this historic place from its Maronite political context. Additionally, the Lebanese flag was removed and the five-colored Druze flag was placed instead of it (Harik, 1993: 59-60). This was not the only incident, through which Walid Joumblat wanted to display his political victory. In 1986, all the schools in the Chouf were subject to the supervision of the PSP. Only history and civic books, which were written by Druze scholars and historians, were commissioned (Harik, 1993: 49). Lastly, the greatest political victory that Walid Joumblat achieved after *Harb Al Jabal* was giving the May 17 agreement a death blow, along with failing the Maronites from creating what he named "the Phalangist state". In De Clerck's words, "the political revenge of 1860 was taken" (De Clerck, 2014: 187).

The above examination reveals how Walid Joumblat managed to foster his leadership over the entire Druze community, becoming its sole protector. Although the above political victories were carried out in the name of the entire community, one could argue that Joumblat was able to achieve narrow personal and familial interests as well (Abu Khalil, 1985: 31-33).

Conclusion

This chapter examined the Mountain War, in which the Druzes and the Maronites fought against each other in Al Chouf region in Mount Lebanon in 1983. This was not the first time that both communities engaged in sectarian clashes in the same geographical entity. Both of them fought fiercely in 1860. The leaderships of both communities tried to depict the renewal of their sectarian clashes in 1983 as a historical continuity for the 1860 rivalries. Although the Mountain War had its international, regional and local contexts, they could not fully explain why the war happened. *Harb Al Jabal* was fueled by historical fears and aspirations to reverse historical political defeat.

While the political leadership of both communities used the discourse of the 1860 rivalries to amass support from their masses and mobilize them against the other community, the Druze political leadership, resembled in Walid Joumblat, was more powerful in mobilizing the Druze masses. This is because of a number of factors: First, the discourse of the 1860 events was not only used among the Druzes during the Mountain War, but it was part of their collective consciousness for a very long time. To further elaborate on that, examples from the Druze poet Tali's Hamdan's *Zajal* was used to show how his popular poems affected the Druzes' awareness of their history, and their collective consciousness. The discourse of the 1860 events was passed down from one generation to another. This chapter also used a number of interviews of both Maronites and Druzes to show the difference between both of them, in regards to the presence of a collective memory of such events. Although the Maronite interviewees expressed their awareness of the 1860 events, they did not associate the Mountain War with the 1860 massacres. In the case of the Druze intervieews, many of them referred to how their grandparents and parents used to inform them of the 1860 events and the historical right of the Druzes in the Chouf. Another factor that enabled the Druzes to win the Mountain War was the unity among their political elites, who were united during the war, under the leadership of Walid Joumblat. The third element that enabled the Druzes to achieve a massive victory in *Harb Al Jabal* was how they perceived the land as equal to their honor and dignity; an attack on their land was equal to an attack on their honor. Re-incarnation, as a basic religious tenet in the Druze faith, is an important element that made the Druzes willing to die for their land. Finally, the role of the religious leadership in the Mountain War was essential to mobilize the masses behind their leaders, depicting the struggle as a religious one. It is important to highlight that dynamics of the Mountain War, from the

massacres of the Christians, their displacement and the destruction of their villages, can help us draw symbiosis with the 1860 massacres' dynamics. Following the end of the Mountain War, the demographic composition of the Chouf changed in favor of the Druzes. The latter, under the leadership of Walid Joumblat, were able to translate their military victory into a political one; by imposing their hegemony over the Chouf.

Concluding chapter

This study aimed at understanding how the specific history of the Druze-Maronite inter-sectarian relations in the mid-nineteenth century, with a specific focus on their sectarian rivalries, could help in the understanding of the context, dynamics and mechanisms that the political leaderships of both communities employed in the Mountain War in the twentieth century. Most of the secondary literature on *Harb Al Jabal* tends to overlook this dimension of the Mountain War, confining it to two main approaches that either situate it in the realm of the Lebanese civil war or reduce it to a mere sectarian clash that is akin to the myriad sectarian confrontations that had plagued Mount Lebanon since its very existence. The first approach tends to understand *Harb Al Jabal* in the realm of the context of the Lebanese civil war, in which the different Lebanese communities clashed as a result of the interplay of a number of local, regional and international factors. This approach does not, accordingly, attribute any historical specificity to the Maronite-Druze inter-sectarian clash in 1983. While the Mountain War had its local, regional and international contexts that were part of the bigger scene of the Lebanese civil war and that paved the way for the war to occur, *Harb Al Jabal* could not be solely confined to such an explanation. The second approach depicts the Mountain War as one of the endless sectarian confrontations between the Druzes and the Maronites, and which could be explained in the light of the prevalence of sectarianism, primordialism and tribalism over modernity and secularism in Lebanon. This approach uses the Druze-Maronite inter-sectarian rivalries in the nineteenth century as an evidence to the presence of engrained historical hatred between both communities. This approach is problematic not only because of its orientalist perspective, but also because of its depiction of such sectarian rivalries as being ahistorical and apolitical; overlooking the socio-economic and political changes that swept Mount Lebanon in the nineteenth century and their impact on the *Iqtaa'* system, upon which Mount Lebanon's socio-economic and political organization was premised. Given such interpretations of the reasons and dynamics of the Mountain War, this thesis attempted to unpack sectarianism in Mount Lebanon and understand the underlying socio-economic and political causes for the outburst of sectarian confrontations between the Maronites and the Druzes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Understanding the politics of Mount Lebanon is quite pertinent to the understanding of the later developments that took place in Greater Lebanon. Given that, the thesis started with the understanding of the process of the establishment of the Emirate of Mount Lebanon under the auspices of the Druze Emir Fakhr al Din Ma'an in the sixteenth century. Although it is quite debatable who inhabited Mount Lebanon first, the Druzes or the Maronites, it is relatively agreeable that the socio-economic and political organization

of the Mountain rested on the system of *Iqtaa'* that linked the primarily-Druze landlord class to the primarily-Maronite peasantry. This does not negate the fact that there were Druze peasants and Maronite landlords. However, this statement endeavors to show that Mount Lebanon was primarily and originally premised on a social division of labor that attributed the Mountain's protection to the Druzes while the different socio-economic activities were carried out by the Christians (in general) and the Maronites (in particular). The rise of some Maronite *muqata'ji* families to power was even through Emir Fakhr al Din; who upon his expansion and annexation of the northern area of Mount Lebanon, which was mainly inhabited by Maronites, to the southern area (Al Chouf) that was majorly inhabited by the Druzes, he provided some families with the title of *muqata'ji* to engage them in the collection of taxes.

Throughout the history of Mount Lebanon up until the mid-nineteenth century, sectarian violence had not erupted between the different sectarian inhabitants of the Mountain. This is because sectarian affiliations were not the marker of identity. On the other hand, class-based affiliations were important in delineating the differences between the landlords and the commoners. The former controlled the latter via the system of *Iqtaa'*, which provided the landlords with a number of rights and duties. The former encompassed the right to collect taxes and own some plots of lands. In regards to their duties, they had to maintain order and stability in the Mountain and prevent any rebellions that could threaten Mount Lebanon's autonomous status vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire. This explains why the Druze and Maronite landlords collaborated at many instances to block any possibility of reforms by the peasants (who happened to be Maronites). Although the system of *Iqtaa'* enabled the landlords to control their peasants to a large extent via a number of socio-economic arrangements, and the support of the religious leaders (with a special focus on the Maronite and Druze religious leaders), it was not immune from the socio-economic and political changes that swept the Mountain by the end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. By the end of the eighteenth century, a number of reform-minded clergy, who received their education in the Maronite academy in Rome, started to challenge the subjugation of the Maronite church to the landlords in Mount Lebanon. This coincided with the increasing exploitation of the peasants in Mount Lebanon. This, accordingly, resulted in the outburst of the 1820 Maronite peasants revolt, which was instigated and led by a number of reform-minded clergy. Despite the fact that such revolts occurred in Kisrawan, the northern part of Mount Lebanon, they were an expression of dissent against the entire system of *Iqtaa'* and all the socio-economic injustices that it entailed. Although the revolts failed to bring down the *Iqtaa'* system in Mount Lebanon, they managed to highlight the emergence of a new form of consciousness that is premised on "*al-Salih al-umumi".* Nevertheless, the involvement of some of the clerics of the Maronite church in the revolts gave it a confessional nature, as well; which could partially explain why the Druze peasants did not participate in such rebellion.

The 1820 revolts were also an expression of how the different groups in Mount Lebanon internalized the socio-economic and political changes that were introduced to the Mountain, starting from the beginning of the nineteenth century with the rise of Emir Bachir Shihab to power. The latter's policy aspired to limit the powers of the landlords, which were associated with the *Iqtaa' system*, via a number of policies that pitted them against each other. It is interesting how the official Druze narrative envisions Emir Bachir's policies as sectarian ones that targeted the Druze landlords without taking into account that the majority of the landlords, at that time, were from the Druze community; and thus, they were the ones who were majorly affected by such policies. With the Egyptian occupation of Mount Lebanon in 1831, the Druze community was further targeted via the policies of Ibrahim Pasha, which imposed army conscription on them. The Maronites were exempted from this policy as they were protected by the European presence in Mount Lebanon. This rendered the Druzes solely vulnerable to conscription. In 1838, the Druzes revolted against the forced conscription. As a result, Ibrahim Pasha and Emir Bachir II armed a number of Maronite peasants and promised them to keep their arms and get plots of lands if they defeated the Druze landlords and peasants. The result was that the Druzes were defeated, many of them exiled to Hawran and some of them were executed, including their leader Bachir Joumblat. Moreover, the lands and properties of the exiled Druzes were transferred to the ownership of the Maronite peasants. With the end of the rule of Emir Bachir II and the return of many of the exiled Druzes, Mount Lebanon had witnessed more changes that include: The demographic increase of the Maronites and which was accompanied by demographic expansion in the Southern area of Mount Lebanon. This is besides the improvement in the socio-economic status of many Maronites who received Western education, with the increased presence of the European missionaries. This turned many of the Maronite peasants into merchants, middlemen, and money lenders to their previous Druze landlords. All those socio-economic changes were accompanied with the Ottoman Empire's introduction of the Tanzimat reforms in 1838/1839, and which included the equality between all the citizens in the Empire; along with the increased European presence in the Mountain as it relied on the silk production that was mostly reliant on the Maronite economic activities. All those socio-economic and political changes challenged the *Iqtaa'* system in Mount Lebanon, rendering it feeble and vulnerable to collapse. Thus, one could argue that, given such changes, the 1841 and 1860 sectarian rivalries, that started as (Maronite) peasants' revolts in 1840 and 1858 respectively, were expressions of the Druze landlords' dissent and reluctance to surrender to the new socio-economic and political reality that was gradually replacing the system of *Iqtaa'*.

Despite the fact that the thesis attempted to provide a more holistic approach towards the nineteenth century developments to be able to unpack the 1841 and 1860 sectarian rivalries, it highlighted the Druze official narrative of such events; and showed how the Druze landlords and religious leaders depicted the 1840 and 1858 (Maronite) peasants'

revolts as an attack on the Druze community's existence and survival in Mount Lebanon. It is important to keep into consideration this official Druze narrative to be able to understand how the Druze political elites used such discourses to fuel their masses to fight in the nineteenth century; and how such narratives were used in shaping the community's collective memory of the nineteenth century developments. Although the thesis highlighted the fact that this narrative is presented by Druze scholars who come from *muqata'ji* families and that the Druze peasants' must have had their own fears from the rise of the Maronite community, coinciding with the fears of their Druze landlords, the thesis was not able to find sources on why the Druze peasants did not participate in any of the 1820, 1840 and 1858 peasants' revolts; and chose instead to side with their landlords. It is, thus, critical to highlight the absence, or better the inability of the researcher of this thesis, to find sources that discuss the individualistic perceptions of the (non-elite) Druzes of both the mid-nineteenth and twentieth centuries sectarian rivalries; which is an under-researched area.

Using the concept of collective memory, the thesis attempted to understand why the 1860 sectarian events were deployed in the Mountain War by the political leaderships of both communities. In order to understand how the Druze political leadership managed to make an uninterrupted link between the 1860 events and the Mountain War, the thesis examined in chapter two how the Druze political leadership, resembled in Kamal Joumblat, attributed the Druze community's socio-economic and political marginalization in the twentieth century to their political defeat in 1860. Kamal Joumblat stressed on this interpretation via a number of writings and statements up until his assassination in 1977. He also tried to manipulate the different political crises that occurred in Greater Lebanon to overthrow confessionalism, which reduced the role of the Druzes in Lebanon to that of a minority. Although Kamal Joumblat featured his struggle against the Maronite-dominated political establishment in the name of progress, revolution and secularism, his writings and statements revealed the presence of narrow sectarian and familial agendas. Some authors argue that it was through empowering his community that he could re-establish his family's traditional role and authority in the Druze community. Kamal Joumblat's assassination in 1977 ended his struggle against confessionalism and the Maronite-dominated political establishment. Chapter two aspired not only to show how Kamal Joumblat dealt with the new political entity of Greater Lebanon, moving from accommodation to confrontation, but also he depicted his struggle to be against a Maronite agenda that is premised on sectarianism and exclusion, dating back to the nineteenth century. Such rhetoric was largely internalized among most of the members of the Druze community via the tradition of oral history, which the community largely replied upon, given the lack of written Druze texts on Lebanon's history (from the Druze perspective) up until the 1980s; with the exception of the writings of Kamal Joumblat in the 1960s.

In chapter three, the thesis discussed the Mountain War that took place in 1983. Although there were a number of local, regional and international developments that paved the way for the Mountain War to occur, it was the decision of the Lebanese Forces to occupy the vacuum that was left by the Israelis on the 3rd of September 1983 that marked the beginning of *Harb Al Jabal.* The chapter examined the statements of both Samir Geagea and Walid Joumblat on the Mountain War to reveal how the 1860 discourse played a central role in fueling the masses of both communities to fight. However, the deployment of this discourse by the Druze political leadership was more effective in mobilizing the Druze masses than it was among the Maronites. The chapter discussed a number of reasons that include: The unity of the Druze political elites in the times of crises, the role of the Druze religious leadership in depicting the struggle as a religious duty and the social functionality of some of the tenets of the Druze faith, such as re-incarnation. This is besides their community's early history of persecution, and which turned the issue of the community's existence into a central matter for the entire community. The discussion of such factors revealed the difference between the Druze and Maronite community's articulation of their collective memory of 1860. While the former internalized this collective memory and used it to deploy a narrative of historical continuity between the political defeat of the Druzes in 1860 and their marginalization in the twentieth century; the Maronite political leadership mostly dwelled on the 1860 events in times of crises as in the 1960s (with the rise of Arab nationalism in Lebanon) and in the Mountain War. As for the Maronite masses, and based on the limited interviews that I conducted, the 1860 events signified a human loss that their community examined in the nineteenth century. As for the Druze collective memory of the 1860 events, this could be explained in the light of the interplay between collective memory and the sense of trauma that is not only limited to massacres, but also socio-economic and political losses (i.e. loss of land); and which could continue to shape some people's present experiences.

With the military and political victory of the Druzes in the Mountain War, following the expulsion of thousands of Christians from Al Chouf and the destruction of their houses and the confiscation of their lands and properties, the Druzes were able to impose a new political reality in Al Chouf. Moreover, the Druze political leadership managed to change the demographic composition of the Mountain, reflecting new political realities and power dynamics. But, most importantly, the Druze jubilant military and political victory enabled Walid Joumblat to re-establish himself as the protector of the Druze community.

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